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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE ASSOCIATION OF REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT WITH: ENTERPRISE 
RESOURCE PLANNING SYSTEMS, AUDIT EFFORT, AND FUTURE FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE  
by 
Angel Arturo Pacheco Paredes 
Florida International University, 2016 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Clark Wheatley, Major Professor 
Emerging research on real earnings management [REM] has expressed the 
concern that firms deviating from normal business practices may endure a negative 
impact on future cash flows and performance. This dissertation (in three essays) 
investigates the phenomenon of real earnings management in its association with: 1) 
enterprise resource planning systems [ERPs]; 2) audit report lags [ARLs]; and 3) future 
firm performance. In the first investigation I hypothesize that the increased monitoring 
associated with the implementation of an ERP will result in a decline in REM. In the 
second investigation I hypothesize that higher levels of REM will evoke greater auditor 
scrutiny and be associated with longer ARLs. In the third investigation I hypothesize that 
managerial actions that would ordinarily be classified as REM: reductions in 
discretionary expenditures or overproduction, are not REM but indicative of enhanced 
efficiencies when found in concert with prior period restructurings or expected future 
sales growth respectively. In each of the three investigations, my hypotheses are 
confirmed.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation examines the extent to which real earnings management [REM] 
is associated with the adoption of enterprise resource planning systems [ERPs], audit 
report lags, and future performance. According to Healy and Wahlen (1999) earnings 
management can be classified into two categories: accruals management and real 
earnings management. The former involves generally accepted accounting principles 
[GAAP], and occurs when managers manage reported earnings by using the accounting 
discretion allowed under GAAP. The latter occurs when managers take actions that 
change the timing or structure of actual business activities. Real earnings management 
has received considerable attention since Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) reported 
that 80% of the U.S. executives they surveyed, were willing to reduce R&D, advertising, 
and maintenance in order to meet earnings benchmarks. Their finding is significant in 
that it suggests that managers are willing to sacrifice future performance in order to meet 
current period financial reporting targets. Furthermore, Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008) 
demonstrate, that after passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SOX], firms shifted from 
earnings management through accruals manipulation, to earnings management through 
REM. After the passage of SOX, earnings management through accruals became more 
likely to draw scrutiny from auditors and regulators (Cohen et al. 2008), and, as shown by 
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005), in a rational expectations equilibrium model, regulations 
that are intended to improve earnings quality can actually lead to a substitution effect 
between accruals management and REM. 
The importance of studying this phenomenon derives from the generally held 
belief that REM negatively affects the future performance of firms engaged in these 
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practices (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Roychowdhury 2006; Badertscher 2011). 
Roychowdhury (2006) conjectures that real activities manipulations can diminish firm 
value, since these practices have a negative effect on the future cash flows. In addition, 
Kim and Sohn (2013) show that REM is costly because the capital markets detect the 
adverse future consequences of REM which in turn leads to an increase in the cost of 
capital 
In order to more fully understand the impact of this phenomenon, I investigate in 
this dissertation whether REM (similar to accruals management) is constrained by ERP 
implementation (Morris and Laksmana 2010), whether REM has an impact on audit 
effort (Caramanis and Lennox 2008; Lee & Son 2009), and whether REM actually does 
have a negative impact on future firm performance (Graham, et al. 2005). This 
dissertation consists of three interrelated essays addressing the topics outlined above. The 
essays are: 1) Real Earnings Management and Enterprise Resource Planning Systems; 2) 
Real Earnings Management and Audit Report Lag; and, 3) Real Earnings Management 
and Future Performance.   
Firms implement enterprise resource planning systems to obtain five primary 
benefits: business process automation; improvement in supply chain efficiency; 
elimination of redundancies; cost reductions; and timely access to management 
information (Rizzi and Zamboni 1999; Latamore 2000; Yusuf, Gunasekaran and 
Abthorpe 2004). An ERP system is modular business software that integrates all aspects 
of a company’s manufacturing, sales and marketing, purchasing and distribution, project 
management, human resources and other systems so as to enable an enterprise to 
efficiently and effectively manage its resources. They are designed as an integrated set of 
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modules that address a wide range of basic corporate functions (Robey, Ross and 
Boudreau 2002). Building on this, an extensive literature has examined the beneficial 
impact of ERPs on firm performance (Poston and Grabski 2001; Hitt, Wu and Zhou 
2002; Hunton, Lipincott and Reck 2003; Nicolaou 2004; Chapman and Kihn 2009). Prior 
studies have also examined how ERP system implementations have impacted the quality 
of financial information (Brazel and Dang 2008; Morris and Laksmana 2010; Dorantes, 
Li, Peters and Richardson 2013; Kim, Nicolaou and Vasarhelyi 2013). Few studies have, 
however, addressed the question of whether the increase in managers’ access to 
accounting data differentially influences managerial behavior and, those that have, 
employ predominately pre Sarbanes-Oxley Act implementation data and or include ERP 
sub-elements in the analysis. In my first essay, I investigate the association of ERP 
implementation (post SOX) with managers’ ability to deviate from normal operating 
practices to present better financial results. In essence, I investigate whether ERP 
implementations enhance the quality of financial reporting by constraining real earnings 
management.  
Using a sample of 109 firms that disclosed in 10-K SEC filings that they 
implemented an ERP between 2002 and 2013, I find a significant negative association 
between REM and ERP implementation. These results hold even in comparison to a 
control group of firms that had not implemented ERPs. These findings show a decrease 
post implementation REM both in my tests solely on implementers and in my tests where 
implementers where compared to the control group. This suggests that the real time 
reporting capabilities of ERPs (information access) do not facilitate real earnings 
management. Rather, ERPs appear to moderate earnings management though REM. 
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There is, again, extensive literature examining the impact of accruals management 
on auditor effort and audit quality (Caramanis and Lennox 2008; Blankley, Hurtt and 
MacGregor 2014; Lobo and Zhao 2013; Schelleman and Knechel 2010). Prior research 
shows that higher quality auditors constrain earnings management via accruals 
manipulation. Thus an unintended consequence of higher quality auditors is that firms 
with incentives to manage earnings engage in higher levels of REM (Chi, Lisic and 
Pevzner 2011). Furthermore, as noted by Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) REM increases 
with regulatory scrutiny and/or auditor monitoring. The substitution effect from accruals 
management to REM may affect auditors’ client-relations decisions, since auditors are 
concerned about clients that engage in abnormal operating practices. For example, Kim 
and Park (2014) show that REM is associated with a higher likelihood of auditor 
resignation.  
PCAOB AU Section 329A Substantive Analytical Procedures calls on auditors to 
consider unexplained differences that may indicate an increased risk of material 
misstatement. O’Keefe, Simunic and Stein (1994) find that increases in risk exacerbates 
the scope of the audit plan, resulting in more audit hours being assigned. Thus the 
presence of abnormal differences that result from REM may increase audit risk and 
require more audit work to be performed 
Similar to the ERP literature noted above, there exists little in the way of 
examinations of the association of audit quality and auditor effort with REM. 
Commerford, Hermanson, Houston and Peters (2014) note, however, that anecdotal 
evidence indicates detection of REM leads auditors to look more closely at a firms 
accruals. In my second essay I empirically test this conjecture by examining whether 
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auditors identify REM that is coincident with firms meeting or beating earnings 
benchmarks such that REM is associated with greater audit effort as measured through 
audit report lags.  
Using U.S. firm data from 2004 to 2014, I find a positive association between 
REM and audit report lags. I performed my analysis using Roychowdhury’s (2006) 
measures of REM (abnormal operating cash flows, abnormal discretionary expenses and 
abnormal production) and the time between the fiscal year end and the date of the audit 
report. In addition, I focus on firm-years where firms’ just meet/beat zero earnings and or 
the previous year’s earnings, and on accelerated versus non-accelerated filers. My results 
suggest that after controlling for other factors, auditors perceived firms that engage in real 
earnings management activities as being more risky – a situation that requires additional 
audit effort.  
Prior studies generally posit that REM is likely to reduce shareholder wealth, 
since it impacts business operations and long-term firm value. The general speculation 
regarding REM is that it has a negative impact on future performance (e.g., 
Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Zang 2012, Kim and Sohn 2013; and 
Kim and Park 2014). Gunny (2010) finds, however, that firms that just meet earnings 
benchmarks by engaging in R&D or SG&A REM have significantly higher subsequent 
industry-adjusted ROA than firms that do not. She suggests that REM may thus be a 
mechanism firms use to signal future performance to the capital markets. Given this 
result Zhao, Chen, Zhang and Davis (2012) find that when firms fail to meet benchmark 
targets, REM is negatively associated with future performance, while REM coincident 
with meeting benchmarks is positively associated with future performance. Based on 
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these results, I hypothesize that REM is not always “earnings management” in a negative 
sense. What may be thought of as REM, could be “just business.” In my third essay I 
investigate the circumstances (restructurings and expected future sales increases) that 
may differentiate between these, and their impact on future operating performance.  
Using Roychowdhury’s (2006) models and a sample of firms for the years 1998 
through 2014, I find that when I control for restructurings, reductions in discretionary 
expenses that would ordinarly be indicative of REM are instead associated with improved 
future ROA and secutity returns. I further find that when I control for future sales growth, 
overproduction is also associated with improved ROS as it is with future increases in cost 
of goods sold. Together, these results may explain the contradictory results presented in 
prior research with respect to the imapct of REM on future performance – that is, some of 
what has been identified as REM in prior studies may, in fact, be “just business.” 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II discusses 
REM and ERPs. Chapter III presents an analysis of REM and audit report lags, and 
Chapter IV identifies circumstances where what would otherwise be identified as REM is 
positively associated with future firm performance.  
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II. ESSAY 1: REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND ENTERPRISE 
RESOURCE PLANNING SYSTEMS 
Motivation 
An extensive literature has examined the beneficial impact of enterprise resource 
planning systems [ERP] on firm performance. Prior studies have also examined how ERP 
system implementations have impacted the timeliness of financial information. Few 
studies have, however, addressed the question of whether the increase in managers’ 
access to accounting data differentially influences managerial behavior. I investigate the 
association of ERP implementation with managers’ ability to deviate from normal 
operating practices to present better financial results. My findings suggest that after the 
implementation of an ERP, earnings management through real activities declines. These 
results uniquely indicate that ERP implementations enhance the quality of financial 
reporting by constraining opportunistic managerial behavior. 
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of information technology on 
earnings management through accruals and through real activities [REM]. Specifically I 
examine the association of enterprise resource planning systems, and earnings 
management subsequent to the implementation of those systems. SFAC 2 (FASB 1980, 
2) tells us that “timeliness, that is, having information available to decision makers before 
it loses its capacity to influence decisions, is an ancillary aspect of relevance” and that if 
information is “made available more quickly without making it materially unreliable… 
its overall usefulness may be enhanced” (para 57). While access to timely information 
would generally be considered a good thing, an enhanced decision-making environment 
may also encourage or even facilitate earnings management. On the other hand the 
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enhanced monitoring that is possible with ERPs may impede opportunistic behavior by 
managers. Since earnings management has received so much attention from legislators, 
regulators and practitioners in recent years, I believe the impact of ERPs on managerial 
opportunism is a subject worthy of examination. 
Firms implement enterprise resource planning systems [ERPs] to obtain five 
primary benefits: business process automation; improvement in supply chain efficiency; 
elimination of redundancies; cost reductions; and timely access to management 
information (Rizzi and Zamboni 1999; Latamore 2000; Yusuf, Gunasekaran and 
Abthorpe 2004; Kim, Nicolaou and Vasarhelyi 2013). Building on this, an extensive 
literature has examined the beneficial impact of ERPs on firm performance (Poston and 
Grabski 2001; Hitt, Wu and Zhou 2002; Hunton, Lippincott and Reck 2003; Nicolaou 
2004; Chapman an Kihn 2009). Prior studies have also examined how ERP system 
implementations have impacted the quality of financial information (Brazel and Dang 
2008; Morris and Laksmana 2010; Dorantes, Li, Peters and Richardson 2013). I extend 
this stream of research by, addressing the question of whether more timely access to 
accounting data differentially influences managerial behavior.  
Following the suggestion of Masli, Richardson, Sanchez and Smith (2011), that 
researchers “examine the link between IT investment and accounting and related 
financial processes” (p. 109) as well as the link between IT investment and business 
strategy, and assuming that the information managers are able to glean from an ERP 
system is, in fact more timely, I examine the association of access to timely information 
with earnings management through real activities as well as accruals. I chose to examine 
the association of ERP implementation with a broad spectrum of earnings management 
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for four reasons. First, prior research regarding ERPs and earnings management has 
focused solely on accruals manipulation. Although this form of earnings management 
may be less costly to firms,1 it is also true that it may have been largely abandoned in 
favor of costly real activities management in the post Sarbanes-Oxley Act environment 
(Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2008). Second, the conflicting results of prior research means the 
question of whether an enhanced information environment is conducive to more or less 
earnings management is still unanswered (Brazel and Dang 2008; Morris and Laksmana 
2010; Dorantes, et al. 2013). Third, the prior research noted above, has primarily sampled 
ERP implementations at large firms that are more likely to have had sophisticated 
internal control systems prior to their ERP implementations. My sample is representative 
of the medium sized firms that comprise the majority of recent ERP implementations, 
many of which implemented ERPs, in large part, to enhance their internal control systems 
(Dorien and Wolf 2000; Forger 2000; Kumar, Pollanen and Maheshwari 2008). Finally, 
the majority of prior studies examine ERP implementations over a time period that is 
predominately pre SOX, and that includes shocks such as the dot-com ‘bubble’ and the 
Y2K phenomenon (Brazel and Dang 2008; Dorantes, et al. 2013). As a consequence, the 
results of those studies may not be generalizable to today.  
My tests include both within-firm tests for differences pre and post ERP 
implementation, and tests against a matched control sample. In order to confirm that any 
change in earnings management is mainly caused by the ERP implementation I apply a 
difference in difference test. I do not find a significant association between ERPs and 
                                                
1 Kim and Sohn (2013) find that the financial markets require a higher risk premium 
when firms engage in REM and that this premium is incremental to that required by firms 
engaging in earnings management through accruals. 
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abnormal accruals in either the pre or post implementation periods. This result is 
consistent with Dorantes et al., (2013) in that I find no evidence of a change in accruals 
management after ERP implementation. When I extended the analysis to include earnings 
management that occurs through real activities, however, my results reveal that these 
activities decrease post implementation. This suggests that while real time reporting 
capabilities could encourage or facilitate the use of real earnings management [REM], 
this is not the case. These results are robust to tests on a sub-sample of suspect firms who 
beat prior period earnings by a small margin. This result holds despite the fact that I find 
no difference in the likelihood that firms meet or beat analyst expectations pre versus post 
implementation. My research contributes to the ongoing literature on the relationship 
between accounting information systems and external financial reporting, as well as to 
the literature examining earnings management per se. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses 
the background and related research and develops the hypotheses. The third section 
presents my research design. The fourth section discusses my sample selection and the 
fifth reports my results. The sixth section offers conclusions and implications. 
Prior Literature 
ERP Systems 
An ERP system is modular business software that integrates all aspects of a 
company’s manufacturing, sales and marketing, purchasing and distribution, project 
management, human resources and other systems so as to enable an enterprise to 
efficiently and effectively manage its resources. They are designed as an integrated set of 
modules that address a wide range of basic corporate functions (Robey, Ross and 
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Boudreau 2002). Furthermore, they are valued by managers because they are integrated, 
and provide direct access to real time information.2 
According to Grabski, Leech and Schmidt (2011), ERP research can be classified 
into three groups: (1) ERP critical success factors, (2) ERP economic impact and (3) ERP 
organizational impact. This latter group addresses the impact of ERP systems on 
management accounting. 
ERPs and Accruals Management 
An ERP can limit managerial control choices and the initial configuration can 
have a long-term impact on restricting a company’s control systems (Grabski et. al 2011). 
Given these restrictions, managers’ ability to deviate from normal accounting practices 
should be reduced after an ERP is implemented. ERP systems may, for example, reduce 
accruals management, because the information provided may encourage managers to act 
in the best interest of the investors (Morris and Laksmana 2010). Furthermore, companies 
that adopt an ERP system are reported to have fewer internal control weaknesses (Masli, 
et al. 2010; Morris 2011) and, as described below, some companies implemented ERPs 
specifically to conform to the internal control standards required by Sarbanes-Oxley 
Section 404.  Prior research (Dorantes, et al. 2013) also suggests that ERP systems 
improve the quality of internal information by facilitating managers’ access to timely and 
accurate data.  
Three papers have examined the effect of ERPs on accruals management with 
limited and mixed results. Brazel and Dang (2008) study the impact of enterprise systems 
                                                
2 Elliott noted in 2002 that “enterprise-wide software in networked organizations already 
permits some firms to report – at least internally – in near real time” (page 140). 
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on measures of information quality and find that discretionary accruals increase 
significantly following an ERP implementation. In contrast, Morris and Laksmana (2010) 
find a significant drop in the absolute value of discretionary accruals and total accruals 
after firms implement ERPs. Finally, Dorantes, et al. (2013) find no significant 
association between enterprise system implementation and abnormal accruals in the pre- 
and post implementation periods.  
The mixed results presented in prior research may, however, be a reflection of the 
different sample periods employed and the definitions of what constitutes an ERP. The 
sample period of Morris and Laksmana (2011) covers implementations in the years 1994 
through 2003 while the sample period of Brazel and Dang (2008) goes from 1993 
through 1999. Both of these time periods include the dot-com bubble, and the Y2K crisis, 
and Morris and Laksmana include the beginning of the post SOX period as well. While I 
make no predictions and conduct no tests pre versus post-SOX, it is likely that 
implementations post SOX were fundamentally different from early ERP 
implementations. As a consequence, I focus my analysis on the post-SOX period. 
According to Kumar, et al. (2008) SOX provided incentives to companies to implement 
an ERP system, because ERPs can help firms to develop and manage effective controls. 
While the sample of Dorantes, et al. (2013) extends further into the post SOX period 
(1995-2008), fifty-eight percent of their sample implementations occurred pre SOX (page 
1434). Their results may also be a function of their inclusion of various systems that are 
pieces of, but not the equivalent of ERPs. For example, supply chain management 
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systems, business intelligence systems, customer relationship management systems, E-
business platforms, and enterprise integration applications are included in their sample.3   
Sarbanes-Oxley 
The specific reasons companies invest in this technology vary, but ERP 
implementations are typically attributed to cost reduction and productivity enhancements. 
After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SOX] was passed by the U.S. congress and signed into 
law in 2002, the dynamics of financial reporting changed. The new requirements forced 
many companies to consider implementing ERPs in order to attain compliance with SOX. 
This is because ERP systems can provide technical tools and solutions not only for 
collecting, analyzing and reporting information but also for implementing internal 
controls.  
There are three main sections of SOX that affect IT governance: Section 302, 
Section 404 and Section 802. Section 302 requires a set of internal procedures designed 
to ensure accurate financial disclosures and assurance from fraud. Section 404 focuses on 
the assessment of internal controls. This section requires executives and auditors to report 
on the adequacy of the company’s internal control over financial reporting. Executives 
are also required to generate an internal control assessment that acknowledges the 
responsibility of management for maintaining an adequate internal control structure. 
Furthermore, the report contains an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control 
structure (including IT controls) and procedures. Executives generally have adopted an 
internal control framework like the Committee of Sponsoring Organization (COSO) of 
                                                
3 ERPs make up the bulk (55%) of their sample (page 1435) but the year of 
implementation corresponding to the various types of “enterprise systems” that they 
include is not disclosed. 
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the Treadway Commission for this assessment. Section 802 of SOX mandates appropriate 
record retention and security for five years and imposes criminal penalties for violation of 
the act.   
While the ERP tools prior to SOX provided some benefit, their effectiveness was 
lacking in comparison with more robust solutions introduced in the later stages of SOX. 
As the requirements for compliance became, however, more familiar to companies and 
ERP vendors, vendors reexamined their software and offered solutions that include a 
greater emphasis on compliance and control (Krell 2007). As such, a new generation of 
ERP systems was launched after 2002 that provide technical tools and solutions for 
gathering, analyzing and reporting information necessary for implementing the internal 
controls required by SOX. In response to this, a number of companies implemented ERPs 
in order to achieve SOX compliance. Hawkins Inc., for example, reported in its 10-K 
filing on Mar-28-2004 that: 
“The Company is currently implementing an Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) system. The ERP system implementation is critical for the 
Company to make its internal control certifications required by the end of fiscal 
2005 pursuant to Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Company believes 
the ERP system will be implemented by October 1, 2004.” 
and Bioanalytical Systems Inc. reported in its 10-K filing on Sep-30-2005 that:  
“Also in fiscal 2004, the Company initiated implementation of a new 
Enterprise Resource Planning ("ERP") system, which was launched at all the 
Company's locations in the third quarter of fiscal 2005... The introduction of a 
new ERP system is part of the Company's response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
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(the "Act"). The Company determined that it was not practicable to comply with 
the control, documentation and testing requirements of Section 404 of the Act 
while operating on different, decentralized, obsolete systems at its various 
locations.” 
Prior research has also shown, however, that ERP system adoptions have 
provided managers with more flexibility to manage earnings due to reductions in internal 
control effectiveness and audit quality in the ERP system setting (Wright and Wright 
2002; Brazel and Agoglia 2007). There are a number of ERP characteristics that impact 
security and internal control: the degree of standardization, authorization and 
centralization. The control executed by managers over financial information through a 
centralized ERP system may thus facilitate increased managerial discretion, since this 
control technology is sometimes fragile when companies pursue more integration 
(Dechow and Mouritsen 2005). In this circumstance, a centralized system can provide the 
opportunity for inappropriate access privileges that may violate internal control 
requirements (Grabski et. al 2011). The ability of an ERP to process thousands of 
transactions daily poses additional problems for control, in that the shear volume of 
transactions makes it difficult to identify anomalies (Singh, Best, Bojilov and Blunt 
2014), and in the absence of a continuous auditing / continuous monitoring system, it 
may be impossible to effectively control opportunistic managerial behavior. Thus I might 
expect accruals manipulation to increase after an ERP implementation.  
These competing conjectures lead to my first hypotheses (in null form):   
H1: Implementation of an ERP system will not be associated with earnings 
management through discretionary accruals. 
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Real Earnings Management 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999) earnings management can be classified 
into two categories: accruals management and real earnings management. The former 
involves generally accepted accounting principles [GAAP], and occurs when managers 
manage reported earnings by using the accounting discretion allowed under GAAP. The 
latter occurs when managers take actions that change the timing or structure of actual 
business activities. Real earnings management has received considerable attention since 
Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) reported that 80% of U.S. executives surveyed, 
were willing to decrease expenditures on R&D, advertising, and maintenance in order to 
meet earnings benchmarks.4  
ERP systems provide companies with reliable, transparent, real-time data access, 
which gives managers the opportunity to make better and faster business decisions. It is 
also expected that, after implementation, there will be an improvement in data access that 
will lead to more accurate forecasting, and that the integration of various functional areas 
will lead to improved communication, productivity and efficiency. Given the benefits 
ERPs yield in the reporting process, this technology may improve managements’ ability 
to engage in real earnings management. This is because REM requires assessment and 
planning and ERPs dramatically improve both of those processes.  
Roychowdhury (2006, 337) defines real earnings management as “departures 
from normal operational practices motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at least some 
                                                
4 Managers may also use REM do reduce earnings when there are incentives to do so 
(Eldenburg, Gunny, Hee and Soderstrom 2011; Chen and Huang 2013). Eldenburg et al., 
show, for example, that when the earnings of non-profit hospitals exceed benchmarks, 
managers increase non-operating expenditures to effect a reduction in earnings.   
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stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal 
course of operations.” The motivations for managers to engage in REM are the same as 
those that motivate accruals management, and include concealing undesirable 
performance, limiting earnings variability, and maximizing bonus compensation (Healy 
and Wahlen 1999). Real earnings management can, however, be costly to firms and 
shareholders, and the overwhelming majority of studies have focused on the negative 
economic consequences of REM  (Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Zang 
2012; Kim and Sohn 2013; Kim and Park, 2014). The evidence from those prior studies 
indicates that REM increases a firm’s cost of capital and imposes greater long term-costs 
on shareholders because of its negative impact on future cash flows. Badertscher (2011), 
for example, finds that firms first engage in accruals management and later move to 
REM, while Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find that declining operating performance after 
seasoned equity offerings is more severe when managers engage in REM than when they 
engage in accruals management. Similarly, Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi and McInnis (2009) 
find that short-term stock market gains achieved by cutting discretionary expenses to 
meet earnings targets are reversed in future periods. 
Declining firm performance and financial health may also increase auditor risk 
and increased auditor risk impacts client retention. Kim and Park (2014) found, for 
example, that auditors are more likely to resign when clients engage in aggressive REM 
practices. As noted above, research on REM has revealed negative consequences 
resulting from this practice, Gunny (2010) finds, however, that firms engaged in REM 
have better operating performance in the following years. 
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Cohen et al., (2008) examined changes in earnings management practices over 
time. Their evidence suggests that firms shifted from using accrual-based to real earnings 
management after SOX, because real activities methods are harder to detect and accrual 
manipulations are more likely to draw auditors’ or regulators’ scrutiny. According to 
Zang (2012), real earnings management increased due to the higher level of scrutiny of 
accounting practices after the passage of SOX. This is because regulatory bodies like the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] are focusing more attention on “an 
apparent increase in abusive earnings management”5 and, as a consequence, auditors pay 
more attention to accruals management than to real earnings management. Chi, Lisic and 
Pevzner (2011) suggest that this occurs because REM does not involve the violation of 
any regulations. 
As described above, earnings management can be achieved by taking advantage 
of accounting discretion or by changing the timing or structure of real transactions 
(Bartov 1993; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005). A unique characteristic of this latter 
approach is that it results in a reduction in long-term firm value (Ewert and Wagenhofer 
2005; Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 2012), while accruals management is not likely to 
destroy long-term value (Badertscher 2011). Earnings management choices depend, 
however, on managerial flexibility. After the passage of SOX, earnings management 
through accruals became more likely to draw scrutiny from auditors and regulators 
(Cohen et al. 2008). Furthermore, as noted by Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) a rational 
expectations equilibrium model, where regulations are intended to improve earnings 
quality can actually lead to a substitution effect between accruals management and REM. 
                                                
5 SEC January 27, 2000. 
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The result is that regulatory actions that restrict managers’ ability to use accruals 
management can increase REM and decrease firm value. Zang (2012) finds, for example, 
that the substitution between these two strategies depends on the cost to the firm. 
Managers may, in general, prefer accruals management to REM because accruals 
management can take place after the fiscal year has ended while real earnings 
management must be done prior to fiscal year end. Absent an ERP, this may pose a 
problem for managers, in that they may not know the extent of REM necessary to meet 
an earnings target. Real-time information, however, provides managers with direct access 
to performance measures that they can use to gauge their progress towards benchmarks. 
This coupled with more accurate forecasting (Dorantes et al. 2013) would encourage or at 
least facilitate managers’ ability to engage in earnings management through real 
activities. Lawson Products Inc., notes in their 2010 annual report that “I expect that the 
new ERP will provide us… with the opportunity to make better and faster business 
decisions… and provide a top-down view of the enterprise” (Exhibit 32).  
Monitoring 
On the other hand, the integration of intra-company systems in combination with 
the monitoring function of ERPs, may constrain managerial discretion over real activities 
such as changes to production levels or unusual changes in discretionary expenditures. 
Masli, Peters, Richardson and Sanchez (2010) examine how these new internal control 
monitoring systems impact firms and find that they are associated with a lower likelihood 
of material weaknesses in the year following implementation, and smaller increases in 
audit fees and audit lags. Similarly, Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorthy and Wright (2014) 
find that monitoring (audit committee members with both accounting and industry 
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expertise) is associated with higher reporting quality and less earnings management. The 
ability to monitor CEO actions is key to ERPs limiting earnings management. Acharya, 
Myers and Rajan (2011, 689) develop a model of “internal governance” where “the self-
serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates.” 
Building on their model, Cheng, Lee and Shevlin (2016) show that REM is inversely 
related to the employment horizon and influence of key subordinates and attribute this to 
those executives caring more than the CEO about long-term firm performance. Since 
ERPs would enhance the information set available to key subordinates, REM would 
likely decrease after an ERP implementation.  
Consider, for example, the setting where a manager’s bonus compensation is tied 
to earnings targets. The manager has real time information (from the ERP) and knows 
what level of performance is yet needed to meet those targets. The manager would like to 
increase production so as to shift fixed costs and overhead from cost-of-goods-sold to 
inventory thus boosting income and insuring the receipt of the bonus. Here, one of two 
scenarios could play out: 1) The manager uses the information from the ERP to 
overproduce and collects the bonus (the decision to overproduce being hidden in the vast 
volume of information processed by the ERP); or 2) The threat of this behavior being 
detected by the board of directors (the top-down view of the enterprise), or by key 
subordinates prevents the opportunistic behavior. This second scenario exists because 
ERPs in a manufacturing setting are specifically designed to improve supply chain 
management and facilitate more efficient production schedules. Thus any unusual over 
production is likely to raise suspicions. As with my discussion of accruals, I again have 
competing conjectures.  
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My second hypothesis (in null form) is thus: 
H2: Implementation of an ERP system will not be associated with earnings 
management through real activities. 
Research Method 
To measure earnings management through accruals, I estimate cross-sectional 
modified Jones discretionary accruals, adjusted for prior year performance as presented in 
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005). Specifically, ROAt-1 is added as an additional 
independent variable to the modified Jones model. To measure real earnings 
management, I employ the three proxies of Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen, et al. 
(2008): abnormal cash flow from operations [REMCASH], abnormal discretionary 
expenses [REMDISC], and abnormal production costs [REMPROD]. These four 
measures serve as dependent variables in my multivariate tests.6 
I then compute two comprehensive measures of abnormal real activities by 
aggregating the individual measures, to capture the overall level of real activity 
manipulation (Zhao, Chen, Zhang and Davis 2012; Cohen 2010). I compute the first of 
these measures [REM1] by summing abnormal production costs and abnormal 
discretionary expense. For the second measure [REM2] I aggregate all three of the real 
earnings management measures.  
Following prior literature (Kim and Park 2014; Zhao, et al.  2012; Zang 2012), I 
include additional independent variables to control for factors that are associated with 
managerial motivations and opportunities to engage in earnings management [EM], the 
                                                
6 My estimation models are run by two digit SIC code and year on a minimum of 15 
observations.  
 22 
costs of EM, and governance features that might have an effect on discretionary accruals 
and real earnings management.7 My resulting test model for differences within 
implementers is:  
EM = β0+ β1ERP +β2LGTA +β3ROA +β4AUD +β5MTB +β6LEV +     β7NOA +β8MKTSHARE +β9INST +β10%CL + β11ZSCORE +  
β12MANU +β13AUDTEN +β14CYCLE +β15MTR +β16ACCR +         Year + ε                                                                                                         (1) 
The test model for my difference in difference (implementer versus control) tests 
is: 
EM = β0+β1ERP +β2POST +β3ERP x POST +β4LGTA +β5ROA +               β6AUD +β7MTB +β8LEV +β9NOA +β10MKTSHARE +β11INST +      β12%CL +β13ZSCORE + β14MANU +β15AUDTEN +β16CYCLE +         β17MTR +β18ACCR + Year +ε                                                                    (2) 
The independent variable, [LGTA], is the natural log of total assets which 
controls for variations in earnings management associated with firm size. I include return 
on assets [ROA] to control for firm profitability. Consistent with Cohen et al. (2010) and 
Chi et al. (2011) I include a Big 4 indicator variable [AUD] and auditor tenure 
[AUDTEN], since clients of large audit firms and longer auditor tenure are associated 
with higher levels of REM. Furthermore, I include the market to book ratio [MTB] to 
control for growth opportunities. Following Zang (2012) I include market share 
[MKTSHARE], institutional ownership [INST], Altman’s Z-score [ZSCORE] and the 
                                                
7 Variable definitions are presented in Appendix. 
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marginal tax rate [MTR] to control for the costs associated with REM. Firms with a 
higher Z-score and managers in market leader firms are more likely to take real economic 
actions to manipulate earnings. Conversely, firms with high marginal tax rates and 
institutional ownership are less likely to engage in REM.  
I include net operating assets [NOA] and discretionary accruals [ACCR] to 
control for accounting flexibility, and similar to Chan, Chen, Chen and Yu (2015), I 
include business cycle [CYCLE] to control for the costs related to accrual manipulation. 
Prior research has shown that leverage [LEV] is associated with discretionary accruals. 
Since earnings management through accruals and REM have been shown to be 
substitutes and complements (Zang 2012; Chan et al. 2015) I include this variable in my 
models. Finally, in keeping with Roychowdhury (2006), I include an indicator variable 
for manufacturing companies [MANU] and a measure of short-term credit risk [%CL] to 
control for managerial incentives to engage in earnings management so as to avoid a 
negative reaction from creditors and suppliers should the firm fail to meet earnings 
benchmarks. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Sample Selection 
I collected ERP implementations disclosed between 2002 and 2013. The sample 
firms were identified by searching the Capital IQ database for ERP implementations that 
were disclosed in 10-k SEC filings. This approach is based on Nicolaou (2004). I employ 
it because it reduces any potential selection bias of that may occur when firms 
implemented an ERP but did not elect to publicly announce the implementation. Such 
selection bias may be particularly severe when sample firms are identified from 
proprietary lists not available to the public. The search focused on the time the ERP 
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implementation was complete using the following keywords: “enterprise resource 
planning,” “ERP,” “implemented,” and “went-live.”  The initial query produced 2,529 
documents containing the search terms. Table 1, Panel A presents the sample documents 
by year.8 The remaining documents were analyzed individually to verify that the sample 
firms had, indeed, completed an ERP implementation and to identify the year of 
implementation. Subsequently, each of these documents was examined and observations 
with a legacy ERP, discontinued ERP project, ERP improvement or updated projects and 
duplicates were deleted. I impose this condition in order to make sure that my sample 
firms were first time implementers. The majority of the disclosures were presented in the 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the 10-k. The financial data is 
obtained from the Compustat database. My sample identification process yielded 168 
unique ERP implementation firms. In order to compare the pre versus post 
implementation periods similar to Brazel and Zang (2008), I require the data necessary to 
construct the earnings management metrics for seven years - three years prior to and three 
years following the implementation. Because I examine the effect of ERPs on earnings 
management, I use an indicator variable with a value equal to 1 for the years following 
ERP implementation, and 0 otherwise. Because I cannot identify exactly when the ERP 
“went live” the implementation year is not part of my analysis. Sixteen firms were 
deleted because they lacked the necessary data for post implementation analysis 
(implemented ERPs after 2011). Two financial institutions were excluded, as were 41 
                                                
8 The filings of OTC-pink sheet firms were excluded from the sample because the 
companies are unable or unwilling to meet the minimum U.S. stock market 
qualifications, and because they are not required to file financial statements with the 
SEC. 
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additional firms that lacked complete data items on Compustat for the pre and post 
implementation periods. Panel B of Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process.  
Following Nicolaou (2004) and Morris (2011) I identify a control group to 
provide a comparison group of firms that had not implemented ERPs. I follow Nicolaou 
(2004), Morris and Laksmana (2010) and Dorantes, et al. (2013) in matching my sample 
to 109 unique control firms by SIC code and total assets at the beginning of the 
implementation year. I employ Mahalanobis Distance to identify the closest match. A 
new search was then executed, to ensure that the identified control firms had not 
announced the implementation of an ERP.9 Each ERP firm is matched with a control 
group firm.  As a result, the subsequent analyses are of 218 firms (109 ERP implementers 
and 109 non-implementers).  
Table 1, Panel C presents the industry distribution for the sample firms. As in 
prior research, the majority of the sample firms are from the manufacturing and service 
industries. The distribution of ERP implementations by year is presented in Table 1, 
Panel D.  Implementations in 2006 and 2010 constitute the largest proportions of the 
sample (17.4 and 16.5 percent respectively), and 2011 represents the smallest with one 
implementation (0.9 percent). 
                                                
9 I am unable to determine whether or not some of the control firms implemented legacy 
ERPs prior to 1999. However, to the extent that ERP implementers differ systematically 
in their earnings management practices from non-implementers, the existence of such 
firms in the control sample would work against me identifying those differences. 
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Results 
Univariate Results 
Table 2, Presents descriptive statistics for firms that implemented an ERP. Panel 
A presents the statistics for both the pre and post implementation periods combined, the 
descriptive statistics for the pre ERP implementation period, and the descriptive statistics 
for the post implementation period. Panel B presents the same information for the control 
sample.  
Panel C of Table 2 presents tests of the equality of means for my control 
variables: implementers versus control group in the pre implementation period. While the 
incidence of Big 4 auditors [AUD] was low for both groups (means of 0.263 and 0.162 
for the implementers and control group respectively), the implementers were significantly 
more likely to have engaged a Big 4 auditor (p ≤ 0.002), have greater market share ((p ≤ 
0.002), and have a longer operating cycle (117.915 days for implementers versus 100.406 
for control firms). None of the other control variables are statistically different at 
conventional levels. This gives me confidence that my matching procedure was 
successful in identifying a representative control sample. 
Table 3 presents Pearson correlations for the model variables. As expected, 
REMDISC and REMPROD are highly correlated (r = 0.646). Also as expected, 
ZSCORE is negatively correlated with leverage (r = -0.512), operating assets is 
correlated with total assets (r = 0.528), as is institutional ownership (r = 0.506). None of 
the other correlation coefficients are greater than 0.50. 
Table 4, Panel A presents univariate tests of my earnings management measures 
pre versus post for my implementers. With the exception of REMCASH all of the 
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measures reflect less earnings management after the ERP implementation. Of these, 
however, only ABSDA REMPROD and REM1 are significant at the p ≤ 0.10 level (p ≤ 
0.126 and p ≤ 0.101 for REMDISC and REM2 respectively). The univariate results thus 
provide some evidence that ERP systems impact earnings management.10 
Panel B (pre implementation) and Panel C (post implementation) present the same 
tests for my implementers versus the control group. There is no statistical difference 
between implementers and the control group for any of the measures in the pre 
implementation period (the probabilities that ABSDA, REMDISC, REMPROD and 
REMCASH are equal for implementers and the control group are 0.88, 0.90, 0.83, and 
0.96 respectively). In the post period, however, the probabilities that the mean values for 
ABSDA, REMDISC, REMPROD and REMCASH are equal for implementers and the 
control group are only 0.12, 0.10, 0.05, and 0.72 respectively.  
Multivariate Results 
Table 5 presents the regression results for my six models. The coefficient on ERP 
is significantly negative (p ≤ 0.05) in the accruals model. This result suggests that 
earnings management through discretionary accruals declines after ERP implementation. 
This finding is consistent with the speculation that ERP systems can reduce managers’ 
discretion over accounting information, and that the use of the ERPs encourages 
managers to act in the best interests of investors. 
The real earnings management models also reveal interesting results. The 
coefficients on ERP in the REMDISC and REMPROD models are similarly negative and 
                                                
10 Consistent with prior research, REMDIS and REMCASH are multiplied by negative 1 
so that the coefficients can be interpreted in the same manner as those on REMPROD and 
ABSDA. 
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significant (p ≤ 0.01), but the coefficient on REMCASH is not significantly different 
from zero. These results suggest that ERP systems, even though they provide managers 
with more timely information, do not facilitate the planning and execution of real 
activities management through reductions in discretionary expenses or overproduction. 
The results from REM1 and REM 2 likewise confirm that ERP adopters engage in 
less real earnings management, as the coefficients on ERP are also significantly negative 
for both measures (p ≤ 0.01).  
Suspect Firms 
Because my initial tests include all of the ERP implementers that I am able to 
identify, I cannot effectively claim that the reductions in discretionary accruals, expenses 
and overproduction that I observe, are necessarily reductions in REM. They may instead, 
be an artifact of ERP adoption unrelated to earnings management. To address this 
possibility, I follow Gunny (2010) and others in identifying firms that may have greater 
incentives to manage earnings as those with earnings scaled by total assets that are 
greater than or equal to the prior year’s earnings but less than 0.01. This screen yields 137 
usable observations for my tests (70 pre implementation and 67 post implementation). 
Table 6 presents the results of my tests on my sample of suspect firms. In these 
tests, ERP implementation is significant at conventional levels for the REMDISC and 
REMPROD regressions, and in the combined models (p-values ≤ 0.05). The coefficients 
on my other proxies for earnings management are not significant at conventional levels in 
two-tailed tests. 
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Matched Results 
Table 7 presents my regression results when my control sample is included with 
the ERP implementers – my difference in difference tests. My variable of interest [ERP x 
POST] is the interaction of ERP with an indicator variable for the post implementation 
period [POST]. Again the implementation is not significant in the accruals or cash flows 
models, but is for REMDISC (p ≤ 0.05) and REM1 (p ≤ 0.05). More importantly, in tests  
of the overall effect of ERP implementation on REM, the joint coefficients of ERP and 
ERP x POST (β1 + β3 = 0) are significantly associated with reductions in REM for the 
REMDISC (p ≤ 0.10), REMPROD (p ≤ 0.01) REM1 (p ≤ 0.01) models.  
These results indicate that the implementation of an ERP can mitigate the use of 
REM and deter managers’ opportunistic behavior. The tighter accounting system, driven 
by the implementation of the ERP, can produce better information about the firm and 
reduce managerial flexibility. This result is consistent with Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) 
and with the conjecture of Zang (2012), that firms constrained by heightened regulatory 
scrutiny will use REM more and accruals less to manage earnings. 
Table 8 presents difference in difference tests when I include only suspect firms, 
both from among the ERP implementers and from the control sample. The control sample 
contained 141 suspect observations. In the REMDISC model, the coefficient on my 
variable of interest is again negative and significant (p ≤ 0.10) as it is in the REMPROD, 
REM1 (both p ≤ 0.05) and REM2 (p ≤ 0.10) models. In joint tests of the overall 
significance of ERPs on REM, ERP implementation appears, however, not to have 
constrained our suspect firms.   
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Additional Analysis 
Since a large number of the control variables suggested by prior research are not 
significant in my regressions, my models may suffer from over-specification, i.e., the 
estimates of the coefficients may be less precise. This is especially the case if some of the 
extraneous variables are correlated with each other (Baum 2006). LEV and ZSCORE, for 
example, are likely measuring the same construct. To address this potential problem, I 
rerun my difference in difference tests using backwards stepwise regression to identify a 
more efficient model. 11 The consensus model I arrive at is:  
EM = β0+β1ERP +β2 POST +β3ERP x POST +β4LGTA +β5MTB +           β6NOA +β7INST +β8%CL +β9MANU +β10CYCLE + Year + ε        (3) 
The results for my test on the entire sample (implementers and control) are 
presented in Table 9. Again, the coefficients on the interaction of ERP and POST are 
negative and significant (p ≤ 0.10) for REMDISC and REM1, with the joint tests 
significant in the REMDISC (p ≤ 0.10), REMPROD (p ≤ 0.05) and REM1 models (p ≤ 
0.05). The results for my suspect firms are presented in Table 10. The coefficients on 
ERP x POST are negative in the REMDISC, REMPROD and REM1 models (p-values ≤ 
0.10). In the joint tests implementation is significantly associated with less earnings 
management for the ABSDA and REMCASH models (both (p ≤ 0.05), but not for the 
others. 
Given the results of Dorantes, et al. (2013), I also test whether there is a change in 
the propensity to meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts post implementation. I calculate 
the difference between actual earnings and median analysts’ forecasts using the last 
                                                
11 I set the significance level at p ≤ 0.20 for a variable to be included in the model. 
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forecast summary reported by IBES prior to the earnings release. I construct two 
measures for meet/beat. The first is an indicator variable equal to 1 if actual earnings are 
greater than or equal to the median analyst forecast and 0 otherwise [MEETBEAT]. The 
second is an indicator variable equal to 1 if actual earnings are greater than or equal to the 
median analyst forecast, and less than or equal to one-percent of total assets 
[SMALLBEAT]. This additional measure is to test the conjecture that firms that just 
barely meet or beat analyst forecasts are more likely to be engaged in earnings 
management. The firms implementing ERPs exceeded the median analyst earnings 
forecast 143 times pre implementation and 150 times post implementation (α = 0.861). 
The incidence of SMALLBEAT was 94 in the pre implementation period and 99 in the 
post implementation period (α = 0.668). Thus I find no statistical evidence that the 
propensity to meet or beat analyst forecasts is lower after an ERP implementation.   
I also test whether my results are sensitive to the sample window criteria (three 
years prior to and three years subsequent to the implementation). I modify the window to 
include all firm year observations for implementers and the control sample. Because this 
modified criteria includes companies with different numbers of firm year observations, it 
leads to unbalanced regressions pre and post ERP implementation. The results of these 
tests are qualitatively identical to those reported above.  
Summary 
I test a sample of ERP implementers post SOX for differences in earnings 
management practices pre and post implementation. My results show that while firms 
that implemented an ERP exhibit a reduction in absolute abnormal accruals, this 
reduction is no greater that that of a matched control group. This suggests that advanced 
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information technology is not a driving factor when it comes to managerial discretion 
with respect to accruals.  
When I focus my analysis on earnings management through real activities, I find a 
decrease post implementation both in my tests solely on implementers and in my 
implementers when compared to my control group. This suggests that the real time 
reporting capabilities of ERPs do not facilitate real earnings management. Rather, ERPs 
appear to moderate earnings management though REM, specifically with respect to 
discretionary expenses. This result is significant in that while REM violates no rules or 
regulations, it is generally viewed as having a negative impact on future firm 
performance. I believe that the enhanced potential for monitoring via the ERP, is the 
constraining factor that drives my results.   
I find substantially the same results when I confine my tests to suspect firms that 
met or just beat a benchmark of the prior year’s earnings. Further, I find no difference pre 
versus post implementation, in the likelihood that firms meet or beat analyst expectations. 
Future research should investigate whether alternative mechanisms, such as classification 
shifting, may have supplanted accruals and real activities management for ERP 
implementers.  
My research contributes to the ongoing literature on the relationship between 
accounting information systems and external financial reporting, as well as to the 
literature examining real earnings management as a response to increased regulatory 
scrutiny of accruals. To the extent that my results are generalizable across firms - 
regulators, auditors and investors may see ERP implementations not just as indicative of 
enhanced operating efficiency, but of higher quality financial reporting as well.  
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Appendix  
Variable Definitions 
Variable Names Definitions 
EM Earnings management constructs ABSDA, REMDISC, REMPROD, 
REMCASH, REM1 and REM2 as defined below 
ABSDA The absolute value of discretionary accruals computed as presented in 
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005). 
REMDISC The level of abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary expenses 
are the sum of advertising expenses, R&D expenses and SG&A expenses. 
REMPROD The level of abnormal production costs, where production costs are defined 
as the sum of cost of goods sold and the change in inventories. 
REMCASH The level of abnormal cash flows from operations. 
REM1 The sum of REMPROD and REMDISC 
REM2 The sum of REMPROD, REMDISC and REMCASH 
ERP An indicator variable with value equal to 1 for the years following ERP 
implementation, and 0 otherwise. 
OCF Operating cash flows divided by total assets 
LGTA The natural log of total assets. 
SOX An indicator variable with value equal to 1 for the years after 2002, and 0 
otherwise.  
ROA The ratio of net income to average total assets. 
AUD An indicator variable with value equal to 1 if firm is audited by a big 4 
accounting firm, and 0 otherwise. 
MTB The market to book ratio 
LEV The ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
NOA An indicator variable that equals 1 if the net operating assets at the 
beginning of the year divided by lagged sales is above the median of the 
corresponding industry-year, and 0 otherwise. 
MKTSHARE The ratio of firms’ total revenues to the total revenues of the corresponding 
industry-year. 
INST The percentage of institutional ownership at the beginning f the year. 
%CL Current liabilities excluding short-term debt as a percentage of total assets at 
the beginning of the year.  
ZSCORE Altman’s (1968) Zscore 
MANU An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm’s SIC code is greater than 1999 and 
less than 4000, and zero otherwise. 
AUDTEN The number of successive years (beginning in 1988) that the current auditor 
has audited the firm’s financial statements 
CYCLE The sum of days receivable and days inventory, less days payable at the 
beginning of the year 
MTR The marginal tax rate, developed and provided by Professor John Graham 
(http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/;jgraham/) 
ACCR Discretionary accruals computed as presented in Kothari, Leone, and 
Wasley (2005) 
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Table 1 Sample Identification 
Panel A: Summary of Sample Search 
 
Year Total Documents 
Total 
Documents 
Traded 
Companies 
Total 
Documents 
OTCPK 
2002 150 57 93 
2003 141 63 78 
2004 170 77 93 
2005 173 97 76 
2006 226 115 111 
2007 240 126 114 
2008 100 66 34 
2009 256 168 88 
2010 245 155 90 
2011 259 178 81 
2012 260 200 60 
2013 309 258 51 
TOTAL 2529 1560 969 
 
Panel B: Summary of Sample Selection Process 
 
Firms 
ERP adoptions disclosed in the annual reports 168 
Less firms adoption after 2011 (16) 
Less financial institutions (2) 
Less firms missing -3 to +3 window data  (41) 
Firms adopting ERP systems 109 
  Control firms not adopting ERP systems 109  
Total firms employed in this study 218  
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Table 1 Continued 
Panel C: Distribution of ERP Implementers by Industry 
 
Adopting Firms Represented by the Following SIC Code 
Number  
of Firms 
(0000–1999)--Agriculture Mining and Construction 
 
3 
(2000–3999)--Manufacturing 
 
81 
(4000–4999)--Transportation and Utilities 
 
4 
(5000–5999)--Wholesale and Retail 
 
9 
(7000–9999)--Services 
 
12 
Total  
 
109 
 
 
Panel D: Distribution of ERP Implementations by Year 
 
 
Implementation 
Year 
 
Number  
of Firms               % 
 
2002 
 
7 6.4 
 
2003 
 
10 9.2 
 
2004 
 
8 7.3 
 
2005 
 
10 9.2 
 
2006 
 
19 17.4 
 
2007 
 
14 12.8 
 
2008 
 
11 10.1 
 
2009 
 
11 10.1 
 
2010 
 
18 16.5 
 
2011 
 
1 0.9 
 
Total 
 
109 100% 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Earnings Management Measures and Control Variables 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for ERP Implementers 
 
  
Pre Implementation Period 
 
Post Implementation Period 
Variable 
  
N 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Std Dev 
 
25% 
 
75% 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Std Dev 
 
25% 
 
75% 
ABACC 
  
327 
 
0.093 
 
0.057 
 
0.134 
 
0.027 
 
0.116 
 
327 
 
0.073 
 
0.051 
 
0.077 
 
0.025 
 
0.093 
REMDISC 
  
327 
 
-0.01 
 
0.013 
 
0.198 
 
-0.096 
 
0.139 
 
327 
 
-0.042 
 
0.017 
 
0.316 
 
-0.09 
 
0.128 
REM 
PROD 
  
327 
 
0.011 
 
-0.011 
 
0.193 
 
-0.118 
 
0.076 
 
327 
 
-0.022 
 
-0.016 
 
0.247 
 
-0.103 
 
0.082 
REM 
CASH 
  
327 
 
-0.045 
 
-0.053 
 
0.126 
 
-0.106 
 
0.01 
 
327 
 
-0.042 
 
-0.045 
 
0.110 
 
-0.094 
 
-0.005 
REM1 
  
327 
 
0 
 
0.014 
 
0.324 
 
-0.174 
 
0.185 
 
327 
 
-0.064 
 
0.008 
 
0.532 
 
-0.19 
 
0.185 
REM2 
  
327 
 
-0.045 
 
-0.045 
 
0.365 
 
-0.249 
 
0.142 
 
327 
 
-0.106 
 
-0.038 
 
0.592 
 
-0.237 
 
0.141 
LGTA 
  
327 
 
6.06 
 
6.087 
 
1.669 
 
4.979 
 
7.392 
 
327 
 
6.359 
 
6.407 
 
1.584 
 
5.299 
 
7.634 
SOX 
  
327 
 
0.765 
 
1 
 
0.425 
 
1 
 
1 
 
327 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0.000 
 
1 
 
1 
ROA 
  
327 
 
0.012 
 
0.042 
 
0.153 
 
-0.004 
 
0.082 
 
327 
 
0.003 
 
0.032 
 
0.129 
 
-0.019 
 
0.083 
AUD 
  
327 
 
0.263 
 
0 
 
0.441 
 
0 
 
1 
 
327 
 
0.229 
 
0 
 
0.421 
 
0 
 
0 
MTB 
  
327 
 
3.058 
 
2.122 
 
4.764 
 
1.351 
 
3.446 
 
327 
 
2.469 
 
1.733 
 
2.489 
 
1.029 
 
3.166 
LEV 
  
327 
 
0.436 
 
0.428 
 
0.221 
 
0.258 
 
0.586 
 
327 
 
0.451 
 
0.438 
 
0.196 
 
0.303 
 
0.593 
NOA 
  
327 
 
0.737 
 
1 
 
0.441 
 
0 
 
1 
 
327 
 
0.706 
 
1 
 
0.456 
 
0 
 
1 
MKT 
SHARE 
  
327 
 
0.05 
 
0.006 
 
0.134 
 
0.001 
 
0.035 
 
327 
 
0.049 
 
0.007 
 
0.128 
 
0.001 
 
0.026 
INST 
  
327 
 
0.642 
 
0.647 
 
0.367 
 
0.411 
 
0.883 
 
327 
 
0.701 
 
0.755 
 
0.364 
 
0.505 
 
0.875 
%CL 
  
327 
 
0.242 
 
0.208 
 
0.149 
 
0.138 
 
0.298 
 
327 
 
0.214 
 
0.195 
 
0.116 
 
0.142 
 
0.248 
ZSCORE 
  
327 
 
6.116 
 
3.723 
 
6.908 
 
2.26 
 
7.17 
 
327 
 
4.182 
 
3.194 
 
4.891 
 
1.912 
 
5.651 
MANU 
  
327 
 
0.743 
 
1 
 
0.438 
 
0 
 
1 
 
327 
 
0.743 
 
1 
 
0.438 
 
0 
 
1 
AUDTEN 
  
327 
 
6.676 
 
5 
 
4.603 
 
3 
 
11 
 
327 
 
9.028 
 
8 
 
5.355 
 
5 
 
13 
CYCLE 
  
327 
 
117.915 
 
97.294 
 
91.536 
 
65.214 
 
151.978 
 
327 
 
116.805 
 
97.692 
 
91.186 
 
57.713 
 
140.748 
MTR 
  
327 
 
0.267 
 
0.314 
 
0.506 
 
0.116 
 
0.378 
 
327 
 
0.034 
 
0.263 
 
1.448 
 
0.037 
 
0.349 
ACCR   
 
327   -0.066   0.152   -0.095   -0.051   -0.013 
 
327   -0.058   0.097   -0.095   -0.047   -0.023 
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Table 2 Panel A Continued 
 
  Pre and Post Implementation Periods Combined 
Variable 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Std Dev 
 
25% 
 
75% 
 ABACC 
 
654 
 
0.083 
 
0.053 
 
0.11 
 
0.026 
 
0.103 
 REMDISC 
 
654 
 
-0.026 
 
0.014 
 
0.264 
 
-0.093 
 
0.13 
 REM 
PROD 
 
654 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.014 
 
0.222 
 
-0.107 
 
0.077 
 REM 
CASH 
 
654 
 
-0.044 
 
-0.049 
 
0.118 
 
-0.100 
 
0.01 
 REM1 
 
654 
 
-0.032 
 
0.009 
 
0.441 
 
-0.185 
 
0.179 
 REM2 
 
654 
 
-0.075 
 
-0.039 
 
0.492 
 
-0.243 
 
0.128 
 LGTA 
 
654 
 
6.209 
 
6.251 
 
1.632 
 
5.116 
 
7.486 
 SOX 
 
654 
 
0.881 
 
1 
 
0.324 
 
1 
 
1 
 ROA 
 
654 
 
0.007 
 
0.037 
 
0.141 
 
-0.01 
 
0.08 
 AUD 
 
654 
 
0.246 
 
0 
 
0.431 
 
0 
 
0 
 MTB 
 
654 
 
2.764 
 
1.984 
 
3.81 
 
1.169 
 
3.167 
 LEV 
 
654 
 
0.444 
 
0.43 
 
0.209 
 
0.28 
 
0.586 
 NOA 
 
654 
 
0.722 
 
1 
 
0.448 
 
0 
 
1 
 MKT 
SHARE 
 
654 
 
0.049 
 
0.007 
 
0.131 
 
0.001 
 
0.036 
 INST 
 
654 
 
0.671 
 
0.726 
 
0.366 
 
0.451 
 
0.885 
 %CL 
 
654 
 
0.228 
 
0.203 
 
0.134 
 
0.138 
 
0.288 
 ZSCORE 
 
654 
 
5.149 
 
3.447 
 
6.059 
 
2.055 
 
6.012 
 MANU 
 
654 
 
0.743 
 
1 
 
0.438 
 
0 
 
1 
 AUD 
TEN 
 
654 
 
7.852 
 
7 
 
5.126 
 
4 
 
12 
 CYCLE 
 
654 
 
117.36 
 
97.493 
 
91.293 
 
62.028 
 
154.308 
 MTR 
 
654 
 
0.151 
 
0.289 
 
0.977 
 
0.077 
 
0.371 
 ACCR   654   -0.062   0.127   -0.095   -0.049   -0.016 
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Table 2 Continued 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Control Group  
 
 
 
Pre Implementation Period 
 
Post Implementation Period 
Variable 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Std Dev 
 
25% 
 
75% 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Std Dev 
 
25% 
 
75% 
ABACC 
 
327 
 
0.091 
 
0.054 
 
0.185 
 
0.027 
 
0.09 
 
327 
 
0.087 
 
0.053 
 
0.144 
 
0.026 
 
0.093 
REMDISC 
 
327 
 
-0.012 
 
0.004 
 
0.232 
 
-0.104 
 
0.132 
 
327 
 
-0.007 
 
0.027 
 
0.240 
 
-0.08 
 
0.128 
REM 
PROD 
 
327 
 
0.012 
 
-0.021 
 
0.174 
 
-0.123 
 
0.054 
 
327 
 
0.012 
 
-0.018 
 
0.209 
 
-0.104 
 
0.082 
REM 
CASH 
 
327 
 
-0.047 
 
-0.063 
 
0.146 
 
-0.126 
 
-0.007 
 
327 
 
-0.047 
 
-0.06 
 
0.238 
 
-0.122 
 
-0.005 
REM1 
 
327 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.006 
 
0.345 
 
-0.206 
 
0.186 
 
327 
 
0.006 
 
0.014 
 
0.379 
 
-0.187 
 
0.185 
REM2 
 
327 
 
-0.067 
 
-0.069 
 
0.393 
 
-0.28 
 
0.136 
 
327 
 
-0.042 
 
-0.038 
 
0.509 
 
-0.254 
 
0.141 
LGTA 
 
327 
 
6.004 
 
6.123 
 
1.689 
 
4.866 
 
7.238 
 
327 
 
6.357 
 
6.421 
 
1.735 
 
5.346 
 
7.634 
SOX 
 
327 
 
0.765 
 
1 
 
0.425 
 
1 
 
1 
 
327 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0.000 
 
1 
 
1 
ROA 
 
327 
 
0.016 
 
0.048 
 
0.166 
 
0.006 
 
0.089 
 
327 
 
-0.006 
 
0.041 
 
0.2 
 
0.002 
 
0.083 
AUD 
 
327 
 
0.162 
 
0 
 
0.369 
 
0 
 
0 
 
327 
 
0.153 
 
0 
 
0.36 
 
0 
 
0 
MTB 
 
327 
 
2.79 
 
2.124 
 
3.891 
 
1.345 
 
3.807 
 
327 
 
2.595 
 
1.944 
 
2.529 
 
1.24 
 
3.166 
LEV 
 
327 
 
0.426 
 
0.408 
 
0.219 
 
0.255 
 
0.576 
 
327 
 
0.44 
 
0.428 
 
0.226 
 
0.255 
 
0.593 
NOA 
 
327 
 
0.679 
 
1 
 
0.468 
 
0 
 
1 
 
327 
 
0.688 
 
1 
 
0.464 
 
0 
 
1 
MKT 
SHARE 
 
327 
 
0.025 
 
0.006 
 
0.054 
 
0.001 
 
0.022 
 
327 
 
0.035 
 
0.006 
 
0.088 
 
0.001 
 
0.026 
INST 
 
327 
 
0.604 
 
0.594 
 
0.959 
 
0.148 
 
0.837 
 
327 
 
0.551 
 
0.66 
 
0.38 
 
0.132 
 
0.875 
%CL 
 
327 
 
0.231 
 
0.2 
 
0.148 
 
0.129 
 
0.29 
 
327 
 
0.212 
 
0.182 
 
0.149 
 
0.114 
 
0.248 
ZSCORE 
 
327 
 
5.431 
 
3.803 
 
6.197 
 
2.148 
 
6.674 
 
327 
 
4.15 
 
3.318 
 
5.834 
 
1.933 
 
5.651 
MANU 
 
327 
 
0.743 
 
1 
 
0.438 
 
0 
 
1 
 
327 
 
0.743 
 
1 
 
0.438 
 
0 
 
1 
AUDTEN 
 
327 
 
7.043 
 
6 
 
4.545 
 
3 
 
10 
 
327 
 
9.245 
 
8 
 
5.573 
 
5 
 
13 
CYCLE 
 
327 
 
100.406 
 
92.624 
 
70.436 
 
41.796 
 
145.548 
 
327 
 
100.068 
 
93.14 
 
67.761 
 
45.078 
 
140.748 
MTR 
 
327 
 
0.406 
 
0.307 
 
1.73 
 
0.092 
 
0.372 
 
327 
 
0.235 
 
0.264 
 
1.011 
 
0.09 
 
0.349 
ACCR 
 
327   -0.059   0.2   -0.083   -0.051   -0.013 
 
327   -0.064   0.161   -0.099   -0.054   -0.023 
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Table 2 Panel B Continued 
 
 
 
Pre and Post Implementation Periods Combined 
Variable 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Std Dev 
 
25% 
 
75% 
ABACC 
 
654 
 
0.089 
 
0.053 
 
0.166 
 
0.027 
 
0.093 
REMDISC 
 
654 
 
-0.01 
 
0.016 
 
0.236 
 
-0.088 
 
0.129 
REMPROD 
 
654 
 
0.012 
 
-0.02 
 
0.192 
 
-0.114 
 
0.067 
REMCASH 
 
654 
 
-0.047 
 
-0.062 
 
0.197 
 
-0.124 
 
-0.006 
REM1 
 
654 
 
-0.025 
 
0.006 
 
0.548 
 
-0.203 
 
0.185 
REM2 
 
654 
 
-0.073 
 
-0.048 
 
0.677 
 
-0.264 
 
0.136 
LGTA 
 
654 
 
6.18 
 
6.27 
 
1.72 
 
5.035 
 
7.411 
SOX 
 
654 
 
0.881 
 
1 
 
0.324 
 
1 
 
1 
ROA 
 
654 
 
0.005 
 
0.044 
 
0.184 
 
0.006 
 
0.087 
AUD 
 
654 
 
0.157 
 
0 
 
0.365 
 
0 
 
0 
MTB 
 
654 
 
2.693 
 
2.012 
 
3.28 
 
1.294 
 
3.525 
LEV 
 
654 
 
0.433 
 
0.415 
 
0.222 
 
0.255 
 
0.581 
NOA 
 
654 
 
0.683 
 
1 
 
0.465 
 
0 
 
1 
MKTSHARE 
 
654 
 
0.03 
 
0.006 
 
0.073 
 
0.001 
 
0.024 
INST 
 
654 
 
0.577 
 
0.64 
 
0.73 
 
0.136 
 
0.868 
%CL 
 
654 
 
0.222 
 
0.188 
 
0.148 
 
0.123 
 
0.273 
ZSCORE 
 
654 
 
4.79 
 
3.554 
 
6.048 
 
2.09 
 
6.053 
MANU 
 
654 
 
0.743 
 
1 
 
0.438 
 
0 
 
1 
AUDTEN 
 
654 
 
8.144 
 
7 
 
5.2 
 
4 
 
12 
CYCLE 
 
654 
 
100.237 
 
93.111 
 
69.059 
 
43.165 
 
143.22 
MTR 
 
654 
 
0.32 
 
0.285 
 
1.418 
 
0.091 
 
0.367 
ACCR   654   -0.062   0.181   -0.091   -0.053   -0.019 
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Table 2 Continued 
Panel C - Tests of Differences in Control Variable Means: ERP Implementers versus Control Group 
 
Variable  n  Mean  Paired t-test n  Mean Difference  t-value   p-value 
OCF  
ERP Implementer  0.079  654  -0.007  -0.530  0.599 
 Control  0.072 
 
   
LGTA  
ERP Implementer  6.060 
 654  -0.056 
 -0.430  0.668 
 Control  6.004 
  
  
SOX  
ERP Implementer  0.765 
 654  -0.006 
 -0.180  0.855 
 Control  0.758 
  
  
ROA  
ERP Implementer  0.012 
 654  0.005 
 -0.380  0.703 
 Control  0.016 
  
  
AUD  
ERP Implementer  0.263  654  -0.101  -3.170  0.002*** 
 Control  0.162 
  
  
MTB  
ERP Implementer  3.058 
 654  -0.268 
 -0.790  0.431 
 Control  2.790 
  
  
LEV  
ERP Implementer  0.436 
 654  -0.010 
 -0.600  0.550 
 Control  0.426 
  
  
NOA  
ERP Implementer  0.737 
 654  -0.058 
 -1.630  0.103 
 Control  0.679 
  
  
MKTSHARE  
ERP Implementer  0.050  654  -0.025  -3.140  0.002*** 
 Control  0.025 
  
  
INST  
ERP Implementer  0.642 
 654  -0.038 
 -0.670  0.506 
 Control  0.604 
  
  
%CL  
ERP Implementer  0.242 
 654  -0.010 
 -0.880  0.381 
 Control  0.231 
  
  
ZSCORE  
ERP Implementer  6.116 
 654  -0.685 
 -1.330  0.183 
 Control  5.431 
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Table 2 Continued 
Panel C - Tests of Differences in Control Variable Means: ERP Implementers versus Control Group 
           
Variable n Mean    
Mean 
Difference  t-value  p-value 
MANU ERP Implementer 0.743  654  0.000 
 
0.000 
 
1.000 
 Control 0.743     
AUDTEN 
 ERP Implementer 6.676 
 654  0.367  -1.030  0.305  Control 7.043 
    
CYCLE ERP Implementer 117.915  654  -17.510  -2.740  0.006*** Control 100.406 
    
MTR 
ERP Implementer 0.267 
 654  0.139  -1.390  0.164 Control 0.406 
    
ACCR 
ERP Implementer -0.066 
 654  0.007  0.480  0.631 Control -0.059         
t statistics in parentheses. Significance is indicated by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3 Pearson Correlations for Model Variables 
 
 ABACC REMDISC REMPROD REMCASH REM1 REM2 LGTA SOX ROA AUD 
ABACC 1.000 
         REMDISC -0.149 1.000 
        REMPROD 0.007 0.646 1.000 
       REMCASH -0.009 0.183 0.426 1.000 
      REM1 -0.086 0.923 0.890 0.324 1.000 
     REM2 -0.079 0.871 0.899 0.530 0.974 1.000 
    LGTA -0.091 0.330 0.022 -0.227 0.209 0.133 1.000 
   SOX -0.163 0.048 0.025 0.011 0.041 0.040 0.043 1.000 
  ROA -0.082 0.023 -0.137 -0.454 -0.055 -0.158 0.213 0.042 1.000 
 AUD 0.145 -0.006 0.001 0.021 -0.003 0.002 0.186 -0.151 -0.104 1.000 
MTB 0.058 -0.235 -0.147 -0.184 -0.215 -0.237 -0.015 -0.178 0.053 0.205 
LEV -0.053 0.178 0.192 0.064 0.203 0.198 0.267 0.030 -0.069 -0.105 
NOA 0.027 0.144 -0.006 -0.212 0.084 0.024 0.528 -0.102 0.135 0.189 
MKTSHARE -0.055 0.038 -0.013 -0.041 0.016 0.005 0.213 -0.039 0.114 0.053 
INST -0.054 0.211 0.011 -0.123 0.132 0.089 0.506 0.102 0.142 0.204 
%CL 0.144 -0.141 0.238 -0.011 0.035 0.029 -0.068 -0.035 0.012 -0.002 
ZSCORE 0.212 -0.295 -0.201 -0.092 -0.278 -0.271 -0.127 -0.205 0.051 0.301 
MANU 0.029 -0.068 -0.069 0.044 -0.076 -0.057 -0.228 -0.108 -0.015 0.044 
AUDTEN -0.074 0.094 -0.093 -0.104 0.010 -0.016 0.437 0.093 0.086 0.168 
CYCLE 0.019 -0.045 -0.044 0.183 -0.049 0.000 -0.195 -0.008 -0.076 0.000 
MTR -0.041 0.001 -0.015 -0.039 -0.007 -0.016 0.011 -0.058 -0.018 -0.005 
ACCR -0.641 0.152 0.080 0.229 0.131 0.173 -0.015 0.145 0.174 -0.147 
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Table 3 Continued 
 
 
MTB LEV NOA 
MKT 
SHARE INST %CL 
Z 
SCORE MANU 
AUD 
TEN CYCLE MTR ACCR 
MTB 1.000 
           LEV -0.100 1.000 
          NOA 0.125 -0.043 1.000 
         MKT 
SHARE -0.041 0.087 0.094 1.000 
        INST 0.007 -0.014 0.401 0.129 1.000 
       %CL 0.137 0.295 0.070 0.068 -0.093 1.000 
      ZSCORE 0.460 -0.512 0.047 -0.070 0.016 -0.020 1.000 
     MANU 0.012 -0.252 0.033 -0.001 -0.025 -0.140 0.141 1.000 
    AUDTEN -0.071 0.106 0.244 0.226 0.266 -0.078 -0.120 -0.057 1.000 
   CYCLE -0.028 -0.131 -0.099 -0.003 -0.032 -0.114 0.047 0.191 -0.030 1.000 
  MTR -0.002 0.076 0.010 -0.075 0.013 0.021 0.013 -0.052 -0.042 -0.063 1.000 
 ACCR -0.059 -0.014 -0.057 0.070 0.053 -0.015 -0.187 0.001 0.046 0.063 0.006 1.000 
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Table 4 Univariate Tests of Equality of Means - Earnings Management Measures 
Panel A - Comparison of Earnings Management Measures of ERP Implementers’ Pre and Post Implementation 
 
Implementers 
 
Pre-ERP 
Implementation 
Post-ERP 
Implementation 
 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
on Mean 
Difference 
t-value  Prob. Pr(|T| = |t|)  
ABSDA 327  0.093 0.134 327 0.073 0.077  0.0201 0.009 2.353 0.018 
REMDISC 327 -0.010 0.198 327 -0.042 0.316  0.0315 0.021 1.530 0.126 
REMPROD 327  0.011 0.193 327 -0.022 0.247  0.0327 0.017 1.886 0.059 
REMCASH 327 -0.045 0.126 327 -0.042 0.110 -0.0028 0.009 -0.308 0.758 
REM1 327  0.000 0.324 327 -0.064 0.532  0.0642 0.034 1.865 0.062 
REM2 327 -0.045 0.365 327 -0.106 0.592  0.0614 0.038 1.597 0.101 
 
Panel B: Comparison of Earnings Management Measures: 
Implementers versus Control Group - Pre Implementation 
 
 
Control Group  ERP Adopters         
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
Difference 
t-value  Prob. Pr(|T| = |t|)  
ABSDA 327  0.091 0.185 327  0.093 0.134 -0.002 0.013 -0.146 0.884 
REMDISC 327 -0.012 0.232 327 -0.010 0.198 -0.002 0.017 -0.124 0.901 
REMPROD 327 -0.047 0.146 327 -0.045 0.126 -0.002 0.011 -0.215 0.830 
REMCASH 327  0.012 0.174 327  0.011 0.193  0.001 0.014  0.047 0.962 
REM1 327 -0.019 0.344 327  0.000 0.324 -0.019 0.026 -0.761 0.447 
REM2 327 -0.067 0.392 327 -0.045 0.365 -0.122 0.029 -0.748 0.454 
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Table 4 Continued 
Panel C: Comparison of Earnings Management Measures: 
Implementers versus Control Group - Post Implementation 
 
 
Control Group  ERP Adopters         
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
Difference 
t-value  Prob. Pr(|T| = |t|)  
ABSDA 327  0.086 0.144 327  0.073 0.077  0.014 0.009 1.490 0.126 
REMDISC 327 -0.007 0.240 327 -0.042 0.317  0.035 0.022 1.602 0.108 
REMPROD 327  0.012 0.209 327 -0.022 0.247  0.034 0.018  1.917 0.055 
REMCASH 327 -0.047 0.238 327 -0.042 0.110 -0.005 0.015 -0.358 0.720 
REM1 327  0.006 0.379 327 -0.064 0.532  0.070 0.036  1.925 0.054 
REM2 327 -0.042 0.509 327 -0.106 0.592  0.064 0.043  1.490 0.136 
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Table 5 Regression Analysis of Earnings Management: Pre versus Post ERP Implementation 
 
 ABSDA  REMDISC  REMPROD  REMCASH  
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
ERP -0.014** (-2.02) -0.097*** (-3.29) -0.057*** (-2.63) -0.009 (-0.84) 
LGTA -0.003 (-0.80) 0.048*** (4.34) 0.011 (1.30) -0.007 (-1.57) 
ROA -0.257*** (-6.49) -0.062 (-0.59) -0.195** (-2.26) -0.358*** (-6.50) 
AUD 0.005 (0.68) 0.016 (0.71) 0.034* (1.90) 0.011 (1.15) 
MTB -0.000 (-0.49) -0.010* (-1.76) -0.007 (-1.27) -0.005* (-1.75) 
LEV -0.017 (-0.91) 0.061 (0.89) 0.046 (0.71) 0.034 (1.04) 
NOA 0.008 (1.00) 0.008 (0.27) -0.009 (-0.34) -0.023* (-1.80) 
MKTSHARE -0.013 (-0.71) -0.059* (-1.83) -0.044 (-1.02) 0.028 (1.28) 
INST 0.007 (0.87) 0.053** (2.45) 0.026 (1.27) 0.009 (0.73) 
%CL 0.112*** (2.61) -0.258*** (-3.41) 0.392*** (3.55) 0.012 (0.27) 
ZSCORE 0.002** (2.31) -0.008*** (-2.60) -0.004 (-1.54) -0.000 (-0.02) 
MANUF -0.003 (-0.36) 0.022 (1.46) 0.011 (0.61) 0.005 (0.48) 
AUDTEN 0.000 (0.48) -0.004** (-2.24) -0.006*** (-3.34) -0.001 (-0.73) 
CYCLE -0.000 (-0.33) -0.000 (-0.48) -0.000 (-0.49) 0.000** (2.32) 
MTR 0.012 (0.78) -0.144*** (-2.82) -0.151*** (-2.90) -0.083*** (-3.59) 
ACCR   0.269*** (3.38) 0.186** (2.21)   
YEAR 
DUMMIES 
YES  YES  YES  YES  
(Intercept) 0.112 (1.52) 0.028 (0.20) -0.110 (-1.24) -0.111 (-1.30) 
N 654  654  654  654  
adj. R2 0.239  0.233  0.136  0.293  
t statistics in parentheses 
Significance is indicated by *p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01, based on firm-level clustered errors 
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Table 5 Continued 
 
 REM1  REM2  
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
ERP -0.154*** (-3.17) -0.166*** (-3.00) 
LGTA 0.060*** (3.15) 0.052** (2.38) 
ROA -0.257 (-1.43) -0.565*** (-2.76) 
AUD 0.050 (1.32) 0.052 (1.27) 
MTB -0.017 (-1.56) -0.021 (-1.60) 
LEV 0.107 (0.86) 0.101 (0.69) 
NOA -0.001 (-0.02) -0.035 (-0.58) 
MKTSHARE -0.103* (-1.69) -0.054 (-0.76) 
INST 0.079** (2.14) 0.098** (2.53) 
%CL 0.134 (0.80) 0.151 (0.84) 
ZSCORE -0.012** (-2.23) -0.015** (-2.27) 
MANUF 0.033 (1.14) 0.038 (1.17) 
AUDTEN -0.009*** (-3.07) -0.009*** (-2.71) 
CYCLE -0.000 (-0.56) 0.000 (0.43) 
MTR -0.295*** (-3.09) -0.347*** (-3.24) 
ACCR 0.455*** (3.07)   
YEAR 
DUMMIES 
YES  YES  
(Intercept) -0.082 (-0.43) -0.221 (-1.18) 
N 654  654  
adj. R2 0.157  0.151  
 
t statistics in parentheses 
Significance is indicated by *p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01, based on firm-level clustered errors 
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Table 6 Regression Analysis of Earnings Management for Suspect Firms: Pre versus Post ERP Implementation 
 
 ABSDA  REMDISC  REMPROD  REMCASH  
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
ERP -0.011 (-0.98) -0.105** (-2.42) -0.073* (-1.69) -0.027 (-1.64) 
LGTA -0.008* (-1.78) 0.042** (2.23) 0.029* (1.77) 0.004 (0.63) 
ROA 0.465 (1.55) 0.164 (0.43) -0.228 (-0.60) -0.027 (-0.14) 
AUD 0.005 (0.36) 0.083** (2.11) 0.093** (2.36) 0.022 (1.03) 
MTB -0.006*** (-2.91) -0.006 (-0.50) -0.002 (-0.24) -0.004 (-1.06) 
LEV 0.038 (1.40) 0.013 (0.15) -0.103 (-0.99) -0.064 (-1.42) 
NOA 0.024* (1.87) 0.081* (1.66) 0.066 (1.47) -0.072*** (-3.63) 
MKTSHARE -0.096* (-1.83) -0.289*** (-2.94) -0.138 (-1.11) -0.054 (-1.03) 
INST -0.009 (-0.59) 0.029 (0.88) -0.046 (-1.33) 0.034*** (2.69) 
%CL -0.004 (-0.10) -0.079 (-0.59) 0.416*** (3.27) 0.227*** (5.33) 
ZSCORE 0.004*** (2.64) -0.006 (-1.19) -0.007 (-1.21) -0.006*** (-3.35) 
MANUF -0.003 (-0.24) 0.033 (0.84) 0.047 (1.28) 0.015 (0.93) 
AUDTEN -0.000 (-0.12) -0.006* (-1.73) -0.009** (-2.60) 0.001 (0.47) 
CYCLE -0.000 (-1.35) 0.000 (0.89) -0.000 (-1.12) 0.000** (1.98) 
MTR -0.036* (-1.76) -0.026 (-0.39) 0.002 (0.03) 0.003 (0.08) 
ACCR   0.651* (1.95) 1.093*** (3.46)   
YEAR 
DUMMIES 
YES  YES  YES  YES  
(Intercept) 0.083** (2.07) -0.165 (-1.16) -0.110 (-0.82) -0.047 (-0.82) 
N 137  137  137  137  
adj. R2 0.179  0.190  0.311  0.213  
t statistics in parentheses 
Significance is indicated by *p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01, based on firm-level clustered errors 
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Table 6 Continued 
 
 REM1  REM2  
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
ERP -0.178** (-2.15) -0.237** (-2.43) 
LGTA 0.071** (2.17) 0.079* (1.98) 
ROA -0.064 (-0.09) 0.553 (0.70) 
AUD 0.176** (2.44) 0.220** (2.42) 
MTB -0.008 (-0.40) -0.009 (-0.35) 
LEV -0.089 (-0.51) -0.226 (-1.14) 
NOA 0.147* (1.67) -0.045 (-0.50) 
MKTSHARE -0.426** (-2.12) -0.513** (-2.10) 
INST -0.017 (-0.28) 0.068 (0.90) 
%CL 0.337 (1.42) 0.817*** (3.26) 
ZSCORE -0.013 (-1.28) -0.032** (-2.40) 
MANUF 0.080 (1.17) 0.115 (1.54) 
AUDTEN -0.015** (-2.36) -0.014* (-1.77) 
CYCLE 0.000 (0.06) 0.001 (1.24) 
MTR -0.024 (-0.19) 0.015 (0.09) 
ACCR 1.744*** (2.80)   
YEAR 
DUMMIES 
YES  YES  
(Intercept) -0.276 (-1.07) -0.461 (-1.52) 
N 137  137  
adj. R2 0.233  0.146  
t statistics in parentheses  
Significance is indicated by *p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01, based on firm-level clustered errors 
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Table 7 Regression Analysis of Earnings Management:  Pre versus Post Implementation for Implementers and Control 
Sample 
 
 ABSDA  REMDISC  REMPROD  REMCASH  
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
ERP -0.011 (-1.05) 0.014 (0.95) 0.000 (0.03) 0.000 (0.02) 
POST -0.012 (-0.86) -0.006 (-0.32) -0.023 (-1.37) -0.012 (-0.93) 
ERP x POST -0.002 (-0.12) -0.051** (-2.02) -0.034 (-1.56) 0.006 (0.35) 
LGTA -0.007*** (-3.35) 0.042*** (6.22) 0.006 (1.04) -0.004 (-0.71) 
ROA -0.166** (-2.50) 0.028 (0.48) -0.287*** (-4.37) -0.316*** (-3.78) 
AUD 0.003 (0.43) 0.003 (0.19) 0.025* (1.71) 0.006 (0.69) 
MTB 0.003 (1.60) -0.010*** (-2.69) -0.008** (-2.25) -0.003 (-1.20) 
LEV -0.013 (-0.50) -0.042 (-1.00) -0.008 (-0.18) -0.017 (-0.51) 
NOA -0.003 (-0.29) 0.006 (0.27) 0.011 (0.63) -0.032*** (-2.72) 
MKTSHARE -0.013 (-0.74) -0.035 (-1.11) -0.028 (-0.84) 0.057*** (2.71) 
INST -0.001 (-0.34) 0.014* (1.70) 0.003 (0.45) -0.007* (-1.84) 
%CL 0.112** (2.25) -0.368*** (-4.89) 0.266*** (4.01) -0.069 (-0.92) 
ZSCORE 0.000 (0.06) -0.005*** (-2.85) -0.004** (-2.34) -0.001 (-1.07) 
MANUF -0.005 (-0.54) 0.013 (0.96) 0.013 (0.96) -0.007 (-0.77) 
AUDTEN -0.000 (-0.10) -0.001 (-0.90) -0.002** (-2.10) -0.001* (-1.78) 
CYCLE -0.000 (-1.59) -0.000** (-2.11) -0.000* (-1.77) 0.000** (2.56) 
MTR -0.005 (-0.24) -0.042 (-1.19) -0.071** (-2.10) -0.091*** (-3.49) 
ACCR   0.218*** (3.83) 0.133*** (2.58)   
YEAR 
DUMMIES 
YES  YES  YES  YES  
(Intercept) 0.125** (2.21) 0.078 (1.09) -0.038 (-0.79) -0.038 (-0.55) 
N 1308  1308  1308  1308  
adj. R2 0.103  0.209  0.139  0.187  
F test β1+β3=0 -0.013 2.27 -0.037* 3.21 -0.034*** 3.92 0.006 0.19 
t statistics in parentheses  Significance is indicated by *p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01, based on firm-level clustered errors 
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Table 7 Continued 
 
 REM1  REM2  
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
ERP 0.015 (0.59) 0.014 (0.49) 
POST -0.029 (-0.90) -0.043 (-1.16) 
ERP x POST -0.085** (-1.99) -0.077 (-1.54) 
LGTA 0.048*** (4.26) 0.043*** (3.02) 
ROA -0.258** (-2.41) -0.476*** (-2.81) 
AUD 0.028 (1.04) 0.032 (1.02) 
MTB -0.018*** (-2.60) -0.021*** (-2.58) 
LEV -0.050 (-0.66) -0.099 (-1.06) 
NOA 0.017 (0.49) -0.021 (-0.54) 
MKTSHARE -0.063 (-1.18) 0.013 (0.21) 
INST 0.017 (1.22) 0.008 (0.55) 
%CL -0.101 (-0.80) -0.193 (-1.17) 
ZSCORE -0.009*** (-2.87) -0.011*** (-3.04) 
MANUF 0.026 (1.09) 0.013 (0.45) 
AUDTEN -0.003* (-1.69) -0.004* (-1.86) 
CYCLE -0.000** (-2.22) -0.000 (-0.65) 
MTR -0.114* (-1.77) -0.196** (-2.50) 
ACCR 0.351*** (3.58)   
YEAR 
DUMMIES 
YES  YES  
(Intercept) 0.039 (0.40) 0.010 (0.09) 
N 1308  1308  
adj. R2 0.114  0.102  
F test β1+β3=0 -0.070*** 4.03 -0.063 2.36 
t statistics in parentheses 
Significance is indicated by *p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01, based on firm-level clustered errors 
 57 
 Table 8 Regression Analysis of Earnings Management for Suspect Firms:  Pre versus Post Implementation – 
Implementers and Control Sample 
 
 ABSDA  REMDISC  REMPROD  REMCASH  
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
ERP -0.019 (-1.61) 0.071** (2.11) 0.068*** (2.60) 0.013 (0.82) 
POST -0.019 (-1.51) 0.028 (0.72) 0.030 (1.04) -0.016 (-1.13) 
ERP x POST 0.011 (0.70) -0.092* (-1.95) -0.083** (-2.15) 0.006 (0.28) 
LGTA -0.008** (-2.29) 0.027** (2.06) 0.011 (1.09) -0.005 (-0.88) 
ROA 0.356*** (3.20) 0.098 (0.38) -0.396* (-1.86) -0.382*** (-2.65) 
AUD 0.001 (0.14) 0.016 (0.48) 0.035 (1.28) -0.007 (-0.42) 
MTB -0.001 (-0.32) -0.015** (-2.04) -0.011* (-1.90) -0.004* (-1.67) 
LEV -0.006 (-0.24) -0.044 (-0.66) -0.063 (-0.94) -0.019 (-0.57) 
NOA 0.019* (1.74) 0.096** (2.09) 0.074** (2.47) -0.032** (-2.07) 
MKTSHARE -0.084** (-1.99) -0.171 (-1.63) -0.106 (-1.02) 0.066 (1.05) 
INST 0.005 (0.62) -0.018 (-0.51) -0.064* (-1.89) -0.008 (-0.64) 
%CL 0.023 (0.57) -0.311* (-1.86) 0.355*** (3.92) 0.056 (1.00) 
ZSCORE 0.002* (1.85) -0.006* (-1.84) -0.003 (-0.94) -0.001 (-0.73) 
MANUF -0.015 (-1.33) 0.093*** (3.04) 0.068*** (2.74) -0.005 (-0.31) 
AUDTEN -0.001 (-0.81) -0.001 (-0.32) -0.001 (-0.48) 0.000 (0.36) 
CYCLE -0.000* (-1.88) -0.000* (-1.74) -0.000*** (-3.15) 0.000** (2.00) 
MTR 0.005 (0.28) 0.023 (0.37) 0.017 (0.29) -0.041 (-1.53) 
ACCR   0.540*** (2.91) 0.723*** (3.66)   
YEAR 
DUMMIES 
YES  YES  YES  YES  
(Intercept) 0.122** (2.15) -0.127 (-1.06) -0.095 (-1.04) -0.020 (-0.25) 
N 278  278  278  278  
adj. R2 0.232  0.195  0.259  0.137  
F test β1+β3=0 -0.008 1.16 -0.021 0.29 -0.015 0.21 0.019 2.49 
t statistics in parentheses Significance is indicated by *p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01, based on firm-level clustered errors 
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Table 8 Continued 
 
 REM1  REM2  
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
ERP 0.139** (2.52) 0.167*** (2.70) 
POST 0.058 (0.91) 0.022 (0.30) 
ERP x POST -0.174** (-2.17) -0.159* (-1.76) 
LGTA 0.038* (1.74) 0.028 (1.13) 
ROA -0.298 (-0.68) -0.634 (-1.20) 
AUD 0.052 (0.91) 0.032 (0.46) 
MTB -0.026** (-2.07) -0.032** (-2.20) 
LEV -0.107 (-0.86) -0.157 (-1.08) 
NOA 0.170** (2.38) 0.098 (1.22) 
MKTSHARE -0.277 (-1.43) -0.110 (-0.42) 
INST -0.082 (-1.26) -0.106 (-1.40) 
%CL 0.044 (0.18) 0.102 (0.35) 
ZSCORE -0.009 (-1.44) -0.012 (-1.54) 
MANUF 0.161*** (3.18) 0.146** (2.52) 
AUDTEN -0.002 (-0.44) -0.001 (-0.19) 
CYCLE -0.001** (-2.57) -0.000 (-1.07) 
MTR 0.040 (0.35) -0.035 (-0.24) 
ACCR 1.263*** (3.72)   
YEAR 
DUMMIES 
YES  YES  
(Intercept) -0.222 (-1.17) -0.269 (-0.98) 
N 278  278  
adj. R2 0.173  0.084  
F Test β1+β3=0 -0.035 0.27 0.008 0.01 
t statistics in parentheses 
Significance is indicated by *p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01, based on firm-level clustered errors  
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Table 9 Efficient Model Analysis of Earnings Management:  Pre versus Post Implementation - Implementers and 
Control Sample 
 
 ABSDA  REM 
DIS 
 REM 
PROD 
 REM 
CASH 
 REM1  REM2  
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff.  
ERP -0.010 (-0.90) 0.009 (0.60) 0.002 (0.17) 0.005 (0.48) 0.011 (0.47) 0.016 (0.56) 
POST -0.010 (-0.69) -0.010 (-0.50) -0.020 (-1.19) -0.004 (-0.31) -0.030 (-0.95) -0.034 (-0.92) 
ERP x 
POST -0.004 (-0.29) -0.046* (-1.78) -0.035 (-1.56) 0.000 (0.02) -0.081* (-1.86) -0.081 (-1.55) 
LGTA -0.013*** (-5.23) 0.042*** (7.00) -0.003 (-0.59) -0.014** (-2.34) 0.039*** (4.05) 0.026** (1.97) 
MTB 0.003* (1.76) -0.01*** (-3.29) -0.01*** (-2.89) -0.004 (-1.47) -0.02*** (-3.24) -0.02*** (-3.11) 
NOA -0.004 (-0.46) 0.004 (0.19) 0.003 (0.16) -0.04*** (-3.36) 0.007 (0.20) -0.031 (-0.83) 
INST -0.003 (-1.19) 0.011 (1.31) -0.004 (-0.54) -0.01*** (-3.58) 0.007 (0.48) -0.006 (-0.38) 
%CL 0.110* (1.86) -0.38*** (-4.84) 0.289*** (4.43) -0.048 (-0.58) -0.092 (-0.73) -0.140 (-0.84) 
MANU -0.001 (-0.17) 0.010 (0.78) 0.018 (1.27) 0.000 (0.04) 0.028 (1.18) 0.028 (1.01) 
CYCLE -0.000* (-1.66) -0.000* (-1.65) -0.000* (-1.85) 0.000** (2.13) -0.000** (-2.04) -0.000 (-0.87) 
YEARS  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Cons 0.153*** (3.78) 0.016 (0.26) -0.022 (-0.36) -0.008 (-0.08) -0.006 (-0.07) -0.014 (-0.10) 
N 1308  1308  1308  1308  1308  1308  
adj. R2 0.068  0.183  0.067  0.072  0.075  0.048  
F Test 
β1+β3=
0 
-0.014 2.76 -0.037* 3.17 -0.001** 4.27 -0.009 0.13 -0.070** 3.83 -0.065 2.30 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
Significance is indicated by *p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01, based on firm-level clustered errors 
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Table 10 Efficient Model Regression Analysis of Earnings Management for Suspect Firms: Pre versus Post 
Implementation – Implementers and Control Sample 
 
 ABSDA  REM 
DIS 
 REM 
PROD 
 REM 
CASH 
 REM1  REM2  
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
ERP -0.021 (-1.54) 0.079** (2.34) 0.073*** (2.73) 0.014 (0.87) 0.152*** (2.71) 0.166*** (2.66) 
POST -0.022* (-1.68) 0.015 (0.40) 0.021 (0.70) -0.010 (-0.67) 0.036 (0.57) 0.026 (0.39) 
ERP x 
POST 0.006 (0.37) -0.085* (-1.80) -0.069* (-1.69) 0.006 (0.30) -0.154* (-1.86) -0.148 (-1.65) 
LGTA -0.01*** (-3.96) 0.023* (1.85) 0.009 (0.99) -0.000 (-0.02) 0.032 (1.57) 0.032 (1.43) 
MTB 0.004* (1.66) -0.02*** (-3.07) -0.02*** (-2.68) -0.01*** (-2.67) -0.04*** (-3.05) -0.04*** (-3.14) 
NOA 0.030*** (3.19) 0.094** (2.22) 0.051* (1.86) -0.04*** (-3.34) 0.145** (2.18) 0.102 (1.41) 
INST 0.004 (0.55) -0.041 (-1.19) -0.076** (-2.19) -0.005 (-0.47) -0.118* (-1.77) -0.123* (-1.71) 
%CL -0.009 (-0.24) -0.326* (-1.87) 0.349*** (3.67) 0.073 (1.36) 0.023 (0.09) 0.096 (0.34) 
MANU -0.011 (-0.94) 0.092*** (3.11) 0.066*** (2.77) -0.006 (-0.42) 0.158*** (3.21) 0.151*** (2.76) 
CYCLE -0.000 (-1.64) -0.000 (-1.42) -0.000** (-2.26) 0.000** (2.19) -0.001* (-1.91) -0.000 (-1.22) 
YEARS YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Cons 0.166*** (4.09) -0.118 (-0.84) -0.208** (-2.15) -0.019 (-0.33) -0.326 (-1.44) -0.345 (-1.36) 
N 278  278  278  278  278  278  
adj. R2 0.126  0.165  0.159  0.096  0.105  0.082  
F Test 
β1+β3=0 -0.015** 3.84 -0.006 0.03 0.004 0.02 0.020** 3.07 -0.002 0.00 0.018 0.06 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
Significance is indicated by *p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01, based on firm-level clustered errors 
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III. ESSAY 2: REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND AUDIT REPORT LAG 
Motivation 
This study examines whether there is a relationship between real earnings 
management [REM] activities and audit report lags [ARLs]. Following the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oley Act [SOX], new SEC rules have reduced the time for 10-K filings as part 
of the effort to provide timely information to investors and to promote confidence in the 
capital markets. As a consequence audit report lags became an important concern for 
regulators. 
Prior research defines the audit report lag as the time between the fiscal year end 
and the date of the audit report. This measure intrinsically reflects auditor effort. More 
specifically, Bamber et al. (1993) show that audit report lags are a function of the audit 
work, which in turn is related to the audit’s complexity and the auditor’s business risk. 
Consistent with this result, Knechel and Payne (2001) find that audit report lags are 
positively associated with audit hours, Lobo and Zhao (2013) find a negative relation 
between audit effort and restatements and Schelleman and Knechel (2010) find that 
auditors engage in more work when they detect earnings management through accruals.  
PCAOB AU Section 329A Substantive Analytical Procedures calls on auditors to 
consider unexplained differences that may indicate an increased risk of material 
misstatement. O’Keefe, Simunic and Stein (1994) find that increases in risk exacerbate 
the scope of the audit plan, resulting in more audit hours being assigned. Thus the 
presence of abnormal differences that result from REM may increase audit risk and 
require more audit work to be performed. Specially, I argue that REM activities increase 
the audit work measured through audit report lags because the unusual or unexpected 
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relationships detected in the financial accounts will motivate auditors to perform 
additional analytical procedures.    
Following the passage of SOX, auditing practice changed. Cohen, Dey and Lys 
(2008) show that while SOX reduced manager’s flexibility to engage in accruals 
management, it was also associated with an increase in the use of REM. This 
phenomenon was also documented in Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal’s (2005) survey 
were manager’s noted a preference for the use of real earnings management – even 
though it could have a negative impact on their firm’s financial condition. 
The negative long-term consequences of REM have been broadly explored in 
prior studies, and the literature conjectures that managing earnings through REM has an 
adverse impact on future cash flows (Roychowdhury 2006; Badertscher 2011; Cohen and 
Zarowin 2010). Such declines in client firms’ financial condition is thus of interest to 
auditors, because the financial condition of client-firms is a primary factor influencing 
auditors’ determinants of risk in planning the audit (Pratt and Stice 1994). 
Research on the association between REM and audit-related topics is limited. 
Previous studies have found, however, that auditors care about REM (Zang 2012; Chi, 
Lisic and Pevzner 2011; Kim and Park 2014; Commerford, Hermanson, Houston and 
Peters 2014). According to Kim and Park (2014) the presence of real earnings 
management is a subject of auditor concern because it can contribute to an increase in 
audit risk. When associated with meeting earnings targets, this increased risk is also 
associated with auditor resignations. Furthermore, Chi, Lisic and Pevzner (2011) find 
(consistent with prior literature) that firms audited by higher quality auditors lead 
managers to use real earnings management, and Jӓrvinen and Myllymӓki (2015) 
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document that managers of companies that disclose material internal control weaknesses 
may engage in REM to boost earnings and thus reduce the negative impact of disclosing 
those material weaknesses.  
Using U.S. firm data from 2004 to 2014, I examine the association of REM with 
audit report lags. I perform my analysis using Roychowdhury’s (2006) measures of REM 
(abnormal operating cash flows, abnormal discretionary expenses and abnormal 
production). In addition, I focus on firm-years where firms’ just meet/beat zero earnings 
and or the previous year’s earnings, and on accelerated versus non-accelerated fillers. My 
results suggest that after controlling for other factors, auditors perceive firms that engage 
in real earnings management activities as being more risky – a situation that requires 
additional audit effort.  
This study contributes to the existing literature by extending the literature linking 
REM to audit practice. Previous studies document that audit effort reduces managers’ use 
of accruals to manage earnings (Caramanis and Lennox 2008), and although REM is not 
considered a violation of US GAAP, auditors should consider the impact of such 
practices when performing their risk assessment. To this end, I examine the impact of 
REM on audit effort as measured by ARLs. Consistent with prior research (Mitra, Song 
and Yang 2015; Wang and Zhou 2012), my results support the top-down risk-based audit 
approach required by Auditing Standard No. 5 [PCAOB, 2007], in that the presence of 
earnings management, even when it violates no rules per se, invokes greater scrutiny and 
additional audit effort. 
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Prior Literature 
Prior research documents that managers engage in earnings management to meet 
earnings benchmarks and to avoid (or minimize) losses (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; 
Gunny 2010). The literature suggests that managers are willing to engage in this behavior 
because the capital markets reward those firms that meet or beat earnings thresholds 
(Barth, Elliott and Finn 1999; Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 2002; Lopez and Rees 2002). 
Most of the prior studies on earnings management have focused on managers’ use 
of discretionary accruals to meet these targets. However, several studies have also studied 
REM as a form of earnings management. While not a new concept, REM is defined as 
the departure from normal operations by managers in order to mislead shareholders to 
make them believe a target has been met (Roychowdhury 2006).  Graham et al.’s (2005) 
seminal paper reveals that managers are willing to take these kinds of actions, even if 
they are a detriment to future firm value, because REM activities are harder to detect. 
As described above earnings management can be achieved by taking advantage of 
accounting discretion or by changing the timing or structure of real transactions (Bartov 
1991; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005). A unique characteristic of this latter approach is that 
it results in a reduction in long-term firm value (Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005; 
Roychowdhury 2006; and Zang 2012), while accruals management is not likely to 
destroy long-term value (Badertscher 2011). Earnings management choices depend, 
however, on managers’ flexibility to make those choices. After the passage of SOX, 
earnings management through accruals became more likely to draw scrutiny from 
auditors and regulators (Cohen et al. 2008), and, as shown by Ewert and Wagenhofer 
(2005), in a rational expectations equilibrium model, regulations that are intended to 
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improve earnings quality can actually lead to a substitution effect between accruals 
management and REM. The result is that regulatory actions that restrict managers’ ability 
to use accruals management can increase REM and decrease firm value. 
Cohen et al. (2008) document that after the passage of SOX, the prevalence of 
accruals management declined while the prevalence of REM increased. They attribute 
this phenomenon to accruals management being more likely to draw the attention of 
auditors and regulators. This substitution effect is also studied by Zang (2007) who 
documents a trade-off between accruals management and REM based on the relative 
costliness of the two mechanisms.  
The general concensus among REM studies is that real activities actions 
negatively affect the future performance of firms engaged in these practices (Cohen and 
Zarowin 2010; Roychowdhury 2006; Burgstahler 2011). Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find, 
for example, that firms that engage in real activities management prior to a seasoned 
equity offering, subsequently experience a decline in performance. Consistent with this 
finding, Roychowdhury (2006) conjectures that real activities manipulations can diminish 
firm value, since these practices have a negative effect on the future cash flows. In 
addition, Kim and Sohn (2013) show that REM is costly because the capital markets 
detect the adverse future consequences of REM which in turn leads to an increase in the 
cost of capital.1 Such managerial opportunism should not only cause investors to 
scrutinize the abnormal differences, auditors should as well, since clients’ abnormally 
aggressive operating decisions may affect the client’s business risk. 
                                                
1 Uniquely, Gunny (2010) finds a positive association between REM and one-year-ahead 
ROA.  
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Broadly speaking, client business risk is defined as the risk that the client’s 
economic condition will deteriroate in the short or long term (Johnstone 2000). As client 
business risk increases, the potential for economic deterioration also heightens earnings 
manipulation risk (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997), and manipulation risk is associated 
with audit risk (Bedard and Johnstone 2004). Additional research also argues that the 
client’s financial condition can influence the level of audit risk (Johnstone 2000; O’Keefe 
et al. 1994). It follows, therefore, that real activities actions are directly linked to audit 
risk and business risk. For example, a firm cutting advertising expense to achieve a short 
term earnings target is also likely to experience a reduction in future cash flows that 
otherwise would have derived from that advertising. Similarly, reductions in SG&A 
might adversely affect the effectiveness of firms’ internal control systems. Each of these 
impacts the business/audit risk and increases the auditor’s litigation risk. Pratt and Stice 
(1992) find that auditors are concerned about clients’ financial condition because “poor 
financial condition [is] associated with higher levels of litigation risk and more audit 
evidence” (p.640). Consistent with this statement, Bamber et al. (1993) find that audit 
report lags, a measure of audit effort, are associated with clients’ financial condition. 
Since audit report lags can be a proxy for audit effort - the unusual increased hours spent 
on audit planning, substantive testing and internal control evaluation (Knechel, Rouse 
and Schelleman 2009) they also reveal what Blankley, Hurtt and MacGregor (2015) 
implicitly describe as difficulties faced during the audit. 
Accounting researchers have used audit report lags as a proxy for audit effort 
(Knechel et al., 2009) and for the amount of audit work required (Knechel, et al. 2001; 
Tanyi, Raghunandan and Barua 2010; Knechel and Sharma 2012). This proxy is 
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important because it can affect earnings announcements and is also considered the most 
important factor in the timeliness of earnings announcements (Ashton, Willingham and 
Elliot 1987). Givoly and Palmon (1982) find, for example, that markets react negatively 
to longer audit report lags. They explain this reaction as representative of a loss of 
information content.  
Since prior research provides evidence that earnings management is associated 
with audit litigation risk (Heninger 2001; Bedard and Johnstone 2004; Lee and Son 
2009), and Caramanis and Lennox (2008) show that low levels of audit hours are 
associated with more accruals management to meet or beat benchmarks, auditors are 
likely to take measures to mitigate this risk by applying more audit effort. Bedard and 
Johnston (2004) suggest, for example, that auditors mitigate their exposure risk by 
charging higher audit fees to cover the cost associated with spending more time on risky 
audits, and Lee and Son (2009) document that earnings management is reduced when 
auditors increase effort. These studies, however, explore only the association of audit 
effort with abnormal accruals. This is understandable, because accruals management may 
involve a violation of GAAP while REM does not. Recent studies show, however, that 
auditors do care about REM (Zang 2012; Chi, Lisic and Pevzner 2011; Kim and Park 
2014). I extend those studies by examining whether the increased risk caused by REM is 
a trigger for greater scrutiny by auditors. Given these arguments I express my hypothesis 
about the effect of REM on audit report lags in the following null form: 
H1: There is no association between REM and audit report lags. 
Then SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt noted in 1998 that markets punish companies 
that miss earnings benchmarks. Companies, therefore, have incentives to meet or beat 
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those earnings benchmarks in order to avoid the negative impact that failing to meet 
benchmarks would have on stock values. This phenomenon has been studied by prior 
studies (Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser 1999; Bartov et al. 2002; Brown and Caylor 
2005). Kasznik and McNichols (2002) find, for example, that investors perceive firms 
that consistently meet thresholds as being less risky and Rickling, Rama and 
Raghunandan (2013) find that the relevance of earnings thresholds is also recognized by 
auditors. They show that firms that repeatedly meet or beat analyst expectations are 
viewed as less risky, since audit fees are negatively associated with meet/beat earnings 
thresholds. It would seem, therefore, that while meeting benchmarks is indicative of 
lower risk (shorter ARLs), meeting them in concert with REM would result in increased 
audit effort (longer ARLs). To test which factor dominates this relationship I examine the 
association of REM with ARLs for subsamples of firms that meet/beat (do not meet/beat) 
earnings benchmarks. My second hypothesis (in null form) is thus: 
H2: Meeting or beating earnings benchmarks via REM is not associated with 
audit report lags. 
The SEC has introduced important changes that have affected the audit 
environment. Specially, the SEC has shortened the filing deadlines for certain firms, with 
the intent to provide timely information to investors. In particular the changed rules 
establish three categories of issuers “large accelerated filers,” “accelerated filers,” and 
“non-accelerated filers” (17 CFR 240.12b-2 – Definitions). Large accelerated filers must 
generally file their Form 10-K within 60 days of the firm’s fiscal year end. Accelerated 
filers are required to file their 10-K within 75 days of fiscal year end. Non-accelerated 
filers must file their 10-K within 90 days of their fiscal year end. As discussed by Munsif, 
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Raghunandan and Rama (2012), the differences in the deadlines for accelerated filers and 
non-accelerated filers, has an impact on audit effort. In particular they note that non-
accelerated filers are not required to have auditor attestation on internal controls while 
accelerated filers are subject to auditor and manager assessment of internal controls. If, as 
a consequence, non-accelerated filers are riskier, REM should be associated with longer 
ARLs to a greater extent for non-accelerated than for accelerated filers. If, however, 
accelerated filers, by virtue of their size, represent higher business risk for auditors, then 
REM would be with associated with longer ARLs to a greater extent for accelerated than 
for non-accelerated filers. Given these contradictory possibilities, my third hypothesis (in 
null form) is: 
H3: REM is not associated with audit report lags differentially by filing status. 
Research Method 
To measure real earnings management, I rely on the three proxies of 
Roychowdhury (2006): abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal discretionary 
expenses, and abnormal production costs. Companies may, for example, boost their sales 
by offering temporary discounts and lenient credit terms to customers. Managers may, 
similarly, boost earnings by cutting discretionary operating expenses, or they may 
overproduce to shift manufacturing overhead to the balance sheet. To measure these three 
factors, it is necessary to generate the normal levels of: cash flow from operations [CO], 
discretionary expenses [DX], and production costs [PC].  
The residuals from the following models serve as the measures of abnormal cash 
from operations [REMCASH], discretionary expenses [REMDISC] and production costs 
[REMPROD]. Following Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008), I 
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also create a composite measure REM1 which is the sum of components REMDISC and 
REMPROD, and REM2 which is which is the sum of components REMDISC, 
REMPROD and REMCASH.  To obtain the residuals, I run the following cross sectional 
regressions for each real earnings management activity. I estimate equations 1 to 3 by 
year and two-digit SIC code.2 
Operating cash flows: 
CO!
ASSETS!!! = 𝛼! 1ASSETS!!! + 𝛼! SALES!ASSETS!!! + 𝛼! ∆SALES!ASSETS!!! + 𝜀!                       (1) 
Where: 
 CO  = cash flow from operations 
 ASSETS = total assets 
 SALES = net sales 
 ΔSALES = change in sales from time t-1 to t 
Discretionary expenses: 
DX!
ASSETS!!! = 𝛼! 1ASSETS!!! + 𝛼! SALES!!!ASSETS!!! + 𝜀!                                                          (2) 
Where: 
 DX = discretionary expense measured as the sum of advertising expense, 
R&D, and selling, general, and administrative expenses and the other variables are as 
defined above. 
Production costs: 
                                                
2 I require a minimum of 15 observation for each two-digit SIC code in each year to make 
these estimations. 
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PC!
ASSETS!!! = 𝛼! 1ASSETS!!! + 𝛼! SALES!ASSETS!!! + 𝛼! ∆SALES!ASSETS!!! + 𝛼! ∆SALES!!!ASSETS!!!+ 𝜀!                                                                                                                         (3) 
Where: 
PC = the sum of the cost of goods sold and change in inventory. 
Consistent with prior studies I multiply REMDISC and REMCASH by negative 1, so that 
they can be interpreted in the same way as REMPROD.  
In order to examine the association between real earnings management and audit 
report lags I follow prior studies (Krishnan and Yang 2009; Tanyi et al. 2010; Knechel 
and Sharma 2012; Munsif et al. 2012; Blankley, Hurtt and MacGregor 2014), in 
constructing my model. I include five variables to control for the potential effect of 
different financial risks on audit delay. I include the presence of losses [LOSS], the 
current ratio [CR], return on assets [ROA], leverage [LEV], and going concern opinions 
[GC]. To control for differences across industry groups, I incorporate 3 dichotomous 
variables for high litigation industries [HIGHTLIT], high growth industries 
[HIGHGROWTH] and high tech industries [HIGHTECH]. Furthermore I include six 
variables that are proxies for audit complexity. These are busy season [BUSY], total 
assets [LGTA], business segments [LGSEGMENTS], foreign operations [FOROPS], 
extraordinary items [EXITEM], and pension plans [PENSION]. Finally, I include a 
number of variables that have been identified in prior literature as important determinants 
of audit report lags. These are auditor size [BIG4], auditor changes [AUCHG], audit fees 
[LGAUDITFEE], and earnings growth [EARGROWTH]. I include discretionary accruals 
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[ABSDACC] because prior research has shown earnings management through accruals to 
be a substitute for or complement to REM. The resulting empirical model is: 
LAG = β0 +β1REM +β2LGTA +β3LGSEGMENTS +β4LGSEGMENTS +  
            β5LGAUDITFEE +β6CR +β7ROA +β8LEV +β9EARGROWTH + 
β10FOROPS +β11PENSION +β12GC +β13LOSS +β14EXITEM +  
            β15ACQ +β16BIG4 +β17AUCHG +β18HIGHTECH +β19HIGHGROWTH + 
β20HIGHTECH +β21BUSY +β22ABSDACC + ԑ                                   (4) 
Where: 
LAG= logarithm of audit report lags; 
LGTA= logarithm of total assets ($ millions); 
LGSEGMENTS= logarithm of the number of business segments; 
LGAUDITFEE= logarithm of audit fees ($ thousands); 
CR= current ratio; 
ROA= earnings before interest and taxes; 
LEV= long-term debt divided by total assets; 
EARGROWTH= the change in net income divided by lagged net income; 
FOROPS= 1 if the firm has any foreign operations, 0 otherwise;  
PENSION= 1 if the firm has a defined benefit pension plan, 0 otherwise; 
GC= 1 if the auditor issued a going-concern opinion, 0 otherwise; 
LOSS= 1 if the firm reported a loss, 0 otherwise; 
EXITEM= 1 if the client reported an extraordinary item, 0 otherwise; 
ACQ= 1 if the firm engaged in an acquisition or merger, 0 otherwise; 
BIG4= 1 if the firm is audited by a BIG 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; 
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AUCHG= 1 if the firm changed auditor during the current year, 0 
otherwise; 
HIGHTECH= 1 if the firm is in high-tech industry (SIC codes 283, 284, 
357, 366, 367, 371, 382, 384, or 737), 0 otherwise;  
HIGHGROWTH= 1 if the firm is in a high-growth industry (SIC codes 
35, 45, 48, 49, 52, 57, 73, 78 or 80), 0 otherwise;  
HIGHTLIT=1 if the firm is in a high litigation industry (SIC codes 28, 35, 
36, 38, 73), 0 otherwise; 
BUSY= 1 if the firm’s fiscal year ends in December or January, 0 
otherwise; 
ABSDACC = Absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using 
performance-adjusted cross-sectional modified Jones. 
To test hypotheses 2 and 3 I use the same model I employ to test hypothesis 1, but 
partition the sample to: 1) focus on firms-years that just meet/beat earnings targets, and 2) 
separate accelerated from non-accelerated filers. 
Sample Selection 
My sample period covers 2004-2014. Table 1, Panel A presents the data selection 
process. I use the Audit Analytics database to identify the audit report date. Financial data 
is obtained from the Compustat annual database.  I begin with the Audit Analytics data 
and delete firms that are in the financial and utility sectors. I remove OTC pink sheet 
firms,3 firms missing SIC codes, and duplicate data. Finally, I merge this data with the 
                                                
3 The filings of OTC-pink sheet firms were excluded from the sample because the 
companies are unable or unwilling to meet the minimum U.S. stock market 
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financial data from Compustat and delete firms-years without the data necessary to 
calculate the REM estimations. My final sample for the audit report lag model contains 
36,416 firm year-observations. The number of observations used in each of the 
regressions is a subgroup of the overall sample because there is variation in the number 
of observations available for each REM model. I winsorize continuous variables at the 
1% and 99% levels. 
Similar to prior studies I calculate ARLs as the number of days between fiscal 
year-end and the date of the audit report. Table 1, Panel B presents trends in the ARL for: 
all firms, accelerated fillers, and non-accelerated filers. The proportions of this sample 
are distributed by filer status as follows: large accelerated 30%, accelerated 33%, and 
non-accelerated filers 37 %.  
 Consistent with prior research (Krishnan and Yang 2009) there is a decline in the 
median audit report lag over time. This trend is explained by the recent rule changes 
which aimed to reduce audit report lags and provide timely information to investors. 
After 2006 the median audit report lag dropped significantly as a response to these new 
rules. It is interesting to observe that non-accelerated fillers have the same response to the 
SEC rules even though they were not required to file within a shorter time period. 
Results 
Descriptive Data 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the model. Panel A 
displays the descriptive statistics for the continuous variables. The REM variables 
                                                                                                                                            
qualifications, and because they are not required to file financial statements with the 
SEC. 
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(REMCASH, REMDISC and REMPROD) are, in general, consistent with prior studies 
(Cohen et al. 2008, and Zang 2012). The mean (median) of abnormal cash flow from 
operations (REMCASH) are 0.09 (-0.02). The mean (median) for the abnormal 
discretionary expenditures measure (REMDISC) are -0.08 (-0.00), and the mean 
(median) for the abnormal production measure (REMPROD) are 0.01 (-0.01). The mean 
(median) of the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) are 0.11 (0.10), and 
the mean (median) of audit report lags are 72.6 days (69 days).  
The firms cover a wide range of conditions (accelerated filer and non-accelerated 
filers), and have an average size (LGTA) of 5.53 (median 5.65). The mean current ratio 
(CR) for these firms is 2.61 and the median is 1.97.  In Panel B we can see that 
approximately 67% of the firms have a December or January fiscal year end (BUSY). A 
loss is noted in about 40% of the firm years and over 49% of the firms have foreign 
operations (FOROPS). On average 21% of the firms are audited by Big 4 audit firms and 
6% of the firms experienced a change in auditor during a given year (AUCHG). 
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlations. The analysis shows a significant 
correlation between REMDISC and REMPROD. This result is consistent with Zang 
(2012), and indicates that firms use both forms of real earnings management at the same 
time. Consistent with our first hypothesis, all our REM measures are significantly 
correlated with audit report lags. The LGTA is also significantly correlated with other 
variables, indicating some degree of multicollinearity, To ensure that this is not problem, 
I calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF) for the variables used in the regression 
model. Untabulated results show that all variables had VIF scores under 5.68 leading me 
to conclude that multicollinearity is not a problem. 
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Results 
H1 
Table 4 presents the multivariate tests examining the association of REM with 
ARLs after controlling for factors associated with audit report lags. The R-squared for 
REMCASH, REMDISC, REMPROD, REM1 and REM2 are 0.289, 0.287, 0.310, 0.307 
and 0.307 respectively, and are consistent with prior research. The magnitude and 
significance of the control variables are also generally consistent with prior studies. For 
example, the coefficients of LGTA, LOSS and GC are significant and have the expected 
sign. The results indicate that large firms have shorter ARLs, and firms in poor financial 
conditions have longer ARLs.  
Regarding my variables of interest, REMDISC is positively associated with audit 
report lags (p-value ≤ 0.01), as are REMPROD (p ≤ 0.01), REM1 (p ≤ 0.01), and REM2 
(p ≤ 0.01). The coefficient on REMCASH is, however, not significantly different from 
zero (p = 0.54). The coefficient on REMDISC is associated with a 2 percent increase in 
audit report lags. The increase in audit report lags is also significant for REMPROD, 
REM1 and REM2, with incremental increases in ARLs equivalent to 3.26 percent, 2.27 
percent and 1.47 percent respectively. 
The results presented in Table 4 columns (2)-(5) suggest that consistent with H1, 
real earnings management activities (REMDISC, REMPROD, REM1 and REM2) are 
associated with longer audit report lags. This suggests that auditors recognize the risk 
driven by REM and, as a consequence, increase their audit effort. 
 77 
H2 
Prior studies have indicated that firms with earnings just at or above zero are more 
likely to have engaged in earnings management to meet those benchmarks (Burgstahler 
and Dichev 1997, Roychowdhury 2006). Following prior studies, I classify firms that 
manage their earnings upward close to zero [Suspects] as those firms with net income 
before extraordinary items, scaled by total assets between 0 and 0.01. This subsample of 
firms with stronger incentives to manage earnings may be indicative of increased risk 
and, as a result, auditors may assign significantly more audit hours to these firms. Table 
5, Panel A, reports the results of my regressions for the two groups: Suspect and Non-
Suspect firms. In all of the regressions I find that the coefficients on REMDISC, 
REMPROD, REM1 and REM2 are positive and highly significant (p-values less than 
0.01). This would indicate that the presence of REM results in greater audit effort, 
regardless of whether firms meet earnings targets.  
Table 5, Panel B shows however, that the magnitude of the impact is significantly 
greater for suspect firms. The coefficients on REMDISC for suspect firms and non-
suspect firms are, for example, 0.058 and 0.017 respectively. These indicate that, on 
average, the presence of REM along with firms just meeting earnings targets is associated 
5.9 percent increase in ARLs, while REM alone increases ARLs 1.7 percent. The 
magnitude of the coefficient for Suspect firms is 3.4 times that of the coefficient for Non-
Suspects. With the exception of the coefficients on REMCASH, Wald tests show that the 
differences between the coefficients for the two sub-samples are statistically significant at 
the 0.001 level, with the coefficients for the suspect firms being significantly greater than 
those for non-suspects. This result is consistent with the impact of REM on audit effort 
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being more pronounced for the suspect firms, as auditors employ more time in order to 
reduce the risk associated with the real earnings management activities for these firms. 
H3  
 Table 6 presents the results of my tests of an association between filing status, 
REM and ARLs. Panel A of Table 6 shows that REM is associated with audit report lags 
for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers. These results are consistent with my 
previous tests in that the coefficients on REMDISC, REMPROD, REM1 and REM2 are 
positive and significant in all the models. For accelerated fillers the coefficients are: 
REMDISC (0.0686; p-value ≤ 0.01), REMPROD (0.047; p ≤ 0.01), REM1 (0.035; p ≤ 
0.01), and REM2 (0.028; p ≤ 0.01). For non-accelerated filers the coefficients are: 
REMDISC (0.012; p-value ≤ 0.05), REMPROD (0.020; p ≤ 0.01), REM1 (0.0155; p ≤ 
0.01), and REM2 (0.01; p ≤ 0.01). Thus regardless of filing status, REM is associated 
with auditors devoting additional time to obtain evidence about client firms’ financial 
reports.  
The amount of additional time is not, however, equal across filing groups. Panel B 
of Table 6 shows that audit report lags are associated with REM to a greater extent for 
firms that are classified as accelerated filers than for non-accelerated filers. This may be 
because accelerated filers are, de facto, larger than non-accelerated filers, or because 
accelerated filers present a higher risk profile because they must comply with SOX 
Section 404(b) while the Dodd-Frank Act exempted smaller firms from the Section 
404(b) attestation requirement. 
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Additional Analysis 
Suspect Accelerated Filers vs. Suspect Non-Accelerated Filers 
Since engaging in REM and being a suspect firm or an accelerated filer are 
associated to a significantly greater extent with ARLs than being a non-suspect or non-
accelerated filer, I examine which of these characteristics is dominant.  
Table 7, Panel A presents the results of my tests after partitioning my sample into 
suspect accelerated filers and suspect non-accelerated filers. For both sub-samples the 
coefficients are positive and significant (except for REMCASH). However, while the 
coefficients for the suspect accelerated filer sub-sample appear to be larger than those for 
the suspect non-accelerated group, Wald tests (untabulated) indicate there are no 
differences between the groups. I conclude from this that auditors are more cautious and 
engage in more audit effort when firms just meet earnings benchmarks, regardless of 
filing status. 
Short versus Long Audit Report Lags 
Prior research has shown that changes in 10-K filing dates affect the quality of 
accounting information (Lambert, Jones and Brazel 2011, Bryant-Kutcher, Peng and 
Weber 2013). Lambert et al. (2011) show that reductions in filing deadlines reduce the 
auditors’ effectiveness in constraining accruals earnings management. Bryant-Kutcher et 
al. (2011) find that reductions in filing deadlines result in a decrease in accounting 
information reliability (firms are more likely to restate financial statements after the time-
to-file was reduced). To examine this issue, I partition my sample into short4 and long 
                                                
4 Firms with an audit report lag of less than 30 days are coded 1, 0 otherwise (Short 
Report Lags). For Long Report Lag, large accelerated filers with an audit report lag of 50 
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audit report lags and test whether REM is similarly associated with ARLs for the two 
groups. I use the following model to investigate the relation between short and long audit 
report lags and REM.  
REM = β0 +β1SHORT(LONG) +β2LGTA +β3LGSEGMENTS +  
             β4LGSEGMENTS +β5LGAUDITFEE +β6CR +β7ROA +  
             β8LEV +β9EARGROWTH +β10FOROPS +β11PENSION +  
             β12GC +β13LOSS +β14EXITEM +β15ACQ +β16BIG4 +  
β17AUCHG +β18HIGHTECH +β19HIGHGROWTH +β20HIGHTECH + 
β21BUSY +β22ABSDACC + ԑ                                    (5) 
The results of my tests are reported in Table 8. Short audit report lags are not 
associated with REM in any of my models. Interestingly, however, firms with longer 
audit report lags are associated with lower levels of REM. This result is consistent with 
Lee and Son (2009) where they show that firms are less likely to engage in accruals 
management as the audit report lag increases. 
Summary 
Prior research has generally examined the conjecture that REM is costly in its 
impact on financial performance. This study contributes to this area of research by 
examining the impact of REM on audit effort and the timeliness of financial information. 
I test the association between REM and audit report lags in general, for a sample of 
suspect versus non-suspect firms, and for accelerated versus non-accelerated filers. My 
results indicate that the incidence of REM is associated with longer ARLs. I find that 
                                                                                                                                            
to 60 days, accelerated filers with audit report lags of 65 to 75 days, and non-accelerated 
filers with audit report lags of 80 to 90 days are coded 1. Other ARLs are coded 0. 
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overall, REM is associated with ARLs, and that the impact of REM on ARLs is greater 
for suspect firms. These results are significant in that despite the fact that REM violates 
no accounting principles, it likely triggers higher risk assessments by auditors and a 
resulting increase in audit effort. In particular, these results suggest that auditors are 
allocating more resources to audits when they encounter REM. This association is 
important, in that it appears REM imposes greater costs on auditors. Since prior research 
indicates that REM has, to a large extent, replaced accruals management as a way for 
firms to meet earnings benchmarks, these results should be of importance to auditors as 
they plan and price audits. It should also be of importance to regulators since shorter 
filing deadlines put greater pressure on auditors and may interfere with their ability to 
conduct additional substantive tests when they encounter REM.   
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Table 1 Sample Selection 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
          
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Firms in Audit 
Analytics with Audit 
Opinion 
15,396 15,400 15,203 15,463 15,486 15,512 15,885 15,202 15,188 16,793 20,394 
Less: 
           Financial Firms (SIC 
60-69) 7,043 6,665 6,283 6,047 5,945 5,739 5,675 5,334 5,124 5,792 7,334 
Utility Firmis (44-49) 954 918 887 849 863 788 724 680 664 700 893 
OTC Firms and 
missing SIC Code 259 462 838 1,377 1,674 2,082 2,686 2,922 3,343 3,812 4,059 
Duplicates 242 270 283 318 593 706 831 696 745 1,435 2,181 
Merge with Compustat 
(cikcode) 2,105 2,409 2,372 2,559 2,359 2,185 2,034 1,677 1,420 1,224 1,949 
Financial Data REM 788 725 733 748 653 694 778 803 792 792 1,235 
Final Sample for 
analysis 4,005 3,951 3,807 3,565 3,399 3,318 3,157 3,090 3,100 3,038 2,743 
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Table 1 Continued 
Panel B: Audit Report Lags Mean and Median by Year 
  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Full Sample (Large Acc, 
Acc, and Non Acc) 
            
 
Mean 70.18  73.33  76.20  73.63  72.55  71.55  70.23  70.61  71.81  69.88  71.33  
 
Median 69.00  70.00  72.00  72.00  70.00  68.00  67.00  67.00  66.00  65.00  64.00  
 
n 4,005  3,951  3,807  3,565  3,399  3,318  3,157  3,090  3,100  3,038  2,743  
             Large Accelerated Filers Mean 
 
64.55  63.96  59.24  56.00  55.25  55.10  55.14  55.18  54.93  58.37  
 
Median 
 
62.00  59.00  58.00  57.00  56.00  55.00  55.00  57.00  57.00  57.00  
 
n 
 
598  1,031  1,091  1,061  929  923  1,040  1,071  1,160  1,150  
             Accelerated Filers Mean 67.56  40.87  73.96  72.14  70.26  67.09  66.38  67.51  68.27  68.55  72.72  
 
Median 69.00  70.00  72.00  75.00  71.00  69.00  68.00  69.00  70.00  70.00  71.00  
 
n 2,020  1,659  1,259  1,201  1,165  1,083  1,032  937  894  801  662  
             Non-Accelerated Filers Mean 77.76  78.98  85.89  87.07  88.91  86.63  85.07  87.06  87.00  86.75  86.62  
 
Median 75.00  76.00  84.00  87.00  86.00  86.00  85.00  87.00  89.40  86.00  86.00  
 
n 1,760  1,694  1,517  1,273  1,173  1,306  1,202  1,113  1,135  1,077  931  
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Continuous Variables 
    Variable n Mean S.D. 25% Median 75% 
       LAG 33,168 4.23 0.29 4.06 4.23 4.39 
REMCASH 33,168 0.09 0.48 -0.09 -0.02 0.1 
REMDISC 32,580 -0.08 0.39 -0.16 0 0.11 
REMPROD 31,097 0.01 0.35 -0.12 -0.01 0.1 
REM1 31,097 -0.07 0.59 -0.25 -0.01 0.2 
REM2 31,097 0.01 0.75 -0.27 -0.01 0.23 
LGTA 33,168 5.57 2.45 3.97 5.69 7.29 
LGSEGMENTS 33,168 1.15 0.85 0.69 0.69 2.08 
LGAUDITFEE 33,168 13.44 1.43 12.47 13.55 14.39 
CR 33,168 2.74 2.24 1.28 2.01 3.36 
ROA 33,168 -0.08 0.33 -0.06 0.02 0.05 
LEV 33,168 0.53 0.3 0.31 0.5 0.7 
EARGROWTH 33,168 -0.12 4.46 -0.72 -0.05 0.43 
ACCRUALS 33,168 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.1 0.18 
       Panel B: Indicator Variables 
    Variable n Rate of Occurance 
    FOROPS 33,168 49% 
    PENSION 33,168 10% 
    GC 33,168 9% 
    LOSS 33,168 39% 
    EXITEM 33,168 18% 
    ACQ 33,168 16% 
    BIG4 33,168 22% 
    AUCHG 33,168 6% 
    NASDAQ 33,168 55% 
    HIGHTECH 33,168 39% 
    HIGHGROWTH 33,168 26% 
    HIGHTLIT 33,168 52% 
    BUSY 33,168 67% 
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Table 3 Pearson Correlations 
 
LAG 
REM 
CASH 
REM 
DISC 
REM 
PROD REM1 REM2 LGTA 
LGSEG 
MENTS 
LG 
AUDIT 
FEE CR 
LAG 1 
         REMCASH 0.25 1 
        
 
0.00 
         REMDISC -0.15 -0.50 1 
       
 
0.00 0.00 
        REMPROD 0.10 0.36 0.24 1 
      
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
       REM1 -0.05 -0.19 0.88 0.68 1 
     
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      REM2 0.10 0.41 0.52 0.85 0.81 1 
    
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
     LGTA -0.52 -0.44 0.30 -0.08 0.18 -0.09 1 
   
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    LGSEGMENTS -0.12 -0.13 0.14 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.25 1 
  
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   LGAUDITFEE -0.45 -0.33 0.20 -0.07 0.11 -0.09 0.89 0.25 1 
 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  CR -0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.09 -0.07 -0.13 1 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.81 0.00 -0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 ROA -0.27 -0.71 0.41 -0.25 0.19 -0.25 0.47 0.13 0.34 0.13 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LEV 0.21 0.47 -0.22 0.11 -0.11 0.18 -0.34 -0.08 -0.23 -0.25 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EARGROWTH 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
 
-0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.22 -0.06 -0.32 -0.01 -0.02 -0.11 
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Table 3 Continued         
 LAG 
REM 
CASH 
REM 
DISC 
REM 
PROD REM1 REM2 LGTA 
LGSEG 
MENTS 
LG 
AUDIT 
FEE CR 
FOROPS -0.28 -0.23 0.13 -0.10 0.05 -0.10 0.48 0.16 0.56 -0.04 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PENSION -0.12 -0.08 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.22 0.13 0.23 -0.07 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.66 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GC 0.33 0.45 -0.24 0.16 -0.10 0.17 -0.47 -0.12 -0.38 -0.19 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LOSS 0.31 0.36 -0.22 0.16 -0.08 0.14 -0.41 -0.16 -0.30 -0.02 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
EXITEM -0.04 -0.05 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.17 0.16 0.20 -0.10 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ACQ -0.13 -0.09 0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.24 0.06 0.24 -0.06 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BIG4 -0.19 -0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.21 0.01 0.22 0.03 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 
AUCHG 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 
 
0.00 -0.12 -0.95 -0.13 -0.46 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.32 
NASDAQ -0.39 -0.25 0.13 -0.08 0.07 -0.08 0.55 0.17 0.52 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.99 
HIGHTECH 0.05 0.12 -0.16 -0.02 -0.13 -0.05 -0.22 -0.14 -0.10 0.22 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HIGHGROWTH 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.09 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.28 -0.17 0.00 
HIGHTLIT 0.04 0.11 -0.10 0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.20 -0.07 -0.06 0.20 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BUSY -0.09 -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.16 0.00 0.17 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.67 -0.32 0.00 0.00 -0.40 0.00 -0.89 
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Table 3 Continued          
 ROA LEV 
EAR 
GROWTH FOROPS PENSION GC LOSS EXITEM ACQ BIG4 AUCHG 
ROA 1 
           
           LEV -0.73 1 
          0.00 
          EARGROWTH -0.03 0.01 1 
         0.00 -0.15 
         FOROPS 0.22 -0.14 -0.02 1 
        0.00 0.00 0.00 
        PENSION 0.08 -0.03 -0.01 0.17 1 
       0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 
       GC -0.55 0.49 0.02 -0.24 -0.08 1 
      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
      LOSS -0.39 0.20 -0.05 -0.23 -0.09 0.33 1 
     0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
     EXITEM 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.08 -0.03 -0.02 1 
    0.00 -0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
    ACQ 0.09 -0.06 0.00 0.19 0.04 -0.10 -0.08 0.03 1 
   0.00 0.00 -0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   BIG4 0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.09 0.02 -0.12 -0.05 0.01 0.05 1 
  0.00 0.00 -0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.23 0.00 
  AUCHG 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 1 
 -0.47 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.43 0.00 0.00 
 NASDAQ 0.24 -0.18 0.00 0.32 0.13 -0.30 -0.30 0.05 0.18 0.17 -0.06 
 0.00 0.00 -0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
HIGHTECH -0.12 0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.11 0.07 0.19 -0.13 0.03 0.01 0.03 
 0.00 0.00 -0.59 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
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Table 3 Continued          
 ROA LEV 
EAR 
GROWTH FOROPS PENSION GC LOSS EXITEM ACQ BIG4 AUCHG 
HIGHGROWTH -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.08 -0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 
 0.00 0.00 -0.32 0.00 0.00 -0.85 0.00 -0.64 0.00 -0.49 -0.92 
HIGHTLIT -0.12 0.02 0.00 0.12 -0.06 0.06 0.15 -0.10 0.03 0.00 0.02 
 0.00 0.00 -0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.64 0.00 
BUSY 0.08 -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.01 
 0.00 0.00 -0.13 0.00 -0.91 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
            
 
 
 
NASDAQ 
HIGH 
TECH 
HIGH 
GROWTH 
HIGH 
LIT BUSY 
NASDAQ 1 
     
     HIGHTECH -0.08 1 
    0.00 
    HIGHGROWTH -0.03 0.18 1 
   0.00 0.00 
   HIGHTLIT -0.07 0.72 0.36 1 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 
  BUSY 0.14 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 1 
 0.00 0.00 -0.20 0 
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Table 4 Real Earnings Management and Audit Report Lags 
 1 2 3 4 5 
REMCASH -0.00248         (-0.61) 
REMDISC  0.0200
***    
-5.21 
REMPROD   0.0321
***   
-7.81 
REM1    0.0225
***  
-9.73 
REM2     0.0146
*** 
-7.3 
LGTA -0.0614
*** -0.0615*** -0.0666*** -0.0674*** -0.0662*** 
(-41.96) (-41.13) (-42.30) (-45.76) (-45.25) 
LGSEGMENTS 0.0059
*** 0.0051*** 0.0061*** 0.0042*** 0.0046*** 
-3.55 -2.99 -3.4 -2.58 -2.8 
LGAUDITFEE 0.0207
*** 0.0214*** 0.0321*** 0.0329*** 0.0317*** 
-8.71 -8.9 -12.62 -13.83 -13.33 
CR -0.0044
*** -0.0048*** -0.0054*** -0.0047*** -0.0047*** 
(-5.97) (-6.39) (-6.84) (-6.42) (-6.41) 
ROA 0.0693
*** 0.0638*** 0.0853*** 0.0746*** 0.0878*** 
-9.35 -10 -12.9 -11.89 -13.22 
LEV 0.0621
*** 0.0594*** 0.0428*** 0.0476*** 0.0470*** 
-10.41 -9.84 -6.77 -8.04 -7.93 
EARGROWTH -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 (-0.13) -0.05 (-0.55) (-0.87) (-0.90) 
FOROPS -0.0163
*** -0.0175*** -0.0164*** -0.0191*** -0.0188*** 
(-4.81) (-5.10) (-4.56) (-5.73) (-5.65) 
PENSION -0.0158
*** -0.0151*** -0.0179*** -0.0173*** -0.0172*** 
(-3.40) (-3.22) (-3.59) (-3.84) (-3.81) 
GC 0.0734
*** 0.0707*** 0.0905*** 0.0859*** 0.0867*** 
-11.27 -10.75 -13.59 -13.25 -13.37 
LOSS 0.0687
*** 0.0687*** 0.0719*** 0.0682*** 0.0689*** 
-20.19 -20.05 -20.47 -20.48 -20.67 
EXITEM 0.0099
*** 0.0076** 0.0089** 0.0081** 0.0087** 
-2.67 -2.03 -2.27 -2.23 -2.39 
ACQ -0.0053 -0.0064
* -0.0045 -0.0071* -0.0071* 
(-1.41) (-1.67) (-1.09) (-1.90) (-1.89) 
BIG4 -0.0600
*** -0.0617*** -0.0696*** -0.0670*** -0.0671*** 
(-17.63) (-17.93) (-19.29) (-20.08) (-20.10) 
AUCHG 0.0591
*** 0.0587*** 0.0599*** 0.0592*** 0.0595*** 
-10.35 -10.17 -10.09 -10.6 -10.64 
HIGHTECH -0.0134
*** -0.0101** -0.0124*** -0.0095** -0.0111*** 
(-3.27) (-2.44) (-2.90) (-2.37) (-2.77) 
HIGHGROWTH 0.0056 0.0065
* 0.0037 0.0056* 0.0056* 
-1.63 -1.89 -1.03 -1.66 -1.67 
HIGHTLIT -0.0294
*** -0.0322*** -0.0316*** -0.0340*** -0.0326*** 
(-6.87) (-7.45) (-7.03) (-8.11) (-7.78) 
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Table 4 Continued    
 1 2 3 4 5 
BUSY -0.0065
** -0.0051* -0.0084*** -0.0067** -0.0070** 
(-2.21) (-1.69) (-2.69) (-2.33) (-2.40) 
ABSACCR 0.1630
*** 0.1750*** 0.0414 0.0438* 0.0445* 
-6.61 -7 -1.59 -1.8 -1.82 
CONSTANT 4.263
*** 4.257*** 4.160*** 4.155*** 4.164*** 
-172.16 -169.78 -156.85 -167.81 -168.32 
N 33168 32580 27346 31097 31097 
adj. R2 0.289 0.287 0.31 0.307 0.307 
t statistics in parentheses  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5 Regression Suspects VS Non-Suspects (Subsample) 
Panel A  
  Suspects Suspects Suspects Suspects Suspects Non Suspects 
Non 
Suspects 
Non 
Suspects 
Non 
Suspects 
Non 
Suspects 
REMCASH 0.0479 
        -0.0026         
-1.5 (-0.63) 
REMDISC 
 0.0588***     0.0175***    
-3.32 -4.43 
REMPROD 
  0.0695***     0.0321***   
-3.77 -7.81 
REM1 
   0.0424***     0.0211***  
-4.3 -8.83 
REM2 
    0.0379***     0.0133*** 
-4.26 -6.49 
LGTA -0.0663
*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.061*** -0.0611*** -0.066*** -0.067*** -0.066*** 
(-16.06) (-16.52) (-17.16) (-17.35) (-17.22) (-38.92) (-38.09) (-42.30) (-42.61) (-42.14) 
LGSEGMENTS -0.0012 -0.0025 -0.0047 -0.0050 -0.0050 0.0071
*** 0.0062*** 0.0061*** 0.0057*** 0.0061*** 
(-0.34) (-0.59) (-1.14) (-1.23) (-1.21) -3.84 -3.33 -3.4 -3.17 -3.38 
LGAUDITFEE 0.0241
*** 0.0289*** 0.0340*** 0.0357*** 0.0346*** 0.0209*** 0.0213*** 0.0321*** 0.0334*** 0.0321*** 
-3.63 -4.28 -5.14 -5.37 -5.22 -8.21 -8.28 -12.62 -13.08 -12.62 
CR 0.0015 0.0008 0.0011 0.0007 0.0008 -0.0054
*** -0.0057*** -0.0054*** -0.0055*** -0.0055*** 
-0.77 -0.4 -0.57 -0.37 -0.4 (-6.71) (-7.05) (-6.84) (-6.98) (-6.98) 
ROA -0.0429 -0.0861 0.0310 0.0055 0.0366 0.0698
*** 0.0651*** 0.0853*** 0.0754*** 0.0874*** 
(-0.62) (-1.33) -0.48 -0.09 -0.56 -9.23 -9.95 -12.9 -11.74 -12.85 
LEV 0.1110
*** 0.1110*** 0.0842*** 0.0827*** 0.0810*** 0.0543*** 0.0517*** 0.0428*** 0.0418*** 0.0411*** 
-6.21 -6.14 -4.71 -4.63 -4.53 -8.52 -8.03 -6.77 -6.62 -6.51 
EARGROWTH -0.0060
** -0.0060** -0.0073*** -0.0074*** -0.0074*** 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
(-2.21) (-2.13) (-2.78) (-2.81) (-2.82) -0.26 -0.41 (-0.55) (-0.42) (-0.45) 
FOROPS -0.0292
*** -0.0312*** -0.0355*** -0.0351*** -0.0352*** -0.0148*** -0.0157*** -0.0164*** -0.0171*** -0.0168*** 
(-3.26) (-3.42) (-3.97) (-3.93) (-3.94) (-4.03) (-4.23) (-4.56) (-4.75) (-4.68) 
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Table 5 Panel A Continued      
PENSION -0.0169 -0.0151 -0.0147 -0.0150 -0.0151 -0.0160
*** -0.0156*** -0.0179*** -0.0182*** -0.0181*** 
(-1.60) (-1.40) (-1.41) (-1.44) (-1.45) (-3.12) (-3.01) (-3.59) (-3.66) (-3.63) 
GC 0.0229 0.0164 0.0509 0.0451 0.0464 0.0765
*** 0.0739*** 0.0905*** 0.0882*** 0.0891*** 
-0.68 -0.49 -1.55 -1.37 -1.41 -11.4 -10.93 -13.59 -13.23 -13.35 
LOSS 0.0319
** 0.0342** 0.0358** 0.0371*** 0.0371*** 0.0735*** 0.0731*** 0.0719*** 0.0726*** 0.0734*** 
-2.25 -2.39 -2.53 -2.62 -2.62 -20.48 -20.26 -20.47 -20.7 -20.91 
EXITEM 0.0053 0.0052 0.0088 0.0077 0.0077 0.0103
** 0.0076* 0.0089** 0.0078** 0.0083** 
-0.55 -0.55 -0.92 -0.81 -0.81 -2.57 -1.88 -2.27 -1.98 -2.13 
ACQ -0.0164
* -0.0203** -0.0211** -0.0212** -0.0211** -0.0036 -0.0041 -0.0045 -0.0046 -0.0046 
(-1.80) (-2.21) (-2.34) (-2.36) (-2.34) (-0.86) (-0.97) (-1.09) (-1.13) (-1.13) 
BIG4 -0.0376
*** -0.0389*** -0.0492*** -0.0488*** -0.0490*** -0.0633*** -0.0649*** -0.0696*** -0.0694*** -0.0695*** 
(-4.31) (-4.37) (-5.66) (-5.62) (-5.63) (-17.16) (-17.42) (-19.29) (-19.24) (-19.26) 
AUCHG 0.0427
*** 0.0457*** 0.0473*** 0.0479*** 0.0473*** 0.0600*** 0.0593*** 0.0599*** 0.0598*** 0.0601*** 
-2.59 -2.71 -2.86 -2.9 -2.86 -9.86 -9.66 -10.09 -10.07 -10.11 
HIGHTECH -0.0006 0.0052 0.0025 0.0042 0.0043 -0.0141
*** -0.0112** -0.0124*** -0.0105** -0.0121*** 
(-0.06) -0.45 -0.22 -0.37 -0.38 (-3.21) (-2.53) (-2.90) (-2.44) (-2.83) 
HIGHGROWTH 0.0199
** 0.0195** 0.0136 0.0139 0.0148 0.0029 0.0039 0.0037 0.0035 0.0034 
-2.07 -2.02 -1.44 -1.48 -1.57 -0.79 -1.04 -1.03 -0.96 -0.94 
HIGHTLIT -0.0423
*** -0.0503*** -0.0411*** -0.0447*** -0.0434*** -0.0277*** -0.0304*** -0.0316*** -0.0329*** -0.0316*** 
(-3.61) (-4.18) (-3.55) (-3.83) (-3.73) (-6.03) (-6.54) (-7.03) (-7.31) (-7.02) 
BUSY 0.0009 0.0017 0.0026 0.0027 0.0032 -0.0073
** -0.0059* -0.0084*** -0.0079** -0.0081*** 
-0.11 -0.22 -0.33 -0.34 -0.41 (-2.30) (-1.83) (-2.69) (-2.53) (-2.60) 
ABSACCR  0.2560
*** 0.2280*** 0.0712 0.0651 0.0726 0.1580*** 0.1720*** 0.0414 0.0457* 0.0459* 
-3.72 -3.23 -1.01 -0.92 -1.03 -5.97 -6.43 -1.59 -1.75 -1.76 
CONSTANT 
4.227*** 4.192*** 4.149*** 4.138*** 4.145*** 4.261*** 4.258*** 4.160*** 4.149*** 4.158*** 
-61.4 -60 -60.49 -60.23 -60.42 -160.51 -158.44 -156.85 -156.18 -156.66 
N 3985 3877 3751 3751 3751 29183 28703 27346 27346 27346 
adj. R2 0.235 0.235 0.241 0.242 0.242 0.29 0.289 0.31 0.31 0.309 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 97 
Table 5 Panel B Difference Tests (Coefficients) 
 Suspect  Non Suspect  Difference 
 Coeff. Est. z-stat  Coeff. Est. z-stat  Coeff. Difference  Wald Chi-Square 
REMCASH 0.05 1.38  0 -0.49  0.05 2.05 REMDISC 0.06 3.26***  0.02 3.51***  0.041 4.88*** REMPROD 0.07 3.91***  0.03 6.40***  0.037 4.1*** 
REM1 0.04 4.45*** 
 
0.02 7.1***  0.021 4.55*** 
REM2 0.04 4.3***  0.01 5.08***  0.025 7.11*** 
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Table 6  Accelerated vs Non-Accelerated (Subsample) 
Panel A 
  Accel-erated 
Accel-
erated 
Accel-
erated 
Accel-
erated 
Accel-
erated 
Non- 
Accel-
erated 
Non- 
Accel-
erated 
Non- 
Accel-
erated 
Non- 
Accel-
erated 
Non- 
Accel-
erated 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
REM 
CASH 
-0.0185*         -0.0055         
(-1.82) (-1.08) 
REM 
DISC 
 0.0686***     0.0122**    
-11.02 -2.31 
REM 
PROD 
  0.0427***     0.0204***   
-6.49 -3.78 
REM1 
   0.0353***     0.0155***  
-9.78 -4.85 
REM2 
    0.0283***     0.0078*** 
-8.49 -2.9 
LGTA -0.0814
*** -0.0835*** -0.0806*** -0.0824*** -0.0811*** -0.0156*** -0.0157*** -0.0265*** -0.0271*** -0.0259*** 
(-49.02) (-49.16) (-47.66) (-48.33) (-47.94) (-5.90) (-5.86) (-9.90) (-10.11) (-9.71) 
LGSEG 
MENTS 
0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0011 0.0159*** 0.0147*** 0.0148*** 0.0144*** 0.0148*** 
-0.15 (-0.89) (-0.32) (-0.74) (-0.63) -4.21 -3.87 -4.03 -3.93 -4.04 
LGAUDIT 
FEE 
0.0674*** 0.0679*** 0.0656*** 0.0666*** 0.0656*** 0.0024 0.0040 0.0227*** 0.0244*** 0.0226*** 
-24.25 -24.34 -23.3 -23.68 -23.3 -0.57 -0.94 -5.34 -5.7 -5.3 
CR -0.0042
*** -0.0055*** -0.0051*** -0.0054*** -0.0055*** -0.0038*** -0.0038*** -0.0037*** -0.0038*** -0.0038*** 
(-5.40) (-6.91) (-6.35) (-6.77) (-6.82) (-2.63) (-2.64) (-2.65) (-2.70) (-2.69) 
ROA 0.0769
*** 0.0682*** 0.1190*** 0.1010*** 0.1260*** -0.0026 -0.0025 0.0154* 0.0093 0.0159* 
-4.66 -5.06 -8.45 -7.5 -9.01 (-0.27) (-0.29) -1.79 -1.12 -1.81 
LEV -0.0048 -0.0080 -0.0058 -0.0059 -0.0069 0.0782
*** 0.0751*** 0.0618*** 0.0608*** 0.0603*** 
(-0.68) (-1.13) (-0.81) (-0.83) (-0.96) -7.48 -7.12 -5.99 -5.89 -5.84 
EAR 
GROWTH 
-0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0007 
(-1.49) (-1.28) (-1.53) (-1.43) (-1.52) (-0.72) (-0.57) (-1.47) (-1.42) (-1.40) 
FOROPS -0.0299
*** -0.0295*** -0.0293*** -0.0289*** -0.0286*** -0.0013 -0.0021 -0.0016 -0.0022 -0.0020 
(-8.56) (-8.36) (-8.20) (-8.09) (-8.01) (-0.18) (-0.30) (-0.24) (-0.33) (-0.29) 
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Table 6 Panel A Continued        
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
PENSION -0.0132
*** -0.0129*** -0.0122*** -0.0129*** -0.0128*** -0.0152 -0.0169 -0.0222* -0.0229* -0.0228* 
(-3.11) (-2.99) (-2.82) (-2.98) (-2.96) (-1.21) (-1.33) (-1.81) (-1.86) (-1.86) 
GC 0.1190
*** 0.1170*** 0.1150*** 0.1160*** 0.1140*** 0.0781*** 0.0766*** 0.0960*** 0.0945*** 0.0957*** 
-9.36 -9.16 -8.91 -8.96 -8.84 -8.89 -8.65 -11.21 -11.03 -11.17 
LOSS 0.0542
*** 0.0540*** 0.0556*** 0.0552*** 0.0560*** 0.0448*** 0.0455*** 0.0475*** 0.0479*** 0.0484*** 
-13.26 -13.2 -13.39 -13.32 -13.5 -7.23 -7.3 -7.88 -7.96 -8.05 
EXITEM 0.0041 0.0007 0.0032 0.0018 0.0019 0.0285
*** 0.0264*** 0.0306*** 0.0292*** 0.0303*** 
-1.12 -0.19 -0.86 -0.47 -0.52 -3.54 -3.22 -3.91 -3.73 -3.86 
ACQ -0.0101
*** -0.0103*** -0.0100*** -0.00100*** -0.00100*** 0.0129 0.0104 0.00515 0.0046 0.0049 
(-2.83) (-2.86) (-2.73) (-2.68) (-2.68) -1.35 -1.07 -0.54 -0.48 -0.52 
BIG4 -0.0490
*** -0.0503*** -0.0510*** -0.0508*** -0.0510*** -0.0744*** -0.0764*** -0.1090*** -0.1090*** -0.1090*** 
(-15.40) (-15.67) (-15.73) (-15.68) (-15.73) (-8.46) (-8.61) (-12.27) (-12.28) (-12.26) 
AUCHG 0.0732
*** 0.0730*** 0.0727*** 0.0724*** 0.0726*** 0.0232** 0.0237** 0.0233** 0.0229** 0.0234** 
-10.98 -10.86 -10.67 -10.63 -10.65 -2.44 -2.46 -2.56 -2.51 -2.56 
HIGH 
TECH 
-0.0094** -0.0006 -0.0028 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0120 -0.0101 -0.0167** -0.0145* -0.0164** 
(-2.19) (-0.13) (-0.64) -0.08 (-0.13) (-1.53) (-1.27) (-2.21) (-1.90) (-2.16) 
HIGH 
GROWTH 
0.0089** 0.0098*** 0.0100*** 0.0100*** 0.0107*** -0.0069 -0.0056 -0.0081 -0.0081 -0.0087 
-2.4 -2.64 -2.67 -2.67 -2.84 (-1.08) (-0.88) (-1.30) (-1.30) (-1.40) 
HIGHTLIT -0.0351
*** -0.0430*** -0.0385*** -0.0417*** -0.0406*** -0.0185** -0.0200** -0.0225*** -0.0236*** -0.0222*** 
(-7.81) (-9.39) (-8.38) (-9.05) (-8.82) (-2.26) (-2.43) (-2.84) (-2.97) (-2.81) 
BUSY -0.0014 0.0014 0.0007 0.0009 0.0010 -0.0075 -0.0083 -0.0142
*** -0.0137*** -0.0140*** 
(-0.45) -0.44 -0.21 -0.27 -0.32 (-1.38) (-1.51) (-2.69) (-2.61) (-2.66) 
ABS 
ACCR 
0.0332 0.0414 0.0428 0.0411 0.0490* 0.2580*** 0.2670*** 0.0515 0.0611 0.0565 
-1.27 -1.57 -1.61 -1.55 -1.84 -5.5 -5.64 -1.11 -1.32 -1.22 
CONS 3.771
*** 3.786*** 3.792*** 3.793*** 3.799*** 4.327*** 4.312*** 4.152*** 4.134*** 4.151*** 
-125.02 -124.98 -123.75 -123.96 -123.97 -99.14 -97.05 -93.82 -92.78 -93.54 
N 20747 20332 20011 20011 20011 12421 12248 11086 11086 11086 
adj. R2 0.213 0.214 0.212 0.214 0.213 0.098 0.098 0.128 0.128 0.127 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6 Panel B Difference Tests (Coefficients) 
 Accelerated  Non-Accelerated  Difference 
 Coeff. Est. z-stat  Coeff. Est. z-stat  
Coeff. 
Difference 
 Wald Chi-
Square 
REMCASH -0.02 -1.64  0 -0.99  -0.02 1.07 REMDISC 0.06 10.25***  0.01 2.06**  0.05 39.65*** REMPROD 0.04 6.46***  0.02 3.36***  0.02 6.16** REM1 0.03 9.31*** 
 
0.01 4.22***  0.02 14.13*** REM2 0.02 7.72***  0 2.51**  0.02 18.40***  
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Table 7 REM and Audit Report Lags for Suspect Firms: Accelerated vs Non-Accelerated 
  Suspect Accel 
Suspect 
Accel 
Suspect 
Accel 
Suspect 
Accel 
Suspect 
Accel 
Suspect 
Non Accel 
Suspect 
Non Accel 
Suspect 
Non Accel 
Suspect 
Non Accel 
Suspect 
Non Accel 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
REM 
CASH 
-0.0227         -0.00582         
(-0.57) (-1.13) 
REM 
DISC 
 0.0604***     0.0107**    
-3.02 -1.99 
REM 
PROD 
  0.0342     0.0191***   
-1.6 -3.49 
REM1 
   0.0293***     0.0144***  
-2.61 -4.44 
REM2 
    0.0229**     0.00676** 
-2.22 -2.49 
LGTA -0.0739
*** -0.0747*** -0.0727*** -0.0740*** -0.0732*** -0.0144*** -0.0143*** -0.0253*** -0.0258*** -0.0246*** 
(-17.66) (-17.16) (-16.80) (-16.93) (-16.88) (-5.16) (-5.09) (-8.98) (-9.15) (-8.78) 
LGSEG 
MENTS 
-0.0046 -0.0051 -0.0047 -0.0051 -0.0049 0.0162*** 0.0155*** 0.0165*** 0.0161*** 0.0165*** 
(-1.18) (-1.28) (-1.15) (-1.26) (-1.21) -4.06 -3.85 -4.24 -4.16 -4.26 
LGAUDIT
FEE 
0.0502*** 0.0501*** 0.0488*** 0.0499*** 0.0490*** 0.0005 0.0019 0.0203*** 0.0220*** 0.0201*** 
-7.39 -7.3 -7.06 -7.2 -7.09 -0.12 -0.42 -4.6 -4.93 -4.54 
CR -0.0009 -0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0046
*** -0.0047*** -0.0044*** -0.0044*** -0.0044*** 
(-0.47) (-1.24) (-1.13) (-1.23) (-1.21) (-3.00) (-3.05) (-2.95) (-2.97) (-2.97) 
ROA -0.4570
*** -0.4500*** -0.4060*** -0.4200*** -0.3980*** -0.0032 -0.0026 0.0149* 0.0092 0.0148* 
(-4.24) (-4.52) (-3.93) (-4.15) (-3.88) (-0.32) (-0.29) -1.7 -1.08 -1.66 
LEV 0.0005 -0.0071 -0.0073 -0.0080 -0.0084 0.0751
*** 0.0717*** 0.0611*** 0.0602*** 0.0597*** 
-0.02 (-0.35) (-0.36) (-0.40) (-0.42) -6.88 -6.52 -5.68 -5.6 -5.55 
EAR 
GROWTH 
-0.0047 -0.0050 -0.0053* -0.0054* -0.0054* -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 
(-1.49) (-1.58) (-1.68) (-1.70) (-1.71) (-0.65) (-0.52) (-1.35) (-1.30) (-1.29) 
FOROPS -0.0473
*** -0.0479*** -0.0498*** -0.0492*** -0.0494*** -0.00333 -0.00341 -0.00355 -0.00409 -0.00391 
(-5.33) (-5.29) (-5.41) (-5.35) (-5.37) (-0.46) (-0.46) (-0.50) (-0.57) (-0.55) 
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Table 7 Continued        
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
PENSION -0.0019 -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0081 -0.0116 -0.0167 -0.0172 -0.0172 
(-0.20) (-0.12) (-0.09) (-0.15) (-0.13) (-0.59) (-0.85) (-1.26) (-1.30) (-1.29) 
GC 0.0855 0.0758 0.0830 0.0792 0.0802 0.0794
*** 0.0782*** 0.0963*** 0.0949*** 0.0962*** 
-1.23 -1.09 -1.18 -1.13 -1.14 -8.87 -8.65 -11.01 -10.85 -10.99 
LOSS -0.0179 -0.0147 -0.0175 -0.0162 -0.0166 0.0483
*** 0.0486*** 0.0506*** 0.0509*** 0.0515*** 
(-1.03) (-0.84) (-0.96) (-0.89) (-0.92) -7.38 -7.39 -7.95 -8 -8.1 
EXITEM -0.00211 -0.0032 -0.0016 -0.0026 -0.0023 0.0282
*** 0.0256*** 0.0290*** 0.0277*** 0.0288*** 
(-0.23) (-0.34) (-0.17) (-0.28) (-0.24) -3.35 -3 -3.53 -3.37 -3.5 
ACQ -0.0183
** -0.0216** -0.0197** -0.0199** -0.0197** 0.0125 0.0112 0.0067 0.0061 0.0065 
(-2.19) (-2.54) (-2.29) (-2.31) (-2.29) -1.24 -1.1 -0.67 -0.61 -0.65 
BIG4 -0.0306
*** -0.0332*** -0.0336*** -0.0335*** -0.0337*** -0.0755*** -0.0774*** -0.1050*** -0.1060*** -0.1050*** 
(-3.78) (-4.03) (-4.02) (-4.01) (-4.03) (-8.14) (-8.30) (-11.27) (-11.29) (-11.26) 
AUCHG 0.0497
*** 0.0526*** 0.0526*** 0.0528*** 0.0528*** 0.0239** 0.0238** 0.0237** 0.0233** 0.0238** 
-2.73 -2.82 -2.77 -2.78 -2.78 -2.4 -2.36 -2.48 -2.44 -2.49 
HIGH 
TECH 
-0.0153 -0.0086 -0.0104 -0.0083 -0.0087 -0.0144* -0.0129 -0.0195** -0.0173** -0.0193** 
(-1.36) (-0.76) (-0.90) (-0.72) (-0.76) (-1.77) (-1.57) (-2.48) (-2.19) (-2.45) 
HIGH 
GROWTH 
0.0190** 0.0188** 0.0178* 0.0181* 0.0187* -0.0082 -0.0072 -0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0092 
-2.03 -2 -1.87 -1.9 -1.95 (-1.24) (-1.08) (-1.31) (-1.31) (-1.42) 
HIGHLIT -0.0238
** -0.0302** -0.0253** -0.0287** -0.0272** -0.0137 -0.0151* -0.0184** -0.0194** -0.0181** 
(-2.08) (-2.54) (-2.15) (-2.41) (-2.30) (-1.62) (-1.77) (-2.24) (-2.34) (-2.19) 
BUSY 0.0039 0.0072 0.0075 0.0077 0.0080 -0.0076 -0.0084 -0.0144
*** -0.0139** -0.0142*** 
-0.49 -0.89 -0.92 -0.95 -0.99 (-1.34) (-1.46) (-2.61) (-2.53) (-2.58) 
ABS 
ACCR 
0.0497 0.0405 0.0603 0.0527 0.0603 0.2330*** 0.2450*** 0.0407 0.0501 0.0456 
-0.71 -0.56 -0.82 -0.72 -0.82 -4.72 -4.91 -0.84 -1.03 -0.94 
CONS  3.988
*** 4.004*** 4.005*** 4.002*** 4.007*** 4.349*** 4.335*** 4.176*** 4.159*** 4.176*** 
-54.68 -54.38 -53.8 -53.8 -53.85 -95.88 -93.95 -90.72 -89.74 -90.47 
N 2994 2913 2864 2864 2864 11430 11284 10199 10199 10199 
adj. R2 0.203 0.201 0.2 0.201 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.13 0.13 0.129 
t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 8 Short and Long Audit Report Lag 
  Short Short Short Short Short Long Long Long Long Long 
 
REM 
CASH 
REM 
DISC 
REM 
PROD REM1 REM2 
REM 
CASH 
REM 
DISC 
REM 
PROD REM1 REM2 
LAG 
DUMMY 
0.0098 -0.0407 -0.0238 -0.0661 -0.054 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0089** -0.0144** -0.0156** 
-0.36 (-1.35) (-0.81) (-1.30) (-0.92) (-0.20) (-0.06) (-2.31) (-2.17) (-2.03) 
LGTA -0.0281
*** 0.0592*** 0.0353*** 0.0964*** 0.0656*** -0.0281*** 0.0591*** 0.0353*** 0.0964*** 0.0657*** 
(-14.36) -27.69 -17.05 -26.94 -15.83 (-14.35) -27.66 -17.09 -26.96 -15.85 
LGSEG 
MENTS 
-0.0012 0.0285*** 0.0192*** 0.0473*** 0.0479*** -0.0012 0.0285*** 0.0191*** 0.0473*** 0.0478*** 
(-0.71) -11.54 -8.19 -11.69 -10.21 (-0.72) -11.56 -8.17 -11.68 -10.19 
LGAUDIT 
FEE 
0.0233*** -0.0726*** -0.0321*** -0.1090*** -0.0808*** 0.0232*** -0.0724*** -0.0319*** -0.1090*** -0.0804*** 
-7.31 (-20.99) (-9.55) (-18.80) (-11.98) -7.31 (-20.95) (-9.49) (-18.73) (-11.92) 
CR 0.0084
*** 0.0083*** 0.0045*** 0.0132*** 0.0205*** 0.0084*** 0.0083*** 0.0049*** 0.0132*** 0.0204*** 
-8.48 -7.66 -4.75 -7.36 -9.82 -8.48 -7.65 -4.71 -7.32 -9.78 
ROA -0.9720
*** 0.2740*** -0.3860*** -0.1170*** -1.0830*** -0.9720*** 0.2740*** -0.3860*** -0.1170*** -1.0830*** 
(-115.89) -30.1 (-43.30) (-7.59) (-60.63) (-115.89) -30.1 (-43.31) (-7.59) (-60.64) 
LEV 0.0327
*** 0.0223** -0.0368*** -0.0081 0.0315* 0.0326*** 0.0224** -0.0375*** -0.0092 0.0303* 
-4.08 -2.56 (-4.38) (-0.56) -1.87 -4.06 -2.56 (-4.46) (-0.63) -1.8 
EAR 
GROWTH 
0.0007* -0.0012*** 0.0015*** 0.0004 0.0012 0.0007* -0.0012*** 0.0014*** 0.0004 0.0012 
-1.66 (-2.69) -3.39 -0.49 -1.4 -1.66 (-2.69) -3.38 -0.47 -1.38 
FOROPS -0.0295
*** 0.0061 -0.0352*** -0.0262*** -0.0564*** -0.0295*** 0.0061 -0.0351*** -0.0261*** -0.0563*** 
(-6.48) -1.23 (-7.43) (-3.20) (-5.94) (-6.47) -1.22 (-7.42) (-3.19) (-5.93) 
PENSION 0.0155
** 0.0276*** 0.0197*** 0.0456*** 0.0608*** 0.0155** 0.0276*** 0.0199*** 0.0459*** 0.0611*** 
-2.48 -4.07 -3.07 -4.12 -4.74 -2.49 -4.07 -3.1 -4.14 -4.76 
GC 0.0213
** 0.1240*** 0.0084 0.1250*** 0.1350*** 0.0213** 0.1240*** 0.0076 0.1230*** 0.1330*** 
-2.44 -13.11 -0.91 -7.83 -7.3 -2.43 -13.1 -0.83 -7.75 -7.23 
LOSS -0.0365
*** -0.0253*** 0.0349*** 0.0143* -0.0256*** -0.0365*** -0.0253*** 0.0347*** 0.0140* -0.0259*** 
(-8.00) (-5.11) -7.38 -1.75 (-2.70) (-8.00) (-5.10) -7.34 -1.71 (-2.73) 
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Table 8 Continued        
EXITEM 0.0074 0.0656
*** 0.0270*** 0.0914*** 0.0989*** 0.0074 0.0657*** 0.0270*** 0.0914*** 0.0990*** 
-1.49 -12.08 -5.24 -10.26 -9.58 -1.49 -12.09 -5.25 -10.27 -9.59 
ACQ 0.0030 0.0041 -0.0026 0.0030 0.0021 0.0030 0.0040 -0.0024 0.0029 0.0024 -0.58 -0.73 (-0.48) -0.28 -0.2 -0.58 -0.72 (-0.45) -0.31 -0.22 
BIG4 0.0039 -0.0140
*** 0.0004 -0.0089 -0.0051 0.0039 -0.0142*** 0.0000 -0.0096 -0.0057 
-0.85 (-2.80) -0.08 (-1.09) (-0.53) -0.86 (-2.85) -0.01 (-1.17) (-0.60) 
AUCHG 0.0005 0.0131 0.0166
** 0.0293** 0.0273* 0.0005 0.0131 0.0162** 0.0287** 0.0266* 
-0.06 -1.57 -2.09 -2.14 -1.72 -0.06 -1.56 -2.04 -2.09 -1.67 
HIGH 
TECH 
-0.0061 -0.1350*** -0.0812*** -0.2110*** -0.2140*** -0.0061 -0.1350*** -0.0812*** -0.2110*** -0.2140*** 
(-1.10) (-22.63) (-14.37) (-21.59) (-18.87) (-1.10) (-22.64) (-14.38) (-21.61) (-18.88) 
HIGH 
GROWTH 
-0.0297*** -0.0132*** -0.0415*** -0.0519*** -0.0813*** -0.0297*** -0.0133*** -0.0418*** -0.0525*** -0.0819*** 
(-6.43) (-2.64) (-8.66) (-6.27) (-8.46) (-6.43) (-2.65) (-8.72) (-6.34) (-8.52) 
HIGH 
LIT 
0.0094 0.1050*** 0.0774*** 0.1840*** 0.1880*** 0.0094 0.1050*** 0.0774*** 0.1840*** 0.1880*** 
-1.63 -16.81 -13.07 -17.92 -15.87 -1.64 -16.8 -13.07 -17.92 -15.87 
BUSY 0.0046 -0.0219
*** 0.0044 -0.0150** -0.0089 0.0045 -0.0217*** 0.0048 -0.0142** -0.0080 
-1.15 (-5.09) -1.06 (-2.12) (-1.08) -1.14 (-5.05) -1.18 (-2.00) (-0.97) 
ABS 
ACCR 
-0.0535 -0.2240*** 0.0384 -0.1130* -0.2200*** -0.0535 -0.2240*** 0.0366 -0.1160* -0.2240*** 
(-1.62) (-6.20) -1.11 (-1.88) (-3.18) (-1.62) (-6.21) -1.06 (-1.94) (-3.23) 
CONS 
-0.154*** 0.546*** 0.187*** 0.770*** 0.562*** -0.154*** 0.544*** 0.189*** 0.771*** 0.565*** 
(-4.64) -15.09 -5.34 -12.68 -7.99 (-4.62) -15.04 -5.39 -12.71 -8.03 
N 33168 32580 31097 31097 31097 33168 32580 31097 31097 31097 
adj. R2 0.515 0.166 0.11 0.062 0.204 0.515 0.166 0.11 0.062 0.204 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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IV. ESSAY 3: REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND FUTURE 
PERFORMANCE 
Motivation 
Emerging research on real earnings management [REM] has expressed the 
concern that firms deviating from normal business practices may endure a negative 
impact on future cash flows and performance. Not all studies have, however, found a 
negative impact of REM on future performance. As a consequence, a new stream of 
research is emerging that examines whether actions that would mechanically be identified 
as REM are truly earnings management, or are, simply efficient business activities. I 
further this stream of inquiry by identifying factors: restructurings; and expectations of 
future sales growth, that can be useful in making a distinction between earnings 
management and “just business.” 
The main objective of financial reporting is to provide information about a 
company’s performance. The Financial Accounting Standard Board’s [FASB] Statement 
of Financial Accounting Concept No. 1 defines earnings as an important component in 
assessing companies’ performance. This is because earnings are used as a summary 
measure of firm performance (Dechow 1994) that incorporates the activities of a firm 
over specific periods of time.   
The traditional view of accounting information is that it plays an informativeness 
role for external evaluators (Ronen 1979; Gjesdal 1989; Dye 1988). Consistent with this 
view, a number of studies show that accounting earnings are used by capital markets in 
pricing debt and equity (Ball and Brown 1968; Bernard and Thomas 1990; Ou and 
Penman 1989). Because accounting numbers reflect performance, they also serve as a 
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basis for the contractual arrangements of the firm, and because they are mutually 
observable, they play an important role in the contractual arrangements of executive 
compensation. This role, however, creates incentives for managers to manage earnings in 
order to increase their compensation (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  
According to Healy and Wahlen (1989) earnings management can be classified 
into two categories: accruals management and real earnings management. The former 
involves generally accepted accounting principles [GAAP], and occurs when managers 
manage reported earnings by using the discretion allowed under GAAP. The latter occurs 
when managers take actions that change the timing or structure of actual business 
activities. 
The prevailing conjecture is that earnings management is costly to firms and 
shareholders, and several studies have focused on the economic consequences of accruals 
management. Xie (2001) for example, studies accruals management and long window 
equity returns. He finds that securities markets overprice earnings that are the result of 
manager’s discretionary accruals. Consistent with this evidence, Sloan (1996) offers the 
conjecture that the lower persistence of earnings performance that results from the 
accrual component of earnings, may be due to the earnings management. Similarly 
Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002) show that the future performance of firms that manage 
accruals to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts is inferior to that of firms that do not engage 
in accruals management. 
Real earnings management has received considerable attention since Graham, 
Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) reported that 80% of U.S. executives surveyed were willing 
to reduce expenditures on R&D, advertising, and maintenance in order to meet earnings 
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benchmarks. Their finding is significant in that it suggests that managers in the U.S. may 
be willing to sacrifice the future performance of their companies in order to meet current 
period financial reporting targets.  
After SOX, managers have reduced the use of accruals management and increased 
the use of REM (Cohen, Dey and Lys 2008). This trade off has also been attributed to the 
higher levels of auditor and regulator scrutiny (Zang 2012). Furthermore, this 
phenomenon has affected the auditor-client relationship. Kim and Park (2014) find, for 
example, that firms with high levels of REM are associated with a higher likelihood of 
auditor resignation.  
Emerging research on real earnings management has also expressed the concern 
that firms manipulating their operations to manage earnings, and thus deviating from 
normal business practices, may endure a negative impact on future cash flows and 
performance. As a consequence real earnings management may be costly to shareholders 
since it may reduce firm value (Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005; Ronen and Yaari 2008; 
Badertscher 2011). Roychowdhury (2006) also suggests that real earnings management 
has negative consequences for future cash flows, and evidence indicates that markets see 
through cash flow manipulation and factor that into an increased cost of capital (Kim and 
Sohn 2013).   
Long-term performance may, for example, be negatively impacted by: temporary 
price discounts or more lenient credit terms that lower margins on future sales; reductions 
in valuable investments in research and development and SG&A activities; and/or by 
increasing investments in unneeded inventories via over-production. If this conjecture is 
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correct, then these negative long-term prospects should be incorporated into investor 
expectations. 
Not all studies have, however, found a negative impact of REM on future 
performance. Gunny (2010) for example, suggests that managers may engage in REM to 
convey information about future growth prospects. She finds increased ROA following 
REM activities that allowed firms to meet earnings targets. Therefore, it is possible that 
only managers who are confident about the prospects for improved future performance 
will engage in REM.  
Similarly, various activities (e.g., reductions in discretionary expenses following a 
restructuring), an activity that would be identified as REM, could result in real 
improvements in firm performance. Cready, Lopez and Sisneros (2012) note: “Take, for 
example, the case of a firm that undertakes a restructuring of operations. If the 
restructuring includes a workforce reduction and plant closing, then the firm may realize 
future efficiency gains from reduced payroll expenses and operating expenses associated 
with running the plant” (page 1166). They go on to write that “operating cash flows are 
less susceptible to temporal manipulation,” and their evidence suggests that the increases 
in earnings they document “are more likely to be the result of real improvements” (page 
1194). Similarly, firms may overproduce not to manage earnings, but in expectation of 
future sales growth (Thomas and Zang 2002). In other words, what may mechanically 
appear to be REM, may in fact be just business. 
As a consequence, a new stream of research is emerging that examines whether 
actions that would mechanically be identified as REM are truly earnings management, or 
are, simply efficient business activities. Vorst (2015), for example, identifies a 
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circumstance - the reversal of abnormal reductions in discretionary expense – that 
facilitates financial statement users in distinguishing between REM and efficient 
managerial actions. I further this stream of inquiry by identifying additional factors that 
can be useful in making this distinction. 
Prior Literature 
Consequences of REM 
A stream of research has focused on the economic consequences of REM. This 
research has examined the opportunism-based REM theory where managers engage in 
suboptimal levels of real activities in order to meet a performance target. A recent paper 
by Kothari, Mizik and Roychowdhury (2016), extends the study by Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010) by examining the opacity of earnings management. The study examines post-
seasoned equity offering [SEO] returns and the role of accruals versus real activities in 
inducing SEO overvaluation. The authors report a significantly negative future return 
when accruals management is used simultaneously with R&D or SG&A reduction to 
generate high earnings during an SEO. This finding suggests that investors cannot detect 
earnings management when real activities are the basis of that management.  
Kim and Sohn (2013), investigate the influence of REM on firms’ cost of capital. 
Their study documents a positive association between the cost of equity and REM. Using 
the average of three implied costs of equity, Beta, Size (log of market capitalization) and 
the Book-to-Market ratio, they find that stock markets penalize firms that engage in REM 
activities by imposing a higher cost of capital.  This link between REM and the cost of 
equity relies on the argument that when REM deteriorates reporting quality, it increases 
the noise in future cash flows, which in turn increases the expected cost of capital.  
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An increase on the cost of equity is not the only economic consequence of REM. 
REM may also have an impact on firms’ credit and bond ratings. Using the bond yield 
spread and the bond rating of firms that issued new bonds during 1993-2009, Ge and Kim 
(2014), examine the effect of REM on the bond market. Their results suggest that 
bondholders perceive REM as a credit risk, because bondholders tend to focus on firms’ 
ability to generate future cash flows. The deviation from optimal operations thus 
negatively affects the quality of the accounting information and the bondholders’ 
forecasts of future cash flows. This results in higher risk premiums. 
The impact of REM on stock prices has also been studied. Francis, Hasan and Li 
(2014) find that the less transparent a firm is, the larger the amount of bad news 
information it can hide. When, however, the capital markets observe the hidden negative 
information the stock price experiences a crash. The authors find a strong positive 
association between REM and the likelihood of a stock price crash in the next period.  
In analyzing firms that adopted a compensation clawback provision, Chan, Chen, 
Chen and Yu (2015) find that firms with increased REM exhibit a higher ROA in the year 
of the increased REM but subsequent years are characterized by declines in ROA. This is 
consistent with Gunny’s (2010) finding that firms that just meet earnings benchmarks by 
engaging in REM have significantly higher subsequent industry-adjusted ROA than firms 
that do not. Based on this result, she suggests that REM may be a mechanism firms use to 
signal future performance to the capital markets. Chan et al. (2015) suggest, however, 
that the increased ROA may be short-lived. Zhao, Chen, Zhang and Davis (2012) find, 
for example, that when firms fail to meet benchmark targets, REM is negatively 
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associated with future performance, while REM coincident with meeting benchmarks is 
positively associated with future performance. 
Restructuring Charges 
A corporate restructuring is defined as a change of the business strategy or 
structure to improve a firm’s future operations. Traditionally restructuring charges 
include costs such as the cost of laying-off/terminating employees, the cost of eliminating 
product lines, the cost to consolidate or relocate operations, losses on disposal of assets 
and losses relating to impairment. According to Atiase, Platt and Tse (2004) an 
operational restructuring is a common corporate reaction to poor performance. Thus, they 
examine whether firm performance improves after a restructuring. Their results reveal a 
positive association between restructuring charges and changes in operating income. 
Their findings are, however, mixed regarding cash from operations. Cready et al. (2012) 
show, however, that corporate restructurings should result in improved firm performance 
and that this should be reflected in operating cash flows. 
In 2002 the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) issued changes to 
SFAS 146, which modified the way companies account for restructuring costs.  Lee 
(2014) predicts that the new requirement (to recognize restructuring costs when incurred) 
will result in smaller and more frequent charges. These smaller charges will, therefore, 
have a smaller effect on future earnings. That research highlights the notion that normal 
charges are more likely to improve firm performance, because they result in fundamental 
improvements.  
Based on the above, I hypothesize that REM is not always “earnings 
management” in a negative sense. What may be thought to be REM can be “just 
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business.” Thus, I predict that firms that are identified as engaging in REM subsequent to 
a restructuring will have better financial performance. My first hypothesis (in alternative 
form) is thus: 
H1: Firms that engage in REM subsequent to a restructuring will exhibit 
improved operating performance while those that engage in REM absent a restructuring 
will not. 
Sales Growth 
Prior research documents that managers choose to overproduce in order to 
manipulate reported earnings. Firms could overproduce opportunistically to meet current 
period demand, and therefore allocate a portion of current period fixed costs from cost of 
goods sold to inventory. Roychowdhury (2006) finds that managers have incentives to 
over-produce in order to influence their earnings and avoid losses. Furthermore, 
inventory buildups convey a strong negative signal to investors, since they indicate the 
presence of slow-moving products that may have to be written off in the future (Lev and 
Thiagaranjan 1993). On the other hand, overproduction may indicate good news because 
managers expect sales to increase in the future. According to Jiambalvo, Noreen and 
Shevlin (1997), “managers may increase the percent of production added to inventory in 
anticipation of an increase in sales. Such behavior is clearly not opportunistic” (p 73).  
Overall, however, prior research does not clearly explain whether earnings management 
or general business management is the cause of changes in inventory. 
Lev and Thiagaranjan (1993) in examining the role of fundamentals in security 
valuation, analyze 12 fundamentals that provide signals to investors about the quality of a 
firm’s earnings. They find a negative association between stock returns and the inventory 
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signal. That is, a disproportionate increase in inventory is a negative signal to the stock 
market because it suggests difficulties in generating sales. 
 The negative effect of overproduction on firm value has also been observed for 
U.S. auto manufacturers. Bruggen, Krishnan and Sedatole (2011) find that automotive 
firms that over-produce subsequently incur an increase in the cost of customer incentives 
and advertising expenditures. The results of their field interviews indicate that the 
inventory buildup deteriorates the brand image of the firm. 
Similar to Roychowdhury (2006), Young, Peng, Chien and Tsai (2014) examined 
a sample of U.S manufacturing companies for the period 2003 to 2008, and find that after 
the adoption of SFAS No. 151 overproduction is exacerbated for firms that lack accrual 
management flexibility but have pressure to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. This 
study, furthermore, shows that overproduction is expensive because it diminishes 
economic income and firm value in the long-term. 
Firms’ fixed cost structures provide a more complete explanation on how 
overproduction results in higher accounting performance. Gupta, Pevzner and 
Seethamraju (2010), investigate the relation between fixed costs and performance. Their 
evidence reveals a significant association between overproduction and contemporaneous 
return on assets for firms with higher fixed costs and with incentives to overproduce. 
Their results indicate that the failure to adjust production after a decrease in demand (a 
delayed reaction) is not the reason for overproduction. 
Alternatively Jiambalvo et al. (1997), in exploring the change in the percent of 
production added to the inventory, find that it may not be an indicator of managers 
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behaving opportunistically. Instead, they find that it is an indicator that managers expect 
future growth in sales.  
When managers face incentives to meet earnings threshold they are likely to 
reduce resources, in order to meet the earnings target. According to Kama and Weiss 
(2013) when sales drop, managers respond by cutting costs more aggressively when they 
face incentive targets. The authors investigate the effect of incentives to meet earnings 
targets on firm cost structure. Focusing on operating costs (i.e., the costs of providing 
goods/services and the cost of marketing and distribution), the authors find that without 
incentives to avoid losses the costs are sticky. When, however, managers have pressure to 
meet earning benchmarks the costs become less sticky. 
The consequences of cutting resources may affect the future performance of the 
firm since firms may incur extra costs in the future in order to replace the resources that 
were cut before. For example, managers incur dismissal costs during the post-dismissal 
adjustment process and then later incur training costs when new employees are hired. 
Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (2003) indicate that in addition to the training costs, 
firms face organizational costs such as loss of morale and erosion of human capital.  
Similarly, firms may overproduce to shift fixed costs to inventory. They may also 
overproduce, however, because they anticipate future cost increases. According to 
Anderson, Banker, Huang and Janakiraman (2007) the SG&A cost ratio is a signal of 
future earnings changes. An increase in this ratio may indicate that resources are being 
used less efficiently, while a decrease in the ratio may show that managers have better 
control over costs. Typically this signal applies during revenue-increasing periods, 
because an increase in business activities requires managers to add more resources to 
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meet demand. The SG&A ratio therefore may provide evidence of the managers’ 
efficiency in controlling costs when the ratio declines.  This traditional view is not true, 
however, in all circumstances. When revenue declines, a company’s cost structure affects 
manager’s decisions to maintain resources. An increase in the SG&A cost ratio may thus 
be caused by managers’ decisions to maintain slack resources without adjustment, and 
may reflect manager’s expectations regarding future performance.  
Based on the above, and the conjecture that REM may be “just business”, I 
predict that firms that engage in REM and, in parallel, experience sales growth will have 
better financial performance. My second hypothesis (in alternative form) is thus: 
H2: Firms that are identified as engaging in REM while experiencing growth in 
future sales will exhibit improved operating performance while those that engage in REM 
absent a growth in sales will not. 
Research Method 
To measure real earnings management, I rely on two of the proxies of 
Roychowdhury (2006): abnormal discretionary expenses; and abnormal production costs. 
In order to measure these variables, it is necessary to generate the normal levels of 
discretionary expenses [DX], and production costs [PC].  
The residuals from the following models serve as the measures of REM: abnormal 
discretionary expenses [REMDISC]; and abnormal production costs [REMPROD]. To 
obtain the residuals, I run the following cross sectional regression for each real 
management activity.  
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Discretionary expenses: 
DX!
ASSETS!!! = 𝛼! 1ASSETS!!! + 𝛼! SALES!!!ASSETS!!! + 𝜀!                                                          (1) 
Where DX is discretionary expense measured as the sum of advertising expense, 
R&D, and selling, general, and administrative expenses, ASSETS is total assets, and 
SALES is net sales.  
Production costs: 
PC!
ASSETS!!! = 𝛼! 1ASSETS!!! + 𝛼! SALES!ASSETS!!! + 𝛼! ∆SALES!ASSETS!!! + 𝛼! ∆SALES!!!ASSETS!!!+ 𝜀!                                                                                                                         (2) 
Where PC is the sum of the COGS and change in inventory, ΔSALES is change 
in sales from time t-1 to t, and the other variables are as defined above. 
The first question of interest is whether firms that are identified as engaging in 
REM coincident with a restructuring, have improved their operating practices while those 
that engage in REM absent a restructuring have not. This is because the restructuring may 
have a long-term positive impact on performance, as compared to REM driven by short-
term earnings objectives. Thus I examine whether REM has an effect on the future 
performance of firms, after controlling for restructurings.  
I employ ROA, future stock returns and firm’s industry-adjusted cash flows from 
operating activities as measures of future financial performance. The dependent variables 
are: one, two and three years ahead values. My test model is:             Future Performance =β0 +β1REMDISC +β2RESTRUC +β3REMDISC x                    RESTRUC +β4REMDISC x BENCHMARK +β5REMDISC x RESTRUC x  
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        BENCHMARK +β6LGTA+β7MTB + Year & Industry Fixed Effects +       ε                                                                                                                                      (3)             
where Future Performance is: 1) return on assets, and 2) annual stock returns; RESTRUC 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm had restructuring expense in the year. All 
indicator variables not equal to 1 are set equal to 0. BENCHMARK is either MEET or 
MEETBEAT where MEET is an indicator variable equal to 1 if net income divided by 
beginning total assets is greater than or equal to zero but less than 0.01 and MEETBEAT 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if net income is greater than zero and greater than the 
prior fiscal year’s net income. 
My second question of interest is whether overproduction is representative of 
REM, or whether it may represent 1) anticipated future sales growth, 2) anticipated future 
cost increases, or 3) both of these. For these tests, I employ future sales growth 
[FSGROW] and return on sales [ROS] as measures of future performance. My test model 
is:      Future Performance = β0 +β1REMROD+β2SGROW+β3REMPROD x  
              SGROW +β4BENCHMARK+β5REMPROD x BENCHMARK+ 
              β6REMPROD x BENCHMARK x SGROW +β7MTB+β8LGTA+ 
              β9ITO +β10ICOGS +β11REMPROD x ICOGS +β12INVTA + 
               Year & Industry Fixed Effects + ε                                                                     (4) 
Where FSGROW is the change in sales for the fiscal year at time t+1; SGROW is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if current year sales growth is positive (year t-1 to t); ITO is 
inventory turnover; ICOGS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the change in cost of 
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goods sold as a percentage of revenues increases from time t-1 to t; INVTA is total 
inventory as a percentage of average total assets; and all other variables are as defined 
above. All indicator variables not equal to 1 are set equal to 0. 
Sample Selection 
Data were collected from Compustat for the 1988 through 2014 period. I chose 
1988 as the beginning year because it was the first year for which statement of cash flows 
information was available. After deleting firms in the financial services industry, my 
sample is comprised of 11,895 unique firms that met my data requirements. Table 1 
presents descriptive statistics for my sample. The mean (-.03) and interquartile range (-
.05 to 0.08) of ROA is stable across the t+1 through t+3 periods. RET is similarly stable 
(mean of 0.01 to 0.02, and interquartile range of -0.39 to 0.08).  FSGROW has a mean of 
0.02, a median value of 0.08, and an interquartile range of -0.03 to 0.20. ROS has a mean 
of -0.08, a median of 0.03 and an interquartile range of -0.06 to 0.08. The mean 
REMDISC is 0.08 with an interquartile range of -0.10 to 0.14. Similarly, the mean of 
REMPROD is 0 with an interquartile range of -0.10 to 0.12.  
There are 4,063 firm years where sample firms had small positive earnings 
[MEET] but when I expand the criteria to include all those whose earnings exceeded 
those of the prior year [MEETBEAT] I get 27,690 firm years. There are 11,073 instances 
of restructuring charges and 71,276 where the rate of increase in sales is positive from t-1 
to t.  In 52,731 instances the cost of goods sold as a percentage of revenues increased 
from time t-1 to t. 
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Results 
Return on Assets 
The results for my return on assets models are presented in Table 2.1 The tests 
where MEET represents my suspect firms are presented in Panel A. The coefficients on 
REMDISC in this model are negative (p-values ≤ 0.01). This is true for all three of the 
future periods. Similarly, the coefficients on RESTRUC are negative (p-values ≤ 0.01). 
The coefficients on the interaction of REMDISC and RESTRUC are, however, positive 
for periods t+1 and t+2. Taken together, these results support the general conjecture, that 
current period reductions in discretionary expense and restructurings are associated with 
poor future performance, but when a restructuring is coupled with cuts in discretionary 
expenses the impact on future performance is positive. I also find that while MEET is 
negatively associated with one-year ahead ROA, the interaction of MEET and REMDISC 
has a positive, but declining, association with future ROA. 
The results for my tests when I expand the suspect firms to include all those 
without losses who beat prior year’s earnings, MEETBEAT, are presented in Panel B. 
The results for these models are qualitatively identical to those reported in Panel A, with 
the notable exception of the significance of the coefficients on MEETBEAT. Where the 
coefficients on MEET were significant only in time t+1, the coefficients on MEETBEAT 
are positive (significant at the p-values ≤ 0.01 level) in all three future periods.  It is 
worth noting that low book-to-market ratios suggest that market participants have higher 
expectations of future growth. 
                                                
1 Fixed effects are not presented in the tables. 
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Consistent with Francis, Hanna, and Vincent (1996) these results show that 
restructuring charges convey information about the future performance. Table 2 Panel A 
and Panel B, provide evidence of the effect of special ítems and REM on future 
performance. The coefficients on the interaction of REMDISC and RESTRUC suggest 
that restructuring charges in conjunction of real activity actions tend to be followed by an 
increase in Return on Assets. This phenomena, is described by Atiase et al. (2004) as 
indicative of an increase in operating efficiency leading to higher profits. Furthermore, 
the results also indicate that REM in conjunction with beating benchmarks provides a 
signal of expected improvements in future performance (Gunny 2010).   
To some extent, these results clarify the idea that the reporting of restructuring 
charges in conjunction with managers’ decisions to cut discretionary expenses, is not 
necessary opportunistic behavior even though it does represent a departure from normal 
operations. Rather than misleading investors (earnings management) it is signal of 
management taking action to change and improve the firm’s situation. 
Stock Returns 
The results for my stock returns models are presented in Table 3. Panel A presents 
the results where MEET represents my suspect firms and Panel B presents the results 
where suspect firms are indicated by MEETBEAT. In both models, the coefficient on REMDISC is negative (p-values ≤ 0.01). In Panel A, restructuring is shown to be weakly, 
negatively associated with stock returns in year t+1 and the interaction of REMDISC and 
RESTRUC is positively associated with stock returns in years t+1, t+2 and t+3 (p-values 
≤ 0.05, 0.01 and 0.10 respectively). The coefficient on the interaction of REMDISC and 
MEET is significantly positive in year t+1 (p-values ≤ 0.05) while the coefficients on the 
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three-way interaction of REMDISC, RESTRUC and MEET are not significantly different 
from zero. Again, these results indicate that the reductions in discretionary expense that 
are associated with restructurings have a positive influence on future performance – in 
this case on future stock returns. 
The results when MEETBEAT represents my suspect firms are consistent with 
those discussed above for MEET. Of importance, however, is that the coefficients on 
MEETBEAT are significantly positive in all periods (p-values ≤ 0.01, 0.05, and 0.01 for 
years t+1 through t+3 respectively). The coefficient on the interaction of REMDISC and 
MEETBEAT is positive (p-values ≤ 0.05) at time t+1. The coefficients on the three-way 
interactions are not significantly different from zero.  
The results of these tests show that firms that reported restructuring charges (an 
example of special items) and engaged in discretionary expense reductions, reduced 
current period income but increased future income. This finding is consistent with what 
Burgstahler, Jiambalvo and Shevlin (2002) describe. Therefore, what prior research on 
real earnings management has indentified as improvements in reported performance 
driven by managers opportunistic behavior, may instead, be a response to serious 
financial issues in an attempt to help the company recover.   
Future Sales Growth 
The results for my future sales growth (and future return-on-sales) models are 
presented in Table 4. The coefficients on REMPROD are negative and significant in both 
the MEET (Panel A) and MEETBEAT (Panel B) models (p-values ≤ 0.05 and 0.01 
respectively). This suggests that overproduction may be the result of errors in predicting 
demand, or that it may be indicative of REM. The coefficients on SGROW are positive 
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(p-values ≤ 0.01). This indicates that current year sales growth is highly, positively 
associated with future period’s sales growth. Contrary to the results for REMPROD by 
itself, however, the coefficients on the interaction of REMPROD with SGROW are 
significantly positive (p-values ≤ 0.01). Thus when current period sales are increasing, 
over production is associated with sales increases in future periods. This suggests that 
when sales are increasing, overproduction is not REM, but instead is done in anticipation 
of increased future sales. The coefficients on MEET and MEETBEAT are both positive 
(MEET marginally so at p-values ≤ 0.10). This result is consistent with the notion that 
growth in sales will lead to growth in income. The coefficients on the interaction of 
MEET or MEETBEAT, with REMPROD are negative. This suggests that overproduction 
to meet earnings benchmarks is indicative of declines in future sales. The coefficients on 
the three-way interaction are not statistically different from zero. 
These results suggest that SGROWTH in conjunction with PROD provides 
positive information about future earnings during periods in which managers 
overproduce. This is a signal of operating efficiency. Therefore, an increase in sales 
coupled with an increase in production, are informative about managers expectations of 
future firm performance.  
Future Cost of Goods Sold 
With respect to my measures for cost-of-goods sold (ITO and ICOGS), the 
coefficients are significantly negative (p-values ≤ 0.01). The coefficients on the 
interaction of ICOGS and REMPROD are, however, positive (p-values ≤ 0.01). I 
interpret this as indicating that overproduction when the cost of production is increasing, 
may be a cost minimization strategy in that over-production in the current period delays 
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the impact of anticipated future cost increases. This strategy is, therefore, indicative of 
managers using internal information about the administration of the firm’s costs to 
maximize future performance. I conclude from these tests that over-production is not 
indicative of REM solely when it is coupled with earnings that meet or beat benchmarks. 
Rather it is indicative of REM when over-production and meet or beat, are coupled with 
declining sales growth.  
Return on Sales 
The coefficients on REMPROD when ROS is the dependent variable are, as I 
would expect, significantly positive (p-values ≤ 0.01), as are the coefficients on SGROW, 
MEET and MEETBEAT. As is the case for the FSGROW models, the coefficients on the 
interaction of MEET and MEETBEAT with REMPROD are significantly negative (p-
values ≤ 0.01). The coefficients on the three-way interaction of REMPROD, SGROW 
and MEET (MEETBEAT) are, however, significantly positive (p-values ≤ 0.05 and 0.10 
respectively). This indicates that when sales are growing, the incidence of over-
production and meeting earnings benchmarks may be indicative of improved future 
performance rather than REM. The coefficient on the interaction of REMPROD with 
ICOGS is significant at the p ≤ 0.05 level in the MEETBEAT model, but is not 
significantly different from zero in the MEET model. 
Summary 
In light of Vorst’s (2015) findings that particular incentives, and other factors 
such as reputation, violation of debt covenants and compensation contracts have long 
term consequences, this paper contributes by adding restructuring charges and sales 
growth as operating environment factors that capture distinctions between real earnings 
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management and decisions that are “just business.” The evidence suggests that 
restructuring charges accompanied by REM, are indicative of managerial efforts to 
improve the long-term profitability. Furthermore, I find that future sales growth is 
associated with changes in sales and overproduction, and that a departure from the 
normal levels of production coupled with positive growth in sales is evidence of mangers 
using resources more efficiently, not a signal of earnings management. In contrast, I find 
that overproduction coupled with a decrease in sales is indicative of earnings 
management. 
In summary, I test whether business activites that are indicative of REM, may 
instead be indicative of improved operating performance. I find that when I control for 
restructurings, reductions in discretionary expenses that would ordinarly be indicative of 
REM are instead associated with improved future ROA and secutity returns. I further find 
that when I control for future sales growth, overproduction is also associated with 
improved ROS as it is with future increases in cost of goods sold. Together, these results 
may explain the contradictory results presented in prior research with respect to the 
imapct of REM on future performance – that is, some of what has been identified as 
REM in prior studies may, in fact, be “just business.” 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. 0.25 Median 0.75 
ROA t+1 -0.03 0.30 -0.05 0.03 0.08 
ROA t+2 -0.03 0.28 -0.05 0.03 0.08 
ROA t+3 -0.03 0.28 -0.05 0.03 0.08 
RET t to t+1 0.01 0.15 -0.39 0.00 0.08 
RET t+1 to t+2 0.01 0.15 -0.38 0.01 0.08 
RET t+2 to t+3 0.02 0.15 -0.37 0.01 0.08 
FSGROW 0.02 0.52 -0.03 0.08 0.20 
ROS t+1 -0.08 0.31 -0.06 0.03 0.08 
REMDISC 0.08 0.41 -0.10 0.00 0.14 
RESTRUC 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SIZE 5.08 2.22 3.48 4.93 6.57 
BM 0.65 0.75 0.27 0.50 0.84 
REMPROD 0.00 0.27 -0.1 0.00 0.12 
MB 2.96 4.78 1.11 1.90 3.40 
INVTA 0.04 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.03 
ITO 16.29 39.27 3.00 5.01 10.31 
      
 n 
    MEET 4063 
    MEETBEAT 27690 
    RESTRUC 11073 
    SGROW 71276 
    ICOGS 52731 
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Table 2 Regressions of Abnormal Discretionary Expense on Return on Assets 
Panel A – MEET earnings benchmark 
 
 ROA t+1 ROA t+2 ROA t+3 
REMDISC -0.143*** -0.115*** -0.0932*** 
 (-59.19) (-46.74) (-35.25) 
    
RESTRUC -0.0372*** -0.0284*** -0.0241*** 
 (-11.62) (-8.66) (-6.74) 
    
REMDISC * RESTRUC 0.0394*** 0.0412*** 0.0187 
 (3.39) (3.41) (1.37) 
    
MEET -0.0116** -0.00540 -0.00439 
 (-2.56) (-1.19) (-0.91) 
    
REMDISC * MEET 0.183*** 0.157*** 0.136*** 
 (24.17) (20.78) (16.99) 
    
REMDISC * RESTRUC * MEET 0.0125 -0.00165 0.0100 
 (0.50) (-0.07) (0.37) 
    
SIZE 0.0350*** 0.0347*** 0.0342*** 
 (75.40) (75.37) (70.36) 
    
BM -0.00113 0.00121 0.00296** 
 (-0.90) (0.94) (2.14) 
    
_cons -0.298*** -0.232*** -0.229*** 
 (-24.44) (-12.95) (-12.18) 
    
N 95552 86180 77508 
adj. R2 0.139 0.132 0.117 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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Table 2 Continued 
Panel B – MEETBEAT earnings benchmark 
 
 ROA t+1 ROA t+2 ROA t+3 
REMDISC -0.140*** -0.111*** -0.0899*** 
 (-57.79) (-45.44) (-34.05) 
    
RESTRUC -0.0342*** -0.0254*** -0.0211*** 
 (-10.70) (-7.76) (-5.93) 
    
REMDISC * RESTRUC 0.0385*** 0.0396*** 0.0162 
 (3.32) (3.29) (1.19) 
    
MEETBEAT 0.0511*** 0.0476*** 0.0454*** 
 (24.90) (23.27) (21.00) 
    
REMDISC * MEETBEAT 0.180*** 0.154*** 0.134*** 
 (23.81) (20.47) (16.79) 
    
REMDISC * RESTRUC * MEETBEAT 0.0221 0.00814 0.0191 
 (0.89) (0.33) (0.71) 
    
SIZE 0.0326*** 0.0326*** 0.0321*** 
 (69.10) (69.53) (65.04) 
    
BM -0.00240* 0.0000572 0.00180 
 (-1.92) (0.04) (1.31) 
    
Cons -0.300*** -0.237*** -0.231*** 
 (-24.74) (-13.26) (-12.32) 
    
N 95552 86180 77508 
adj. R2 0.145 0.137 0.122 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3 Regressions of Abnormal Discretionary Expense on Annual Stock Returns  
Panel A – MEET earnings benchmark 
 
 RET t to t+1 RET t+1 to t+2 RET t+2 to t+3 
REMDISC -0.0077*** -0.0079*** 0.0062*** 
 (-6.59) (-6.28) (-4.64) 
    
RESTRUC -0.0030* -0.0010 0.0018 
 (-1.95) (-0.60) (1.06) 
    
REMDISC * RESTRUC 0.0143** 0.0189*** 0.0125* 
 (2.53) (3.00) (1.79) 
    
MEET 0.0011 -0.0029 0.0025 
 (0.52) (-1.32) (1.10) 
    
REMDISC * MEET 0.0077** 0.0037 0.0005 
 (2.18) (1.00) (0.14) 
    
REMDISC * RESTRUC * MEET -0.0125 0.0066 0.0081 
 (-1.08) (0.54) (0.64) 
    
SIZE 0.0059*** 0.0059*** 0.0055*** 
 (27.03) (25.87) (23.55) 
    
BM -0.0046*** 0.0017** 0.0015** 
 (-7.41) (2.49) (2.11) 
    
Cons -0.0065 -0.0170* -0.0264*** 
 (-0.78) (-1.71) (-4.34) 
    
N 86557 76126 67156 
adj. R2 0.044 0.047 0.046 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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Table 3 Continued 
Panel B – MEETBEAT earnings benchmark 
 
 RET t to t+1 RET t+1 to t+2 RET t+2 to t+3 
REMDISC -0.0074*** -0.0077*** -0.0059*** 
 (-6.29) (-6.09) (-4.47) 
    
RESTRUC -0.0028* -0.0009 0.0020 
 (-1.81) (-0.53) (1.15) 
    
REMDISC * RESTRUC 0.0141** 0.0187*** 0.0123* 
 (2.49) (2.98) (1.76) 
    
MEETBEAT 0.0041*** 0.0024** 0.0029*** 
 (4.30) (2.37) (2.84) 
    
DISEXP * MEETBEAT 0.0076** 0.0037 0.0005 
 (2.15) (1.02) (0.13) 
    
REMDISC * RESTRUC * MEETBEAT -0.0117 0.0072 0.0086 
 (-1.01) (0.59) (0.68) 
    
SIZE 0.0057*** 0.0058*** 0.0054*** 
 (25.79) (24.97) (22.71) 
    
BM -0.0047*** 0.0015** 0.0015** 
 (-7.55) (2.25) (2.14) 
    
Cons -0.0070 -0.0175* -0.0268*** 
 (-0.85) (-1.76) (-4.40) 
    
N 86557 76126 67156 
adj. R2 0.045 0.047 0.046 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4 Regression of Over-Production on Year-Ahead Sales Growth and Return on 
Sales 
 FSGROW FSGROW ROS t+1 ROS t+1 
REMPROD -0.0404** -0.0532*** 0.369*** 0.3904*** 
 (-2.56) (-3.19) (26.28) (25.48) 
     
SGROW 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.0950*** 0.0935*** 
 (32.36) (32.31) (30.71) (30.51) 
     
REMPROD * 
SGROW 
0.0637*** 0.0790*** -0.107*** -0.1018*** 
(4.10) (4.73) (-7.74) (-6.63) 
     
MEET 0.0125  0.0314***  
 (1.38)  (4.63)  
     
REMPROD * 
MEET 
-0.151**  -0.400***  
(-2.08)  (-6.84)  
REMPROD * 
SGROW * 
MEET 
    
0.0576  0.147**  
(0.66)  (2.11)  
    
MB 0.0042*** 0.0044*** -0.0085*** -0.0078*** 
 (11.86) (12.24) (-27.43) (-25.47) 
     
SIZE 0.0171*** 0.0154*** 0.0448*** 0.0401*** 
 (21.90) (19.15) (59.57) (52.94) 
     
ITO -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
 (-4.22) (-4.12) (-9.68) (-9.09) 
     
ICOGS -0.0134*** -0.0182*** -0.0150*** -0.0283*** 
 (-3.70) (-4.98) (-5.46) (-10.03) 
     
REMPROD * 
ICOGS 
0.0383*** 0.0420*** 0.00268 0.0228** 
(2.93) (3.19) (0.25) (2.10) 
     
MEETBEAT  0.0397***  0.1055*** 
  (9.49)  (34.22) 
     
REMPROD * 
MEETBEAT 
 0.0033  -0.2832*** 
 (0.10)  (-10.24) 
REMPROD * 
SGROW * 
MEETBEAT 
    
 -0.0397  0.0613* 
 (-1.11)  (1.95) 
    
INVTA   -0.3960*** -0.3868*** 
   (-22.63) (-22.28) 
     
cons -0.105*** -0.107*** -0.373*** -0.377*** 
 (-3.38) (-3.46) (-13.47) (-13.77) 
     
N 91222 91222 91222 91222 
adj. R2 0.039 0.040 0.169 0.184 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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